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Chapter 1 Introduction: Challenges of Police Reform in Post-Socialist  
   War-Torn Societies  
 
 
1.1 Police Reform in Ethno-Political Post-Conflict Situations 
 
The police components of international post-conflict peace-building missions, which deal 
with peace consolidation after the resolution of violent intra-state conflicts,1 are of increasing 
importance. A prime feature of intra-state conflicts is the challenging of the states’ “internal 
sovereignty”2 by domestic actors (sometimes supported by external ones), who call into ques-
tion the legitimacy of the state’s monopoly of force. If this monopoly is challenged and the 
state is no longer able to provide “security, law and a reasonable amount of order”3 for all citi-
zens, intra-state security dilemmas arise.4 If citizens or groups believe that potential rivals will 
not be restrained by state authority, they will take security into their own hands by arming 
themselves, thus initiating an “intra-state arms race”.  
 
In order to re-establish the state’s legitimate monopoly of force, which, according to 
Senghaas, is “of paramount importance for any modern peace order”5 and to secure a sustain-
able peace process, citizens must be disarmed, the parties to the conflict demobilized and 
demilitarized, and the armed forces reconstituted.6 In addition, it is particularly important to 
reform or even completely restructure the domestic police forces. After the international 
police have withdrawn, the (re-)established democratic police services7 must have both the 
ability and the will to prevent human rights violations, protect democratic institutions and 
resolutely fight corruption, organized crime and terrorism. The ability to provide public 
security for all population groups is a basic precondition for the socio-economic stabilization 
of crisis regions.8 
 
 
1.1.1 The Ethno-Political Dimension of Police Reform 
 
The establishment of ethnically mixed police forces within multi-ethnic societies in the after-
math of violent conflicts presents a particular challenge for police reforms. In an environment, 
which is characterized by ethnically motivated hatred and social mistrust, police forces must 
be constituted of members of all population groups. Otherwise the population or at least cer-
tain minority groups will have no confidence in the security forces and will either flee or rely 
on vigilantism. The intra-state security dilemma would then continue. However, the key ques-
tion, particularly in view of the high hopes implied in police mission mandates, is whether and 
to what extent it is possible to unite members of antagonistic ethnic communities in one and 
                                                 
1  For a definition of the concept of peacebuilding see Schneckener 2005: 19. 
2  Holsti 1996: 94. 
3  Ibid. 
4  For an excellent analysis of intra-state security dilemmas, see Kafir 2003: 53-76. 
5  Senghaas 2004: 28. In addition to the state monopoly of force, Senghaas mentions five other “essential 
conditions for the civilized – i.e. the non-violent – resolution of unavoidable conflicts in societies”: rule 
of law; affect control, democratic participation, social justice and equity, and constructive conflict 
management (pp. 28-31).  
6  Cf. Perthes 2000: 447. 
7  According to Call and Bayley, key characteristics of “democratic policing” are: civilian control of the 
police, police responsiveness to the needs of the population and the accountability of the police to mul-
tiple external audiences (cf. Call 2000: 9; Bayley 1985). 
8  Cf. McCartney/Fischer/Wils 2004: 5; Matthies 2004: 47-50; Ferdowsi/Matthies 2003: 33; Perthes 2000: 
447. 
 8
the same police force, and to develop a spirit of professionalism and comradeship within these 
multi-ethnic police units, without which effective co-operation is impossible.  
 
Moreover, the example of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown that parallel 
chains of command and loyalties based on membership in specific ethnic groups can persist in 
reformed police units, seriously undermining their performance.9 Separate agendas of the 
different ethnic components of the police can lead to openly arbitrary performance of police 
officers with respect to the members of other ethnic communities. A number of examples 
show how indigenous police officers have either acted inadequately or not at all when dealing 
with riot control or investigations concerning members of their own ethnic group. The reason 
for this failure is partially rooted in the open partisanship towards one’s own ethnic group. In 
addition, police officers are exposed to strong social pressure from their own ethnic groups. 
 
The creation of a multi-ethnic police service does not take place in a socio-political vacuum 
and its mere existence does not guarantee its acceptance by all ethnic groups. Even if the 
police behave appropriately and protect the rights of all citizens in an unbiased way, some 
ethnic groups may need more time to gain confidence. For this reason comprehensive and 
long-lasting confidence-building programmes such as “community policing”10 are necessary.     
 
The integration of members of ethnic minorities into the police is closely related to the reinte-
gration of former regular and irregular combatants. This can lead to a particular dilemma: 
Demobilization programmes are usually doomed to failure if former combatants are not given 
economic perspectives. In collapsed post-war economies, the integration of former comba-
tants into police and/or military forces often appears to be the only quick solution to this prob-
lem. However, if the incorporation of former combatants does not succeed, there is a serious 
risk of a sharp rise in organized crime, based on the close relationship between members of 
former armed units.11 Furthermore, acting according to the principles of the rule of law and 
democracy constitutes a great challenge for former combatants. Thus, their incorporation may 
hinder the functioning of multi-ethnic police units as well as their acceptance by the popu-
lation. 
 
Even if the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants proves to be successful, a 
sharp increase in (organized) crime is almost unavoidable in post-conflict societies with war-
shattered economies.12 In the fight against organized crime, the question for police reformers 
is whether to resort to existing experienced, but publicly discredited, police forces or to rely 
on the newly established police units that are trained to respect human rights, but are inexperi-
enced in fighting crime. The support of international police forces frequently makes no great 
difference, because they are usually not familiar with the local languages, culture, and police 
laws, let alone the local criminal structures.13 However, without success in fighting crime, the 
police will not gain trust among the population and this may worsen the security situation in 
general. 
 
 
 
                                                 
9  Cf. Stodiek 2004a: 210; Hansen 2003: 187. 
10  According to a definition by the OSCE, community policing aims at fostering the co-operation between 
the police and the population in identifying and resolving issues of concern to the citizens, e.g. problems 
of crime, social disorder or the “overall quality of life in the community” (OSCE 2003: 22). 
11  Cf. Perthes 2000: 447; Call/Stanley 2001: 154. 
12  Cf. O’Neill 2003: 154ff.  
13  Cf. Stodiek 2004b: 217; Call/Stanley 2001: 164. 
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1.1.2 Structural Deficiencies of Post-Socialist Police Forces 
 
Beyond the above-mentioned challenges to creating multi-ethnic police services, police 
reforms in the transformation societies of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe have been con-
fronted with particular structural deficiencies. These societies are characterized by an unfi-
nished process of modernization and development14 and exhibit hybrid forms of intellectual 
constructs that combine traditional and modern elements. The functional differentiation of the 
state is still incomplete. Although these states have undergone fundamental social change, 
cultural patterns, not congruent with the requirements of legal rational statehood, are still pre-
sent in the way actors behave. This contradiction has led to the creation of hybrid forms of 
governance, which combine political and economic power options, the insufficient division of 
public and private spheres, the paramount importance of personalized politics, and the break 
up of formal legal rules through the clientelistic law of reciprocity.15 Typical structural defi-
ciencies of transformation societies are the weak performance of democratic institutions, 
state-controlled economic structures, underdeveloped civil societies, a lack of political 
accountability and transparency as well as severe shortcomings in the rule of law.16 Concer-
ning the police, these shortcomings include aspects such as the over-centralization, politiciza-
tion and militarization of the police apparatus as well as records of human right abuses and 
endemic corruption. These structural deficiencies have posed additional obstacles to the cre-
ation of democratic police services in post-conflict settings. The particular structural deficien-
cies and dysfunctions of the post-Yugoslav police will be described in detail below (see 1.3). 
 
 
1.1.3 Resource Problems and the Question of Reform Ownership 
 
Alongside the ethno-political and structural obstacles, international police reform missions 
usually have to cope with substantial resource problems. Reform efforts have frequently suf-
fered from a severe lack of qualified personnel, lack of standardized curricula and textbooks, 
and a scarcity of material and financial resources for equipping international police instruc-
tors. This lack of resources has made the training of domestic police forces much more dif-
ficult. Moreover, local governments have also often been short of resources for providing 
their police officers with adequate equipment and pay.  
 
Last, but by no means least, local governments must have a sense of ownership if the reform 
process is to be successful. If governments and local administrative bodies do not fully 
support the reforms, they will not be sustainable.17 However, reforming the police is a very 
sensitive issue for every government, because it “touches the heart of a state’s sovereignty and 
its monopoly of coercive means”.18 Resistance to reform may, of course, not only come from 
the government, but also from within the police. Police forces show a tendency to adhere to 
traditional structures and assumptions that constrain reform options, particularly if these for-
ces used to enjoy privileges under authoritarian regimes, and sometimes they even formed a 
state within a state.19 It may therefore not always be easy for international organizations to get 
the support they need from their local counterparts. The best way to secure support from local 
governments is to involve them in the development of the reform process at every stage, 
                                                 
14  Cf. Matthies 1994: 11. 
15  Cf. Kößler 1994; Schlichte 2000; Schlichte/Wilke 2000. 
16  Cf. Ackermann 2001: 118; Lindholt 2003: 12f. 
17  Cf. Eide/Holm 2000: 5. 
18  Hansen 2003: 176. 
19  Cf. Wulf 2004: 14; Hänggi 2005: 124. 
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making them see the immediate benefits of training, and to offer them political incentives 
right up to the possibility of EU and NATO accession in the future.20  
 
Furthermore, the reform process must be perceived as legitimate by the local population, 
otherwise the international organizations’ efforts may be seen as assisting the coercive appa-
ratus of an illegitimate government. The public will become even more distrustful if this as-
sistance includes technical support such as riot-control or surveillance equipment. 
 
 
1.2 Objectives and Methodology of the Study 
 
The (re-)establishment and/or reform of multi-ethnic democratic police services have become 
an integral part of peace-building missions by the UN, the OSCE and the EU. In 2005, world-
wide 13 out of 17 post-conflict peace-building missions included a police component, tasked 
with creating, reforming and/or training local police forces.  
 
Following its first engagement in police monitoring in Croatia,21 the OSCE has become a key 
player in the field of training and reforming police forces in the Western Balkans: since June 
1999 in Kosovo, since May 2001 in the south Serbian Presevo valley, and since August 2001 
in Macedonia. While bearing the main responsibility for the basic training of local police offi-
cers and providing assistance to local authorities in reforming police services, the OSCE 
police components have co-operated with their counterparts from the UN (UNMIK in 
Kosovo) and the EU (EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia), as well as with a number of other 
international organizations, NGOs and bilateral state actors.  
 
The aim of this study is to compare the international police activities of the OSCE, UN and 
EU in Kosovo, South Serbia (Presevo valley) and Macedonia in order to analyse whether, and 
to what extent multi-ethnic police services can help to overcome the legacy of ethno-political 
conflicts, as well as to identify the structural deficiencies of post-socialist security sectors and 
to study the problems confronting the OSCE, UN and EU when they developed and imple-
mented their training and reform concepts.  
 
The findings of the study are based on the analysis of a number of documents and research 
reports published by international organizations and NGOs as well as on numerous oral inter-
views and a comprehensive written survey with local police officers and their instructors and 
monitors from the OSCE, the UN and the EU in Kosovo, South Serbia and Macedonia, which 
were carried out by the author between September 2003 and June 2005.  
 
 
1.2.1 The Written Survey 
 
The survey was conducted with representative samples of international police officers and 
local police officers belonging to (at least) the two largest ethnic groups in each mission area. 
Questionnaires were distributed at police academies and at police stations with multi-ethnic 
staff. Other criteria for the selection of police stations were that they be located in the biggest 
municipalities as well as in particular hot spots of inter-ethnic conflicts.  
 
                                                 
20  Cf. Hänggi 2005: 122; Lindholt/de Mesquita/Titus/Alemika 2003: 173 and 177. 
21  In October 1998, an OSCE Police Monitoring Group continued the police monitoring task of two prede-
cessor missions by the UN, which had initially established and trained a multi-ethnic police force in 
Croatia’s Eastern Slavonia region; see Stodiek, 2004a: 128-158.   
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Altogether, 1,016 questionnaires were distributed, of which 692 were returned. This corres-
ponds to a return rate of 68.1 per cent. In Kosovo, questionnaires were distributed to 130 
police cadets at the Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS) in Vucitrn, to 250 officers of the 
Kosovo Police Service (KPS), to 50 OSCE police instructors and to 100 UNMIK police offi-
cers, including field trainers, station commanders, shift leaders and patrol officers, herein after 
referred to as UNMIK police monitors. In Macedonia, questionnaires were given to 100 
police cadets, 150 local police officers, six OSCE police instructors, and 50 EUPOL Proxima 
police monitors (including co-locators at stations, monitors and advisors). In South Serbia the 
sample comprised 150 local police officers as well as 30 former OSCE instructors. Table 1 
shows the distribution of returned questionnaires with respect to the different samples. 
 
Table 1:  Returned Questionnaires and Return Rates 
 Kosovo Macedonia South Serbia 
Cadets 61 = 47% 
Ethnicity: 
                52 Albanians 
                  6 Serbs  
                  3 “Others” 
97 = 97% 
Ethnicity: 
               53 Albanians 
               43 Macedonians 
                 1 “Others”  
-∗ 
Local Police Officers 178 = 71.2% 
Ethnicity: 
                83 Albanians 
                68 Serbs  
                27 “Others” 
102 = 68% 
Ethnicity: 
               54 Albanians  
               38 Macedonians 
               10 “Others” 
126 = 84% 
Ethnicity: 
          80 Albanians 
          46 Serbs 
Internat. Instructors 30 = 60% 6 = 100% 5 = 17% 
Internat. Monitors 54 = 54% 33 = 66% -∗∗ 
 
The small number of questionnaires returned by OSCE instructors in Macedonia and Serbia 
results from the fact that, at the time of the survey, only six instructors were present in 
Macedonia, and that, of the 30 former OSCE instructors in Serbia (training ended in May 
2002), who were contacted in October 2004, only five were able or willing to participate in an 
online survey. Since this small number of responses is unsuitable for a statistical evaluation, 
they have not been taken into consideration for quantitative assessments. However, since a 
number of OSCE representatives were interviewed in Belgrade and Bujanovac (Presevo 
valley), the qualitative tendencies of their responses were taken into account for the South 
Serbia case. This procedure was even more appropriate for the Macedonia case study, since 
the (small) sample of OSCE instructors there was fully covered.  
 
In addition to the standardized written surveys, more than 100 semi-structured oral interviews 
were conducted with police station commanders in all three mission areas, members of the 
KPS Counselling and Support Teams (KPS-CAST) in Kosovo, responsible for the psycho-
social care of KPS officers, senior representatives of all missions, representatives of the 
ministries of the interior (Macedonia and Serbia), and a number of human rights NGOs.22 
                                                 
∗  At the time of the survey, the basic academy training for officers of the Multi-Ethnic Police Element 
(MEPE) had been completed, so that there were no cadets to be interviewed. 
∗∗  At the time of the survey, there were only two OSCE police monitors left in South Serbia. They were 
interviewed orally. 
 
22   Because of the riots in March 2004, the reconciliation process between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo 
suffered a heavy setback. Investigations were conducted against ethnic Albanian officers accused of 
severe misconduct; ethnic Serbian officers were dismissed because they adamantly refused to further co-
operate with their Albanian colleagues. Since the local police were also affected, the assumption was that 
the findings of the September 2003 survey regarding the inter-ethnic climate in the KPS might no longer 
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The following map shows the police stations in the three mission areas visited during the field 
research. 
 
   Map: Police stations visited 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
be valid. Therefore, a number of additional interviews were carried out with senior representatives of 
UNMIK police and the OSCE-led KPSS in March 2005. 
Map modified by CORE  
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1.2.2 Research Questions and Variables of Analysis 
 
The three central research questions of this study are: 
• To what extent was it possible for multi-ethnic police forces to be established in the 
post-war societies of the Western Balkans? 
• To what degree have the populations gained confidence in them? 
• Which factors explain the success or failure in establishing multi-ethnic police services? 
 
To answer these questions, two dependent variables were introduced: “status of the creation 
and integration of multi-ethnic police units” and “degree of acceptance of the multi-ethnic 
police in the population”. The dependent variable, “status of the creation and integration of 
multi-ethnic police units”, is operationalized on the basis of the proportion of members of 
ethnic minorities in the multi-ethnic police, the inter-ethnic social climate within the police, 
the integration of the multi-ethnic police elements within the general police structure as well 
as the general performance of the multi-ethnic police forces in the three mission areas. The 
second dependent variable, “degree of acceptance of the multi-ethnic police in the popula-
tion”, is operationalized on the basis of surveys of citizens’ perceptions of the police and the 
degree of citizens’ co-operation with the police, and with the help of the self-perception of 
local police officers with respect to their acceptance in the population.  
 
The results of the dependent variables will be explained on the basis of the independent vari-
ables “ethno-political conflict constellation” and “structural aspects of the police apparatus”, 
as well as with the help of the intervening variable “impact of international actors on the pro-
cess of police reform”.  
 
The independent variable “ethno-political conflict constellation” will be operationalized on 
the basis of the conflict intensity in the three cases, e.g. the number of casualties, refugees and 
displaced persons, as well as the violent actions of the security forces and rebel movements 
(see 1.4). The independent variable “structural aspects of the police apparatus” is operationa-
lized on the basis of the recruitment situation with a special view to the inclusion of former 
combatants and members of political parties, the achieved level of general education and 
police training of the police cadets and officers, and the structural deficiencies of the legal 
systems of the countries concerned in terms of the politicization and centralization of the 
police, the level of corruption, the quality of the legal foundations of police work, and the 
availability of material resources (see 1.3). This discussion of the entire legal system is neces-
sary, because its effectiveness is a prerequisite for the effectiveness of the police in providing 
order and security. If legal and judicial reform lags behind police reform, a feeling of impun-
ity among the population and one of frustration and cynicism among police officers might de-
velop, leading to improper behaviour or vigilantism.23 
 
 
1.2.3 Problems in Evaluating the Results of Police Reform  
 
While it is rather easy to evaluate the quantitative criteria of police reform − the numbers of 
police officers recruited, trained and integrated − it is much more difficult to evaluate the 
qualitative criteria, particularly the levels of police performance.24 For the qualitative evalu-
ation of police performance, a comprehensive set of direct and indirect indicators has to be 
                                                 
23  See for example Call/Stanley 2001: 168. 
24  For a general discussion of the difficulties of defining the success of reforms see German/Chalmers 2005: 
299-308. 
 14
analysed. Direct performance indicators include crime statistics, clear-up rates for crimes, as 
well as assessments by international police monitors and human rights NGOs covering 
aspects such as the record of human rights abuses or police corruption. Indirect indicators 
include the public perception of the police, the personal feeling of security within the popula-
tion, the scale of illegal distribution of small arms among the population as well as the level of 
co-operation between the public and the police.25 In view of the specific reform task of cre-
ating multi-ethnic police units, the inter-ethnic climate within the police units and at the police 
academies represents an additional performance factor. Except for clear-up rates, which were 
not consistently available for all three cases studies, all other indicators are analysed in the 
case studies.  
 
 
1.3  Structural Deficiencies within the Police System: The Yugoslav Legacy  
 
In pre-war Yugoslavia, as in other communist states, police forces were dysfunctional in the 
sense that they served the state, meaning the ruling party, rather than the public. Throughout 
the Balkans, the popular perception emerged, particularly among ethnic minorities, that the 
police were biased in favour of certain ethnic and/or political groups.26 During the Milosevic 
era, ethnic minorities such as the Albanians in Kosovo, Muslims in Sandzak, Roma through-
out Serbia, but also other minorities such as homosexuals suffered from police discrimination, 
unlawful arrests and ill-treatment. However, not only minorities, but also citizens opposing 
the Milosevic regime, faced excessive use of force by the police, as did journalists who 
covered such incidents.27 With respect to the recruitment and promotion of police officers, 
their loyalty to the regime was more important than their professionalism. Their prime task 
was not to investigate and solve criminal cases, but to demonstrate power and to vigorously 
enforce public order.28 In the early 1990s, the Serbian police was restructured, and many refu-
gees from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were integrated into the police. Although they 
were well paid, they did not receive Serbian citizenship. As any regime change would have 
threatened their position, they were very loyal to the government and regarded the opposition 
as an enemy.29 The criminal police dealt rather with opposition against the state than with 
criminal acts involving citizens.30  
 
Due to the economic decline during the last phase of the Tito regime, corruption within the 
police increased. However, the criminalization of the police, from the lower ranks to the top 
leadership, reached its climax in the 1990s during the Milosevic era. Corruption within the 
police became the norm. The negative consequences of the state-directed command economy 
had already led to a growing black market in the 1970s and 1980s, on which not only citizens 
but also companies relied. The rise of the black market went hand in hand with the increase in 
corruption of those state officials ostensibly tasked with fighting it. The acceptance of bribes 
gave these officers the opportunity to improve their living standard despite the general econo-
mic decline. Another source of additional “income” was pocketing road traffic fines. In order 
to become promoted to such lucrative positions, police officers had to bribe their superiors. 
Secret service and customs officers also profited from the illegal import of high-tech products 
from Western countries.31 
                                                 
25  See Boeden 1988: 67. 
26  Cf. OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 2001e: 15; Caparini/Day 2002: 6; Hansen 2003: 
177f.; Babovic 2003: 53 and 59; Caparini 2004: 256. 
27  Cf. Human Rights Watch 1999 and 1997. 
28  Cf. Caparini/Day 2002: 6f. 
29  Cf. International Crisis Group 2000b: 8. 
30  Cf. Caparini/Day 2002: 6f. 
31  Cf. Center for the Study of Democracy 2004: 41f. and 48; Transparency International Serbia 2001: 63. 
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Corruption increased in the same way as the state economy declined, due in part as well to the 
UN economic sanctions over the course of the Balkan wars.32 A governmental distribution 
system based on licenses had to be established for scarce commodities.33 The state and the 
leading party had enormous influence on the economy. Furthermore, state authorities issued 
vouchers for special goods for the friends of the regime. With the beginning of the UN embar-
go, the smuggling of weapons, oil, foreign currencies, drugs, cigarettes, alcohol and food lite-
rally exploded. The margins of profit allowed for bribing customs and police officers. Police 
escorts for transports of illicit goods were common practice.34 In some cases, police officers 
even participated in trafficking in heroin.35 
 
Milosevic had already laid the foundations for the interconnectedness between politics, police 
and organized crime in the early 1990s. In 1991, he replaced the whole staff of the secret ser-
vice with people of his choice.36 The connection between police and organized crime was 
most obvious on the payrolls of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior that contained a number 
of well-known figures in the underworld.37 The regime used small-timers and major criminals 
for its dirty purposes.38 Secret service and police officers co-operated with crime bosses in 
assassinating defectors or politicians who represented an obstacle for Mr Milosevic. Starting 
in 1991, more than 150 unsolved murders of that kind took place, including more than 60 of 
Yugoslav émigrés residing predominantly in Western Europe. Alleged criminals often carried 
police identification. According to the “Center for the Study of Democracy”, the systematic 
employment of criminals was initiated by the later chief of the uniformed police and vice-
minister of the interior, Radovan Stojicic.39 The most prominent crime figures handling extra-
legal deeds on orders of the police or the state security were Zeljko Raznatovic and Jovica 
Stanisic, also known as “Arkan” and “Giska” respectively.40  
 
Arkan and Giska, did not act only in secret, but earned an infamous reputation for the atroci-
ties they and their paramilitary units committed among the non-Serb communities in Croatia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo during the Balkan wars of the 1990s.41 It was not only 
their units that committed war crimes, but also some special police units that were militarized 
by Milosevic with equipment and infrastructure. These paramilitary police units have been 
accused of carrying out many more war crimes than the armed forces themselves.42    
 
In Macedonia, the structural deficiencies mentioned above more or less survived the country’s 
peaceful secession from Yugoslavia. The police were as politicized and centralized as in 
Serbia, and violated the human rights of citizens to the same extent. Rather than ethnicity, the 
common characteristic of victims was usually their “oppositional political activity or low 
social-economic status”.43 Individuals were sometimes arrested without a warrant and beaten 
until they confessed to a crime. Corruption was as endemic as in Serbia and, due to the inter-
national sanctions against Yugoslavia and the simultaneous Greek economic embargo against 
                                                 
32  Cf. OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 2001e: 13 and 15; Caparini/Day 2002: 6; 
Mappes-Niediek 2003: 53. 
33  Cf. Mappes-Niediek 2003: 45f. 
34  Cf. Center for the Study of Democracy 2004: 48; Mappes-Niediek 2003: 30f. and 53. 
35   Cf. OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 2001e: 13; Caparini/Day 2002: 6. 
36  Cf. International Crisis Group 2000b: 7. 
37  Cf. Center for the Study of Democracy 2004: 49. 
38  Cf. Caparini/Day 2002: 7f.; Mappes-Niediek 2003: 37f. 
39  Cf. Mappes-Niediek 2003: 41f. 
40  Cf. Mappes-Niediek 2003: 30f.; Center for the Study of Democracy 2004: 42. 
41  Cf. Mappes-Niediek 2003: 30f. 
42  Cf. OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 2001e: 15; Caparini/Day 2002: 6; Hansen 2003: 
178; Mani 2000: 11; Amnesty International 1999; Human Rights Watch 1999. 
43  Human Rights Watch 1998: 1. 
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Macedonia in the course of the dispute over Macedonia’s official name, smuggling also 
exploded in Macedonia leading to an interconnectedness between police, politics and orga-
nized crime similar to that in Serbia. 
 
Similar to the situation in Serbia, parts of the Macedonian police were also militarized; the 
difference between the military and the police became blurred in terms of competencies, 
weaponry and structures. Both institutions became closely associated as the government 
turned to the military to shore up the police’s capacity to maintain internal power with coer-
cive means, particularly during the violent conflict in 2001.44 In addition to the already exis-
ting special police task force, the “Tigers” and units of police reservists, used in fighting the 
UCK rebels, the then Macedonian minister of the interior, Ljube Boskovski, created his own 
paramilitary police unit, the “Lions”, in 2001. This unit, acting under Boskovski’s direct com-
mand, acquired a notorious reputation for its intimidating and violent behaviour against the 
Albanian population,45 culminating in the brutal police raid on the Albanian village of 
Ljuboten on 12 August 2001, just one day before the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agree-
ment. The army first shelled the village. After the “Lions” had entered the village, houses 
were blown up, detained civilians severely beaten and shot, and ten villagers killed. 
Boskovski himself and a commanding officer of the Lions were indicted by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in this context for violating the laws or customs 
of war.46 While this incident seems to be the only case of police involvement in war crimes, 
the Albanian population, nevertheless, still has no trust in any of the Macedonian special 
police forces. 
 
 
1.4 The Legacies of Ethno-Political Violent Conflict 
 
The three cases significantly differ in terms of the level of violence during the conflict peri-
ods. In Kosovo, the level of violence was by far the highest. Serbian security forces and the 
paramilitary gangs of Arkan and others used brutal force against the Albanian population both 
before, and in particular, during the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia, and committed 
atrocities and large scale acts of “ethnic cleansing”. On the other hand, members of the 
Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves/UCK) and ethnic Albanian 
civilians committed revenge killings and acts of “ethnic cleansing” as well. This time, Serbian 
civilians became the victims. The number of Albanians killed by Serbs is estimated at about 
10,000.47 Between June and November 1999, Albanians killed more than 200 Serbs. While 
approximately 860,000 Albanians were internally displaced or had fled from Kosovo by June 
1999,48 about 150,000 Serbs and members of other minorities fled to Serbia proper after July 
1999.49  
 
In the south Serbian Presevo valley, the structure of the conflict was similar to that in Kosovo. 
However, the level of violence was significantly lower. The municipalities of the Presevo 
valley – many of which were inhabited by an ethnic Albanian majority – had been neglected 
economically by the Belgrade government for years. The authorities discriminated against the 
Albanian population. The attacks of the Albanian Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and 
Bujanovac (Ushtria Clirimtare e Presheves Medvexhes dhe Bujanovicit/UCPMB) on Serbian 
                                                 
44  Cf. Hansen 2003: 178. 
45  Cf. Ordanoski 2001; Matveeva/Hiscock/Paes/Risser 2003: 22f. 
46  Cf. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 2004. 
47  Cf. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2000: 32.  
48  Cf International Crisis Group 2000a: 2. 
49  Cf. Human Rights Watch 2001. 
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security forces after January 2000 provoked massive retaliation by the police and the 
military.50 The new political constellation after the fall of Milosevic in October 2000, as well 
as the desire of NATO not to see a new violent conflict develop within the Ground Safety 
Zone between Kosovo and Serbia proper, paved the way for a stop to the fighting long before 
a level of violence similar to that in Kosovo had been reached. According to the International 
Crisis Group, about 100 people were killed during the fights between the UCPMB and the 
security forces; and 12,500 Albanians fled to Kosovo.51  
 
In Macedonia, the level of violence was comparable to that of South Serbia. Fighting between 
the Albanian National Liberation Army (Ushtria Clirimtare Kombetare/UCK) and the 
Macedonian security forces, starting in January 2001, caused about 100 casualties with a very 
small death toll among civilians.52 Because the peace agreement of August 2001 was reached 
rather quickly, the number of displaced persons was also rather low compared to Kosovo. 
About 108,000 Albanians and 40,000 ethnic Macedonians fled from the North-Western 
Macedonian crisis region.53 
 
Because of the much lower level of violence in South Serbia and Macedonia, we assume that 
the level of inter-ethnic hatred there is considerably lower than in Kosovo and that therefore 
the chances for the creation of multi-ethnic police services as well as for their acceptance in 
the population are significantly better. However, the hard line taken by anti-terror police units 
against the ethnic Albanian population in South Serbia and Macedonia has undoubtedly 
deepened the mistrust against these units, which are still composed solely of ethnic 
Macedonian and Serbian officers today. 
 
The next three chapters cover the case studies on police reform in Kosovo, South Serbia and 
Macedonia. Each case study provides a comprehensive analysis of the mission mandate, the 
reform activities implemented as well as the results achieved. In chapter 5, the conclusions of 
the three cases are compared and summarized, interrelating the values of the independent, 
intervening and dependent variables. Based on the study’s findings, recommendations are 
given with respect to the enhancement of the effectiveness of police training and reform 
missions.    
                                                 
50  Cf. International Crisis Group 2001: 2. 
51   Cf. International Crisis Group 2003: 1. 
52  Cf. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung 2004. 
53  Cf. UNHCR 2001. 
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Chapter 2 Kosovo 
 
 
After the complete withdrawal of the Serbian security forces from Kosovo within the frame-
work of the “Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force and the 
Governments of the Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia”, which marked the 
end of the Kosovo war in June 1999,54 the incoming NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) and 
the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) were confronted 
with a dangerous security vacuum. Anarchy was spreading throughout this crisis-stricken pro-
vince. 
 
 
2.1 Mandate  
 
In an attempt to cope with this situation, UN Secretary-General Annan formulated two main 
goals for UNMIK’s law enforcement strategy: the ‘provision of interim law enforcement ser-
vices and the rapid development of a credible, professional and impartial Kosovo Police 
Service’ (KPS).55 As soon as a credible national police force had been established, law 
enforcement authority was to be gradually transferred from UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) 
to the KPS.56 UNCIVPOL was responsible for law enforcement and the field training of the 
new KPS officers, while OSCE police instructors were supposed to provide the basic KPS 
training at the Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS),57 run by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo 
(OMIK). Originally, a UNCIVPOL contingent of 3,10058 and 150 OSCE police instructors59 
were designated for accomplishing these tasks. 
 
Initially, the creation of a KPS contingent of 3,000 police officers was envisaged.60 The com-
position was to be multi-ethnic, with at least nine per cent Serbian officers and seven per cent 
of officers belonging to other minorities. 20 per cent of the officers were to be women.61 
Police cadets were supposed to undergo five weeks of basic training at the police academy in 
Vucitrn, followed by 19 weeks of field training with UNMIK police officers, and an addi-
tional 80 hours of advanced classroom training provided by OMIK at the KPSS, before they 
were eligible for certification and independent assignment.62 The tentative start date for train-
ing was 30 August 1999.63  
 
 
2.2 Building up the Kosovo Police Service 
 
Building up the KPS consisted of three successive core steps: recruitment (see 2.2.1), acade-
my training (see 2.2.2), and field training (see 2.2.3). On this basis, the confidence of all eth-
nic communities of the local population was to be gained (see 2.2.4), and a number of reform 
                                                 
54  Cf. NATO 1999a. 
55  UNMIK 2003a: 5. 
56  For a detailed description of UNMIK’s and KFOR`s mandates see United Nations Security Council 1999; 
and Stodiek 2004a: 261-265. 
57  Cf. Unites Nations Security Council 1999; UNMIK 2003a: 5; OSCE Permanent Council 1999: 1. 
58  The CIVPOL contingent was later expanded to 4.700 officers.   
59  Cf. UNMIK 1999: 6; OSCE 1999: 2. 
60  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 1999b. 
61  Cf. UNMIK 2003a:  9. 
62  Cf. UNMIK 2000: 2f.; OSCE Mission in Kosovo 1999a; OSCE Mission in Kosovo 1999b. 
63  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 1999b. 
 19
obstacles inherited from both Yugoslavia’s socialist and Milosevic eras needed to be tackled 
(see 2.2.5). 
 
 
2.2.1 Recruitment 
 
In order to be recruited, KPS candidates had to meet the following minimum qualifications:64  
• Aged between 21 and 55 years; 
• have completed a high school education; 
• ability to read, write and understand the Albanian and Serbian languages; 
• demonstrate willingness to work with all ethnic groups; 
• demonstrate willingness to follow the rule of law and protect the human rights of all 
people, regardless of ethnicity, and to be intolerant of ethnic violence; 
• have sufficient intellect, stability and strength of character to learn, apply and reinforce 
law enforcement techniques in the context of principles of democratic and community-
oriented policing and internationally recognized human rights standards; 
• be able to read, analyse and apply laws relevant to the Kosovo Police Service organiza-
tion, management, operations and problem solution; 
• absence of physical or mental disabilities that would preclude the performance of the 
previously listed essential functions; 
• no substantiated history of war crimes or criminal conduct (excluding minor traffic vio-
lations, juvenile offences or political crimes) and capable of operating a motor vehicle 
legally. 
 
By the beginning of the first training course on 7 September 1999, over 19,500 candidates had 
applied for a job in the KPS. It was often very difficult for the UNMIK recruitment officers to 
conduct the necessary background checks on the candidates, as most official documentation 
had been destroyed or had disappeared during the war. Therefore, the recruitment officers 
often had to rely on information provided by relatives and neighbours.  
 
Out of the first 400 candidates, who were selected for the first two classes, 80 per cent were 
Albanians, 13 per cent Serbs, and seven per cent belonged to other minorities. 20 per cent of 
the Albanian applicants had already served in the Serbian police65 until March 1989, when 
Milosevic revoked autonomous status for Kosovo, and Albanians were released from the 
police. The fact that only three of the first 200 cadets were members of the UCK led to mas-
sive protests by the UCK leadership, which demanded stronger representation for its members 
in the police in compliance with the demilitarization agreement with KFOR of June 1999.66 
The UCK finally succeeded in having its demand met. At least 40 per cent of the following 
classes were former UCK members.67 By the end of 2004, a total of 6,900 cadets had been 
recruited.68 UNMIK expanded the size of the future KPS several times after 1999, from the 
original 3,100 to 7,500, a number to be achieved by December 2005.69 The ethnic composi-
tion of the KPS was as follows: 84 per cent Albanians, ten per cent Serbs and six per cent 
other minorities (e.g. Bosniaks, Turks, Roma, Ashkali and Gorani). 16 per cent of the officers 
                                                 
64  Cf. UNMIK 2000: 3. 
65  Cf. United Nations News Service 1999. 
66  Cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 August 1999; NATO 1999b; NATO 1999c. 
67   Cf. Bennett 2001a: 8. 
68  Cf. OSCE 2004b. 
69  Cf. OSCE 2004b. 
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were women,70 a figure that is clearly higher than the average figure of ten per cent for female 
officers in Western European police forces.71  
 
With respect to the recruitment process, international police instructors and monitors often 
complained in interviews with the author about the poor quality of KPS applicants, who, 
nevertheless, were accepted. They were particularly critical of the fact that the maximum age 
of 55 years for applicants was tolerated, and of the lack of reading and writing skills of many 
applicants. A number of UNMIK officers also complained about insufficient background 
checks on criminal records of applicants and demanded a stronger involvement of KPS offi-
cers in these procedures, because they were more familiar with the local population. Due to 
the difficulties in obtaining viable information on applicants, additional screening during the 
training period or in the course of promotion procedures led to the release of a number of KPS 
officers for having given wrong information about their educational level or because of their 
criminal background.72 
 
Concerning the co-operation between UNMIK and OMIK in the recruiting process, percep-
tions differed between the members of the respective organizations. OMIK instructors often 
demanded more involvement in the recruiting process. 11.1 per cent considered co-operation 
with UNMIK, in this respect, only as fair; three times as many (33.3 per cent) considered it to 
be bad; while 44.4 per cent said it was good; and only 3.7 per cent reported that it was 
excellent (see annex 2, chart A.1). By contrast, UNMIK officers, who carried the main 
responsibility for recruiting, rated the co-operation with OMIK much better. Only 6.1 per cent 
of them called it bad with respect to recruiting (cf. chart A.1). 
 
 
2.2.2  Academy Training  
 
Initially, basic training was to last for five weeks. The first training curriculum included 
lessons on crime investigation, defense tactics, democratic policing including observance of 
human rights, legal affairs, police patrol duties, use of firearms, police skills, first aid, conflict 
intervention and handling of refugees, forensics and evidence, as well as traffic control.73 In 
June 2001, driver’s training was also introduced at the KPSS, because more than 50 per cent 
of KPS officers did not possess a driver’s licence.74  
 
When it became obvious that the training period was too short to teach the content of the 
courses thoroughly, academy training was extended, first from five to nine weeks in the year 
2000, and then to twelve weeks in 2001.75 Since the lessons taught by international trainers 
had to be translated into Albanian and Serbian, the actual teaching time was reduced by about 
two-thirds, which exacerbated the problem. Another revision of the training curriculum in 
2003 finally led to the extension of academy training to 20 weeks, starting in January 2004.76 
Since the loss of teaching time (due to the necessary translations of English instruction given 
by international trainers) had also been significantly reduced by the introduction of local KPS 
trainers (see below), the timeframe for effective teaching the academy training seems to be 
sufficient now. One year after the start of the first course, about 2,000 cadets had graduated 
                                                 
70  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2004c: 1 and 3. 
71  Cf. Peake2004: 17. 
72  Interviews with UNMIK police representatives, Kosovo, September 2003. 
73  Cf. UNMIK 2000: 2f. 
74  CF. OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Department of Education and Development 2003a: 10. 
75  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2001a. 
76  Cf. OSCE 2004a. 
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from the police academy.77 In September 2001, this number had doubled to more than 
4,100.78 By the end of 2004, more than 6,900 cadets had graduated from the KPSS.79 
 
Specialized training. After a significant number of KPS cadets had finished their basic 
training in 2000, supervisory and specialist-training courses were introduced in anticipation of 
the hand-over strategy from UNMIK police to the KPS. One of the first special training cour-
ses was a four-week Criminal Investigation Course with 20 participants in February 2001.80 
By February 2003, a total of 351 KPS officers had completed the course.81 In November 
2003, the KPSS started with a three-week advanced training course in Special Weapons and 
Tactics (SWAT), hostage negotiations, and investigations in arson cases in order to provide a 
selected group of KPS officers with the specific skills for conducting tactical operations, 
thereby supporting the efforts of and relieving UNMIK police officers. Later on, some of 
these courses were given by other organizations on a bilateral level, co-ordinated by the 
KPSS.82 
 
In addition, the KPSS offered training to 100 officers to become members of Close Protection 
Units (CPUs) and to several hundred officers to be part of Special Police Units (SPUs). Initi-
ally, the establishment of three SPUs, capable of conducting riot-control tasks, was planned. 
The first two SPUs completed their training by the end of 2003, but due to the lack of equip-
ment,83 they were not ready when riots broke out in March 2004 (see 2.3.2.1). When it 
became obvious how important the availability of local SPUs was for the maintenance of 
security and order, UNMIK quickly decided to equip and retrain the existing SPUs as well as 
enlarge the KPS SPU component to five units by June 2006. In addition, in all five regions of 
Kosovo so-called Regional Operation Support Units (ROSUs) were established. These special 
police units, each consisting of 40 officers, received special training, based on a Danish train-
ing module, and were equipped with state of the art equipment to ensure that they would be 
capable of effectively conducting riot control as well as other special operations such as sear-
ches.84    
 
Other specialist training courses provided at the KPSS after 2001 included Traffic Accident 
Investigation Courses and Emergency Response Driving Courses,85 as well as courses for bor-
der police and correction service officers (see 2.2.5).86 In 2001, the KPSS also started re-certi-
fication courses for KPS officers, who were already on duty. These courses concentrated on 
refreshing skills in the fields of firearms, defensive tactics, first aid and drug identification.87 
By the end of 2003, more than 4,500 KPS officers had participated in 49 of those courses.88 
 
Supervision and management courses. In July 2000, the first 17 candidates began their 
twelve-day supervisor training at the academy.89 By February 2003, a total of 347 officers had 
                                                 
77  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2000. 
78  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2001a.  
79  Cf. OSCE 2004b. 
80  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2001b: 2. 
81  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2003b: 2. 
82  Cf. OSCE 2003d; OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2004c: 3. 
83  Cf. UNMIK 2003a: 11. 
84  Cf. UNMIK 2003a: 11; United Nations Security Council 2004d: 11; interviews with UNMIK police re-
presentatives, Prishtina, March 2005. 
85  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2002a: 2. 
86  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2004c: 3. 
87  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2001b: 2. 
88  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2003b: 2. 
89  Cf. UNMIK 2000: 3. 
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graduated from the First Line Supervisory Courses.90 In 2001, a Senior Management Course 
started for 32 officers, the first of whom was promoted to the rank of colonel in June 2001. 
Six further officers were promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel in August 2001.91 In 
January 2002, the first Middle Management Course started for KPS officers; in July 2002, a 
total of 22 graduated. After six more months of field training, they could apply for the rank of 
captain to become a station commander or deputy station commander. Altogether, by the end 
of 2004, UNMIK had promoted one KPS officer to the rank of colonel, nine to lieutenant 
colonels, nine to majors, 32 to captains, 153 to lieutenants and 333 to sergeants. 
 
National trainers. Starting in December 2001, 15 national KPS trainers began co-teaching 
courses with some of their 181 international colleagues from 23 countries92 in general poli-
cing, firearms instruction, defensive tactics and staff development.93 In April 2002, a first 
Human Rights Awareness training for KPS instructors was started to prepare them to conduct 
future human rights training for KPS officers on their own.94 By the end of 2001, one hundred 
sixty KPS officers had completed the twelve-week Trainer Certification Program.95 By April 
2003, fifty-five local instructors had co-taught classes with 89 international trainers.96 By 
September 2004, local police instructors had outnumbered the international instructors 80 to 
60. In 2002, OMIK also started training local Field Training Officers (FTOs). By the end of 
2003, all new KPS cadets, who graduated from the academy, were mentored by 800 local 
FTOs.97 By May 2005, the transition of police training from OMIK to KPS staff had made 
considerable progress: 80 per cent of instructor posts, 90 per cent of technical and support and 
68 per cent of management positions were filled by local staff.98   
 
2.2.2.1 Evaluation of Training by KPS Cadets 
 
In general, the OSCE basic academy training received good ratings from KPS cadets and offi-
cers. While the cadets of September 2003 almost enthusiastically rated the basic training − the 
vast majority being satisfied or extremely satisfied with basic training (72.5 per cent) −, for-
mer cadets were somewhat more critical, yet still the majority very satisfied or extremely 
satisfied with the training (56.2 per cent). 27.6 per cent of the cadets of September 2003 and 
38.3 per cent of former cadets stated that they were fairly satisfied. While no one of the 
September 2003 cadets gave negative statements regarding the basic training, a small 
percentage of former cadets (4.9 per cent) were more or less dissatisfied with the basic 
training (cf. chart A.2). In general, KPS cadets and officers did not believe there were any 
subjects missing in the basic training. The only aspect criticized by a number of them was the 
amount of practical training, which, according to them, needed to be expanded. 
 
With respect to the performance of the OSCE instructors at the KPSS, assessments by cadets 
and former cadets differed considerably. While the vast majority of KPSS cadets in 2003 were 
very, or even extremely satisfied (26.2 / 42.6 per cent) with the OSCE instructors, former 
cadets were more critical in hindsight, with 37.9 per cent stating they were very satisfied; but 
only 12.1 per cent stated that they were extremely satisfied. However, the relative majority 
(45.4 per cent) of former cadets were only fairly satisfied with the OSCE instructors, while 
                                                 
90  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2003b: 2. 
91  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2002a: 2; OSCE 2002b. 
92  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2002a: 3. 
93  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2002b. 
94  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2002c: 1. 
95  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2002a: 3. 
96  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2003b: 3; OSCE 2003a. 
97  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2003b: 2. 
98  Cf. United Nations Security Council 2005: 9f. 
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only 27.9 per cent of the KPSS cadets, who had finished their training in September 2003, 
gave their instructors such mediocre ratings. 1.6 per cent of the cadets of September 2003, and 
2.9 per cent of former cadets were more or less dissatisfied with the OSCE instructors (cf. 
chart A.3). It is interesting to note that OSCE instructors received their best ratings for their 
readiness to solve ethnically motivated problems at the academy (52 per cent of the cadets of 
2003 and 31 per cent of former cadets saying excellent, 20 / 24.6 per cent very good and 22 / 
24.6 per cent good (cf. chart A.5a and A.5b). This assessment is interesting, in light of the fact 
that almost nobody claimed to have recognized any ethnically motivated problem at the 
academy (see 2.3.3.1).  
 
Interestingly, the cadets of September 2003 gave their local instructors better marks than the 
international instructors, while former cadets gave better evaluations to the OSCE instructors 
than to their local instructors. Among the cadets of September 2003, there were 24.6 per cent 
who were very satisfied; and 62.3 per cent were even extremely satisfied with their country-
men, while only 18 per cent of the former cadets were extremely satisfied; and 23.8 per cent 
were very satisfied with the local instructors. By contrast, 13.4 per cent of the former cadets 
were more or less dissatisfied with the local trainers, while only 1.6 per cent of the cadets of 
2003 viewed their local instructors in such a bad light (cf. chart A.4). It would seem that the 
teaching skills of local trainers have significantly improved since they started teaching in 
December 2001.   
 
Assessment of the resources available. While the majority of KPS cadets in September 2003 
considered the time frame and the material resources for the basic training to be sufficient (60 
/ 51.7 percent), former cadets were somewhat more critical in this respect. Here the majority 
considered the time frame and the material resources for the basic training to be merely mod-
errately sufficient (56.6 / 51.4 per cent). Only 34.2 per cent (time frame) and 24 per cent (ma-
terial resources) considered them to be sufficient (cf. chart A.8). This might have been due to 
the shorter training period and the fewer training resources available in the first two and a half 
years of academy training. About ten per cent of the KPS cadets, and of the former cadets, 
described the time frame and the material resources as insufficient (cf. chart A.8). 
 
Most of the OSCE trainers considered the material training resources to be sufficient (56 per 
cent); 36 per cent said that they were moderately sufficient. However, with respect to per-
sonnel resources, their assessment was much more critical. Sixty per cent said personnel 
resources were moderately sufficient; and only 39.1 per cent said they were sufficient (cf. 
chart A.7). At the time of the survey, the number of international trainers had been reduced 
from 180, in 2001, to less than half that number, and was to be further reduced to 60 in Sep-
tember 2004.99 The introduction of local trainers, who outnumbered their international col-
leagues in 2004, did not seem to change the rather sceptical assessment.   
  
2.2.2.2 Assessment of Qualification of the Cadets  
 
In 2003, the majority of OSCE instructors (51.7 per cent) considered 50-75 per cent of the 
cadets suitable to become police officers. A total of 27.6 per cent believed that 75-90 per cent 
were suitable, while only 6.9 per cent said that more than 90 per cent of the KPS cadets were 
suitable for the job. A minority of OSCE instructors (13.8 per cent) was of the opinion that 
only 25-50 per cent were suitable (cf. chart A.10). By 2005, about 60 cadets had been dis-
missed from the academy, because they failed to pass the exams or the fire arms tests. The 
vast majority of OSCE instructors who were interviewed said that educational deficits were 
                                                 
99  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2004c: 3. 
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the most important reason for the unsuitability of a number of cadets. Another reason, accor-
ding to the instructors, was the criminal background of a number of cadets. OMIK instructors 
did not perceive inter-ethnic hatred among the cadets and therefore did not consider this as-
pect to be relevant for the unsuitability of certain officers. 
 
 
2.2.3 Field Training 
 
Upon successful completion of the academy training, the cadets were assigned to police sta-
tions to complete the 19-week long field training, which focused on patrolling, investigating, 
arresting, incidents and disputes, traffic control, and police station duties. UNMIK police 
Field Training Officers (FTOs) were responsible for training and developing the cadets’ skills. 
UNMIK expected the FTOs to be experienced officers with the appropriate competency and 
attitude required to serve as good role models for the new KPS officers.100 Unfortunately, the 
international FTOs, coming from a large variety of countries with different police cultures, 
showed a very mixed record of policing skills and quite uneven dedication to their tasks. This 
led to a significant lack of standardization in the training. In addition, with a growing number 
of KPS cadets starting the field training, the ratio between FTOs and trainees became more 
and more unfavourable, so that intensive personal mentoring was no longer possible.101 
Because of the reduction of the field training timeframe from 19 to 17 weeks in 2000,102 and 
further down to 15 weeks in 2001,103 the situation got even worse. It was not until the intro-
duction of local KPS field trainers in 2002 and the reassessment of the field training pro-
gramme by UNMIK police – which finally led to its extension to 20 weeks in 2004104 – that 
the training became more adequate to the task.  
 
Another problem was that many UNMIK police station commanders preferred to let their 
UNMIK police personnel continue their public duties rather than let them take the time to tho-
roughly mentor their inexperienced KPS colleagues. This was particularly relevant with res-
pect to putting the abstract principles of democratic policing into reality.105 There was also no 
coherent policy on what to do with the new KPS officers, once they reached the stations. 
International officers often hesitated to transfer responsible operational tasks to their local col-
leagues.106 These factors led to deficiencies in policing skills – sometimes quite significant 
ones − among a number of KPS officers (see 2.3.3.2).  
 
Evaluation of field training by KPS officers. Compared to the critical view of the field training 
held by international police officers and researchers, the majority of KPS officers seemed to 
be quite satisfied with the training. There were 54.6 per cent who said that they were extreme-
ly or very satisfied with the training. On the other hand, by comparison with the academy 
training, the field training received much lower ratings from the KPS officers, with 37 per 
cent saying they were fairly satisfied and 7.7 per cent that they were more or less dissatisfied 
(cf. chart A.2a). As with the general assessment of the field training, KPS officers seemed to 
be more satisfied with the time frame and the material resources available than did the inter-
national observers. 55.2 per cent called the time frame moderately sufficient; and almost 38.3 
per cent considered it sufficient, while 63.3 per cent thought the material resources had been 
                                                 
100  Cf. UNMIK 2000: 2ff. 
101  Cf. O’Neill 2002: 110; Cockell 2002: 495; Peake 2004: 20. 
102  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2000. 
103  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2002a: 2. 
104  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2004c: 2. 
105  Interview with UNMIK FTO coordinator, Kosovo, September 2003; Peake 2004: 20. 
106  Interview with UNMIK FTO coordinator, Kosovo, September 2003; Peake 2004: 2ff. 
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moderately sufficient; and 28.3 per cent assessed them as sufficient (cf. chart A.9). This rather 
positive assessment might be rooted in the KPS officers’ lack of knowledge about training 
programmes in other countries, which gave them no opportunity to compare the availability of 
resources. 
 
Additional training provided by other international actors. In addition to its own training 
programmes, OMIK co-ordinated training courses within the framework of the EU-funded 
regional Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS) 
programme as well as bilateral courses offered by a number of OSCE participating States (e.g. 
France, Germany, Switzerland and the USA) and several NGOs. These courses focused on a 
variety of issues such as organized crime, human trafficking, drug enforcement, border poli-
cing, hostage negotiations, special weapons and tactics, and community policing.107 In order 
to avoid duplication of projects and to ensure the quality of additional projects, OMIK created 
the position of a European Bilateral Training Project Manager. Since most additional training 
programmes were provided at the KPSS, OMIK had the opportunity to select projects, thereby 
avoiding duplications. However, it was more difficult to avoid duplication of projects in cases 
where the KPS leadership itself decides on bilateral projects.108   
 
 
2.2.4 Efforts to Win the Trust of the Local Population  
 
The OMIK Department of Police Education and Development (DPED) had been implemen-
ting community-based projects since the beginning of the mission. After the March 2004 riots, 
more emphasis was put on the relationship between police and youth. The KPSS offered KPS 
trainees the opportunity to take part in interactive and participative learning that focused on 
issues such as conflict, non-violent problem solving and community policing addressed to 
local youth. In addition, annual youth camps were organized at the KPSS, at which secondary 
school students from different ethnic groups focused on civic responsibilities and non-violent 
problem solving and conflict resolution skills. Furthermore, the DPED set up Community 
Policing Programmes in eight municipalities across Kosovo.109 
 
UNMIK established local Crime Prevention Councils in a number of municipalities of 
Kosovo, bringing together police, KFOR, municipality authorities and community representa-
tives to address the requirements of local security. After the March 2004 riots, UNMIK, 
KFOR and the Kosovar government (Provisional Institutions of Self-Government/PISG) es-
tablished the Kosovo Security Advisory Group as a forum for all communities to discuss their 
security concerns with UNMIK and KFOR. However, the group’s activities stopped after its 
first meeting in July 2004, when the Belgrade government decided not to allow the Kosovo 
Serbs to participate.110 In January 2005, UNMIK began deploying 350 international police 
officers to potential return sites of Serbian refugees and areas inhabited by vulnerable commu-
nities across Kosovo as part of a new community policing project. The primary task of these 
international police officers was to patrol on foot in order to establish close relations with the 
communities, so that they might better address their special security needs.111 However, there 
was criticism within the UNMIK police that the mission had not chosen police officers from 
Western European countries, who were familiar with the concept of community policing, but 
                                                 
107  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2004c; OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2004d: 6; interviews with KPSS 
representatives, Vucitrn, May 2004 and March 2005.  
108  Interview with OMIK representative, Vucitrn, March 2005.  
109  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2004c: 2; OSCE 2004d. 
110  Cf. United Nations Security Council 2004c: 10f.  
111  Cf. UNMIK 2005a. 
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instead primarily officers from countries with no community policing traditions at all. There 
was concern that this could severely undermine the confidence-building efforts between 
Serbian returnees and the police.112 
 
 
2.2.5 Excursus: Reform of the Judicial and Penal System 
 
The best police system cannot function without a properly working judiciary. The following 
excursus on the specifics of the reestablishment of a judicial system in Kosovo after 1999 
shows how painful it was to reforge the basic conditions for law enforcement there. 
 
Due to the total collapse of the judicial system during the Kosovo war and thereafter, when 
Serbian judges, prosecutors and lawyers left Kosovo, UNMIK and OMIK had to rebuild the 
whole system from scratch.113 The first action of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General (SRSG) for Kosovo, Bernard Kouchner, was to establish a Joint Advisory Council on 
Provisional Judicial Appointment (JAC), which soon recommended the provisional appoint-
ment of 55 judges and public prosecutors114 to conduct pre-trial hearings of those detained by 
KFOR since June 1999. Provisional district courts and public prosecutors’ offices were estab-
lished in four cities; mobile court units operated in those areas not served by the courts.115 The 
OSCE developed training for local judges, prosecutors and lawyers at the Kosovo Judicial 
Institute (KJI), and established the Kosovo Law Center (KLC) responsible for the compilation 
of compendia of law as well as for the reform of judicial education at the University of 
Prishtina. To ease the burden on understaffed local courts and in an effort to maintain the 
impartiality of the courts, UNMIK appointed international judges and prosecutors who co-
operated with local personnel and dealt primarily with crimes and offences related to ethnici-
ty. Up until this point, there had been a number of cases, in which Albanian judges applied the 
law in a discriminatory way against Serbs while favouring fellow Albanians, particularly 
when they were regarded as “war heroes”.116    
 
However, the capacity problems continued, the courts could not cope with all cases in a time-
ly manner, and there continued to be cases of biased court decisions. By the end of 2000, 
UNMIK reacted to these irregularities by appointing a commission that reviewed questionable 
cases. Furthermore, by enacting UNMIK regulation 2000/64 in December 2000, the SGRG 
gave UNMIK the power to assign a minimum of two international judges to three-judge 
panels in certain cases, where the unbiased ruling of a local judge did not seem to be guaran-
teed.117 However, Kosovar political elites kept trying to influence court decisions, and social 
pressure was exerted on the judges and prosecutors to not convict Albanians for crimes com-
mitted against Serbs. While UNMIK was able to limit biased rulings at the district level, 
ethnic and social minorities were still discriminated against at the municipal level in cases of 
minor offences. Biased court rulings occurred not only with respect to ethnically related cases, 
but also with respect to sexual offences. In cases of sexual abuse, forced prostitution and 
domestic violence, local judges and prosecutors often favoured the male perpetrators. The 
average sentence for rape decreased from three years to one year. In a further effort to gain 
control over the judicial system, UNMIK established a Judicial Inspection Unit, tasked with 
                                                 
112  Interviews with UNMIK police representatives, Kosovo, March 2005. 
113  Cf. Stodiek 2004a: 345f.  
114  The candidates were selected either from a list that the OSCE had drawn up earlier in the refugee camps 
in Macdeonia, or from a list provided by attorneys in Kosovo (cf. Hartmann 2003: 5).  
115  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law, Legal System Monitoring 
Section 2004a: 10; Hartmann 2003: 4ff. 
116  Cf. Hartmann 2003: 6.  
117  Cf. OSCE Department of Human Rights 2004: 11; Hartmann 2003: 10ff. 
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investigating complaints against judges and prosecutors, which in a number of cases imposed 
disciplinary measures.118  
 
The efforts of UNMIK to appoint Serbian judges as well were hampered by the Serbian 
government in Belgrade, which was putting strong pressure on Serbian judges to not co-
operate with UNMIK. Up until March 2002, there were only four Serbian judges and prosecu-
tors working in the official Kosovar judiciary. Belgrade maintained parallel structures of 
courts that were present in Serb enclaves in the Mitrovica, Prishtina and Gnjilane regions of 
Kosovo. UNMIK tried to dismantle the parallel courts and continued its efforts to recruit Ser-
bian judges and prosecutors into the Kosovar judicial system by signing a Joint Declaration 
with the Serbian Ministry of Justice in July 2002.119 By January 2003, seven Serbian judges 
had been sworn in by UNMIK. In 2004, the integration of Serbian judges into the Kosovar 
justice system suffered a severe setback due to the March riots, after which a number of 
Serbian judges refused to show up at the courts for security reasons. Consequently, the 
parallel court structures, which had ceased to function, resumed their work in the Mitrovica 
and Prishtina regions.120 By September 2004, some of the judges had returned to work: 16 
Serbian judges and three Serbian prosecutors worked alongside 297 non-Serbian judges and 
70 non-Serbian prosecutors of which 16 judges and six prosecutors belonged to other 
minorities, thus slightly improving the participation of minorities in the Kosovar court 
system.121 To facilitate access to justice for the Serbian minority population outside the towns, 
where they often could not move without the fear of being attacked by Albanians, UNMIK 
established the Municipal Court Departments in the Serbian villages of Novo Brdo, 
Gorazdevac, Vitina, Orahovac and Gracanica by December 2004.122 By 2005, three hundred 
sixty-three local judges and 58 local prosecutors handled more than 97 per cent of all criminal 
cases and 100 per cent of all civil. Despite this progress, UNMIK and the EU Commission 
described the growing backlog of cases and the sustained danger of executive influence on the 
judicial system as being among the biggest challenges in Kosovo.123    
 
Establishment of a correctional service. The correctional service also had to be completely 
rebuilt after the war, because prisons had been destroyed or were in terrible condition. Since 
1999, UNMIK has refurbished seven prisons and, in co-operation with the OSCE, trained the 
correction service personnel. In the beginning, UNCIVPOL officers had to run the prisons.124 
By May 2001, seven hundred local corrections officers had been trained at the KPSS. The aim 
was to train 1,688 officers for the Kosovo Correctional Service (KCS).125 However, more than 
80 per cent of the KCS officers were inexperienced, posing a serious problem for the moni-
toring of detention centres.126 By May 2005, the number of KCS staff originally envisaged 
had almost been reached with 1,648 officers, of whom 1,402 were ethnic Albanians, 192 
Serbs, and 55 members of other ethnic groups. Moreover, UNMIK had handed over complete 
authority for the management of the detention centres in Prizren, Pec, Prishtina and Gnjilane 
to the KCS. The three remaining prison facilities were to be transferred by the end of 2005.127 
 
 
                                                 
118  Cf. Stodiek 2004a: 346. 
119  Cf. OSCE Department of Human Rights 2004: 12. 
120  Cf. United Nations Security Council 2004c: 8. 
121  Cf. OSCE Department of Human Rights 2004: 12f; United Nations Security Council 2004c: 8. 
122  Cf. UNMIK 2004f.  
123  Cf. UNMIK 2003a: 14; UNMIK 2005d; Commission of the European Communities 2004b: 54f. 
124  Cf. Stodiek 2004a: 346; UNMIK 2003a: 17. 
125  Cf. Bennett 2001a: 8; UNMIK 2003a: 18. 
126  Cf. Peake 2004: 20; UNMIK 2003a: 18ff.; Commission of the European Communities 2004b: 55. 
127  Cf. UNMIK 2005b; UNMIK 2005f. 
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2.2.6 Police-Related Law Reform 
 
The severe deficits in the judicial system were aggravated by disputes between international 
and local authorities over the applicable law. According to a UN principle for peace missions, 
UNMIK had to apply the law of the host country, as long as it conformed to internationally 
recognized human rights standards. However, in the case of Kosovo, ethnic Albanian judges 
refused to accept the Yugoslav law, because they felt discriminated against and oppressed by 
it. It took almost half a year before the SRSG, Kouchner, decided that the Yugoslav law of 22 
March 1989 – the law applicable before the removal of Kosovar autonomy by Slobodan 
Milosevic – would be applicable, though subordinate to several regulations promulgated by 
Kouchner himself.128 It took even longer to develop coherent Serbian, Albanian and English 
translations of the applicable law and to distribute them to the local as well as the interna-
tional staff of the judiciary and the police. Furthermore, it was difficult for international police 
officers in Kosovo to combine the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and criminal provi-
sions issued by the UN Interim Administration with specific Yugoslavian legal regulations. 
The regulations for investigative activities, for example, differ from country to country, and 
the resultant insecurity of international officers, who were not familiar with those specific 
regulations, interfered with efficient crime solving.129 The long-lasting uncertainty about the 
applicable law also had negative effects on training at the KPSS. On 6 July 2003, after four 
years of preparation, SGRG Steiner promulgated the Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo 
and the Provisional Criminal Procedure Code of Kosovo, which finally provided the legal 
basis for the fight against crime and criminal prosecution.What is more, it could be used as a 
teaching tool at the KPSS. Nevertheless, it took another eight months before the two Codes 
entered into force.130 
 
To fight organized crime effectively, UNMIK has introduced several new regulations since 
2001. UNMIK regulation 2001/4 of January 2001 defined, for the first time, the crime of traf-
ficking in human beings.131 UNMIK regulation 2001/10 of May 2001 dealt with measures to 
prevent illegal border crossings.132 UNMIK regulation 2001/12 of June 2001 dealt with the 
Prohibition of Terrorism and Related Offences.133 Moreover, UNMIK established a witness 
protection programme in 2001, hoping this would lead to an increased willingness of the 
population to co-operate with the police during investigations.134 Finally, UNMIK regulation 
2002/6 of March 2002 allowed the use of covert and technical measures of surveillance and 
investigation for the first time.135  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
128  Cf. Rausch 2002: 13ff.; Strohmeyer 2001: 58f.; interviews with UNCIVPOL representatives in June 2000 
in Kosovo and in July 2001 in New York.   
129  For example, the Yugoslav law, which was to be applied in Kosovo, demanded that UN police officers 
call an investigating judge when approaching the scene of a crime and searching for traces of evidence. 
Because many international police officers did not know this fact, or because, in some cases, there was 
simply no investigating judge available, a lot of crime evidence material, which had been collected by the 
police, was later not accepted in court due to procedural errors (interviews with UNCIVPOL representa-
tives, Kosovo, June 2000). 
130  Cf. UNMIK 2003b; and UNMIK 2004a. 
131  Cf. UNMIK 2001a. 
132  Cf. UNMIK 2001c. 
133  Cf. UNMIK 2001b. 
134  Cf. UNMIK 2001d; UNMIK 2001e: 17. 
135  Cf. UNMIK 2002a. 
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2.3 Taking Stock of Reform Efforts  
 
Whether and to what extent UNMIK and OMIK have managed to achieve the goal of 
establishing the ‘credible, professional and impartial’ multi-ethnic police service, the UN 
Secretary-General had envisaged in 1999 (see 2.1) will be analysed in this section. 
   
 
2.3.1  Establishment of the Multi-Ethnic Kosovo Police Service 
 
With almost 7,000 KPS officers trained by 2005, of whom 9.3 per cent belong to the Serbian 
and 5.7 per cent to other minorities, UNMIK and OMIK have achieved their quantitative 
goals with respect to the number of trained officers and the ethnic composition of the police 
force. There is no doubt that the goal of 7,500 officers will be reached by 2006 (see 2.2.1). 
This represents an important success for the international organizations. 
 
With the growing capacities of the KPS, a gradual transfer of policing responsibilities from 
UNMIK to the KPS has taken place. KPS was supposed to become more and more respon-
sible for daily law enforcement, while UNMIK’s task was to shift from executive policing to 
monitoring and advising the KPS. The ultimate transition is to occur in 2006. In addition to 
establishing a local police leadership structure (cf. 2.2.2), UNMIK had already begun to trans-
fer the leadership for police stations to the KPS in 2002, with Gracanica becoming the first 
village with a KPS police leadership.136 Choosing the Gracanica police station as the first one 
under local leadership was even more important from a symbolic point of view, as it was a 
station with multi-ethnic staff. By March 2004, ten police stations had been transferred to the 
KPS.137  
 
After the March 2004 riots, the transformation process was stopped to allow assessment of 
stations, which were scheduled to be transferred, on the performance of their staff during the 
riots. In July 2004, the process was resumed and one year later, all 33 police stations had been 
transferred to KPS command.138 However, particularly with respect to the Mitrovica region, 
where the last station (Mitrovica North) was transferred in July 2005, many experts within 
and outside the UNMIK police, doubtful of the capacity of the KPS to do its job sufficiently, 
have criticized the hastiness of the process. They point to the lack of local personnel (ranging 
from an insufficient number of Serbian officers in North Mitrovica to a general lack of quali-
fied leadership personnel), as well as a lack of office and communication equipment, which 
could severely hamper the autonomous functioning of the KPS.139 There was also concern 
that KPS officers from North Mitrovica would continue to be reluctant to enforce the law in 
cases in which the rights of Albanians had to be protected, attacks upon Albanians had to be 
investigated, or UNMIK’s vehicle registration regime had to be enforced. These officers were 
anxious about losing the acceptance of the Serbian population that still considered the 
ongoing parallel security structures of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) to be 
the real security provider.140 In addition to the police stations, three of the six Police Regional 
Headquarters had already been transferred to the KPS by August 2005. The final transfer to 
the KPS of responsibility for all stations and regional headquarters is envisaged for the first 
                                                 
136  Cf. UNMIK 2002d. 
137  Cf. United Nations Security Council 2004a: 8. 
138   Cf. United Nations Security Council 2004c: 8; UNMIK 2004d; UNMIK 2005a; UNMIK 2005i; UNMIK 
2005g. 
139  Cf. European Stability Initiative (ESI) 2004: 23; interviews with OSCE and UNMIK police representa-
tives, Mitrovica, March 2005. 
140       Cf. International Crisis Group 2005b. 
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quarter of 2006. By then, UNMIK also plans to have established a ministry of interior and a 
ministry of justice.141  
 
The transfer of responsibilities has been accompanied by the downscaling of the UNMIK 
police contingent. In the summer of 2002, the KPS outnumbered the international police 
contingent for the first time with more than 4,700 local officers on duty compared to 4,500 
UNMIK officers.142 From a maximum of 4,500 officers in 2001, the international contingent 
had shrunk to 3,500 officers by 2003 and was supposed to be scaled down by another 30 per 
cent in 2004. However, after the March 2004 riots, the downscaling process came temporarily 
to a halt. Unfortunately, primary police contributing countries such as Germany had already 
reduced their contingents by 30 per cent in March and did not reverse this step. By June 2005 
the international contingent had further decreased to around 3,000 officers.143 UNMIK police 
had assumed primarily observational and advising functions. The KPS even bore the prime 
responsibility for controlling mass rallies. UNMIK’s SPUs only stood by to assist in emergen-
cies.144  
 
 
2.3.2 Performance of the KPS 
 
Establishing such a big police contingent in less than six years certainly carries with it the 
danger of quantitative success being gained at the cost of quality. For this reason, the qualita-
tive performance of the KPS will be assessed in more detail, taking into account the criteria 
introduced in Chapter 1 (see 1.2.3). 
 
2.3.2.1 Crime Developments 
 
Since the KPS has taken the prime responsibility for law enforcement from UNMIK (except 
for intelligence and certain kinds of organized crime), the development in crime figures can 
be linked to the work of the KPS in the same way as it is to the work of UNMIK police. 
According to UNMIK’s statistics, there was a steady decrease in serious crimes such as mur-
ders (particularly ethnically motivated murders), attempted murders or kidnappings between 
1999 and 2004. Crime figures for rapes, robberies or arson stagnated or were on the rise.145 
UNMIK explained the increase of these crimes with the growing willingness of the population 
and crime victims to turn to the police with their problems. The initial lack of trust in the 
international police force had given way to a growing readiness to inform the police, even 
when sensitive issues such as domestic or sexual violence were involved. UNMIK and the 
KPS viewed this development as a result of their work.146 However, the flow of information 
was still disrupted in cases where witnesses feared acts of revenge, or where political hard-
liners exerted pressure on the population to not co-operate with the local and international 
police (see 2.3.5). After the sharp increase in murder and attempted murder in connection with 
the March 2004 riots, figures for serious crimes dropped again to the level of 2003.147 In the 
first half of 2005, crime reports were dominated by a small number of politically motivated 
attacks on UNMIK and OSCE premises as well as against moderate politicians such as 
                                                 
141  Cf. UNMIK 2005i; UNMIK 2005g. 
142  Cf. United Nations Security Council 2002: 5. 
143  United Nations Security Council 2005: 21. 
144  Interviews with UNMIK police representatives, Prishtina, March 2005. 
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President Rugova, apparently conducted by the Albanian extremist group the Albanian 
National Army.148 Thus, while acts of “ordinary” serious crime decreased to a level compar-
able to other countries in the neighbourhood, the level of politically motivated serious crimes, 
focusing primarily on local political actors and on the international community in Kosovo, 
was growing.   
 
In an UNDP survey conducted in November and December 2003, 33 per cent of Albanians 
believed that crime in Kosovo had increased in 2003; 30 per cent said that it had remained the 
same; and 31 per cent thought crime had decreased. However, 47 per cent of the Kosovo-
Serbs thought that crime had increased; 42 per cent said it had stayed at the same level; and 
only 5 per cent believed it had decreased.149 The views of Albanians and Serbs were similarly 
divergent on the point of the development of the general security situation in Kosovo. 49 per 
cent of Albanians felt that the security situation in Kosovo had improved; 34 per cent said the 
security situation was unchanged; and only 15 per cent said the situation had deteriorated. In 
sharp contrast to this, only nine per cent of the Serbian respondents were of the opinion that 
the situation had improved, while 60 per cent believed it had stayed the same, and 29 per cent 
thought it had worsened. It should be noted that this survey was conducted four months before 
the March riots of 2004.150   
 
There were also significant differences between Albanians and Serbs on the issue of their 
main security concerns. While Albanians (35 per cent) characterized murder as the most pres-
sing issue in Kosovo, only five per cent of Serbs held this view. In contrast, 37 per cent of 
Serbs saw the lack of “freedom of movement” as their biggest security problem.151 Corres-
pondingly, only ten per cent of Albanians, but 46 per cent of the Serbs in Kosovo had limited 
or changed their activities due to their concerns about crime.152 It is interesting to note that 
other minority communities, in significant contrast to the Serbs, assessed the security situation 
and levels of crime even slightly better than the Albanians.153 Kosovo-Serbs were thus over-
whelmingly convinced that they were at considerably greater risk in Kosovo than any other 
ethnicity. This feeling of insecurity, as well as the lack of employment opportunities were the 
biggest obstacles to the return of Serbian refugees and internally displaced persons. By 2005, 
barely ten per cent of Serb refugees had returned.154 
  
2.3.2.2 Demonstrated Skills and Level of Professionalism  
 
According to 11.5 per cent of UNMIK police officers surveyed in police stations with multi-
ethnic staff in September 2003, more than 90 per cent of KPS officers were suited for their 
jobs. 25 per cent of the UNMIK officers believed that at least 75-90 per cent of the KPS 
officers were suited for police work, and 30 per cent thought that 50-75 per cent of the local 
officers were suited. 21.2 per cent of the UNMIK officers said that only 25-50 per cent of the 
KPS officers were suited; and 7.7 per cent still thought that only between 10 and 25 per cent 
of their local colleagues were suited for their job (cf. chart A.10). Interestingly, KPS officers, 
by and large, shared the views of their UNMIK colleagues. Except for some 6.3 per cent, who 
considered all of their colleagues to be suitable for the police job, almost as many local as 
international police officers (26.7 / 30.7 per cent) claimed that 75-90 per cent, or 50-75 per 
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151  Cf. ibid.: 33. 
152  Cf. ibid.: 31. 
153  Cf. ibid.: 31-33. 
154  Cf. Christian Science Monitor 2005; Waringo 2005. 
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cent respectively, were suitable (cf. chart A.10). In interviews, UNMIK police officers 
considered educational deficits, professional deficits as well as the politicization of the police 
by certain groups and parties to be primarily responsible for the deficits of those officers not 
suited for the job.155 According to the head of the KPSS, until 2001, 0.5 per cent of KPS 
officers had become involved in criminal activity.156 By 2005, about 300 KPS officers had 
been dismissed from the KPS for disciplinary reasons.   
 
The human rights record of the KPS. The KPS seems to be free of allegations of serious 
human rights violations against Kosovar civilians. The only accusations by human rights 
NGOs such as Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International against members of the local 
police have to do with to the alleged passive behaviour and failure of KPS officers to protect 
the minority populations during the March 2004 riots.157 Accusations of widespread biased 
and discriminatory behaviour against minorities focus primarily on the courts.  
 
Fight against organized crime. Since only a small number of KPS officers were playing a 
supporting role in UNMIK police’s fight against organized crime until 2004,158 and were only 
integrated in larger numbers into the specialized organized crime units by 2005, it is too early 
to make a final assessment of the KPS performance in this field. In general, the fight against 
organized crime poses the biggest challenge to the international and local police in Kosovo. 
According to a Europol report of 2003, the spread of organized crime in the Balkans represen-
ted the most important danger for the EU in the areas of trafficking in drugs and human 
beings.159 Kosovo was seen as the most important transit country for smuggling cigarettes, 
drugs and weapons from South-Eastern to Western Europe. The International Police Associ-
ation to Fight Narcotics Trade has estimated that, every month, four to five tons of heroin are 
brought from Kosovo to Serbia and Montenegro, from where it penetrates the European mar-
kets via Italy, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Hungary.160 In the field of human trafficking, 
Kosovo as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina are considered to be the most important transit 
countries for around 120,000 women and girls, who are smuggled out of the CIS and South-
Eastern European countries every year by criminal organizations, in most cases for sexual 
exploitation.161  
 
The fight against organized crime was hampered from the beginning by a lack of personnel, 
equipment and legal regulations. It took the UN almost three years, before effective special 
units to combat drug smuggling, trafficking in human beings and illegal prostitution were set 
up, legal prerequisites (e.g. the Provisional Criminal Code or the Witness Protection Pro-
gramme) were introduced, and the necessary technical equipment was provided to conduct 
intelligence operations. In addition, cross-border co-operation arrangements with the law 
enforcement agencies of neighbouring states, which are indispensable for the effective fight 
against transnational organized crime, were absent until 2002.162 Moreover, the lack of know-
ledge of local structure and languages on the part of the international police, and the lack of 
trust in the police among the population caused severe problems in gaining relevant informa-
tion. Particularly in Kosovo, family ties and clan structures often form the informal frame-
                                                 
155  Interviews with UNMIK police representatives, Kosovo, September 2003. 
156  Cf. Bennett 2001a: 8. 
157  Cf. Human Rights Watch 2004. 
158  For example, by 2004, 26 KPS officers worked in the Trafficking and Prostitution Unit, 17 in the Central 
Drugs Unit, eleven in the Kosovo Organised Crime Bureau (KOCB), and eight in the Central Criminal 
Investigative Unit (cf. UNMIK 2003c). 
159  Cf. Beta 2004. 
160  Cf. Beta 2003. 
161  See International Organization for Migration 2001: 2; UNHCR 2002: 4. 
162  Cf. United Nations Security Council 2002: 5. 
 33
work for criminal networks, which are hard for outsiders to infiltrate. By integrating local 
police officers into its special crime fighting units, UNMIK tried to cope with this latter prob-
lem.163 However, finding KPS officers suitable for this task proved to be difficult since reli-
able background checks were hard to conduct and the KPS officers chosen had little experi-
ence and training.164 
 
Nevertheless, the continuing pressure on organized crime in Kosovo by law enforcement 
bodies in the international community seems to have produced its first results.165 According to 
the Czech National Centre for Fighting Drugs’ assessment, the Kosovo-Albanians have lost 
their predominance in drug trafficking on the Balkans. Today, organizations operating in 
Albania and Serbia are regarded as the main drug suppliers. Drug streams are increasingly 
bypassing Kosovo.166 Interestingly, while the international police force has put the fight 
against organized crime at the top of its agenda, only seven per cent of the Kosovars 
considered trafficking in human beings or drugs to be of primary concern.167 
 
Performance during the March 2004 riots. Without any preparation for dealing with riots of 
this dimension, lacking equipment such as riot control gear, shields, tear gas or rubber bullets, 
and with no contingency plans, the majority of KPS officers behaved professionally and 
bravely and tried their best to control the riots, prevent the mobs from attacking Serbian prop-
erty and to save the lives of Serbs, Roma and Ashkali.168 In view of the simultaneous escala-
tion of violence at more than 30 hot spots across Kosovo, they worked most of the time with 
UNMIK officers within units hastily assembled because of the scarcity of available offi-
cers.169 Without the support of the KPS in communicating with the demonstrators, KFOR and 
UNMIK police would have been even more helpless to calm the crowds down.170 In addition 
to 67 KFOR soldiers and 65 UNMIK police officers, 58 KPS officers were injured during the 
riots.171 
 
Juxtaposed with the generally positive statements on the KPS’s performance given by the UN 
and international think tanks, were serious accusations of misconduct made against Albanian 
KPS officers by Serbian citizens, NGOs and by Serbian KPS officers. In addition to the most 
frequent accusation made, namely that many Albanian officers had stood by passively 
watching the riots, the most serious accusations were that Albanian officers had denounced 
their Serbian colleagues to the mob or that they had even taken part in the riots.172 While there 
were no complaints from Serbs against KPS officers in Prizren, the most serious complaints 
came from Serbs in Vucitrn, Obilic and Kosovo Polje.173 During the investigations of the 
March 2004 riots, a number of UNMIK police officers also complained that many Albanian 
KPS officers had undermined the investigations by refusing to identify Albanian suspects on 
videotapes, often in cases where they supposedly knew the subjects, since they knew whole 
                                                 
163  Cf. UNMIK 2003c.  
164  Cf. Stodiek 2004b: 213. 
165  Between 2002 and 2004, often in co-operation with police forces of several European countries, KOCB 
led  major operations against organized crime networks which, in turn, led to the arrest and conviction of 
a number of high ranking criminals (cf. UNMIK 2002c; United Nations Security Council 2004b: 12). For 
a detailed description of UNMIK successes in the fight against organized crime see Stodiek 2004b: 213f.  
166  Cf. Beta 2004. 
167  Cf. UNDP 2004a: 20. 
168  Cf. United Nations Security Council 2004b: 12. 
169  Interview with UNMIK police officers, Kosovo, May 2004. 
170  Cf. International Crisis Group 2004: 20. 
171  Cf. United Nations Security Council 2004b: 1. 
172  Cf. International Crisis Group 2004: 20f.; Human Rights Watch 2004, Chapter 6: 2; United Nations 
Security Council 2004b: 12. 
173  Cf. Human Rights Watch 2004, Chapter 7. 
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communities of certain villages.174 In July 2004, investigations were underway against some 
100 KPS officers for allegations of misconduct. However, no evidence was found to back up 
the most serious allegations. Therefore, by March 2005, only about a dozen officers had been 
temporarily suspended for disrupting radio communication during the riots.175 Compared to 
the some 5,700 officers, who were on duty in March 2004, this small number of accused and 
convicted officers is an indication that the share of ethnically motivated failures within the 
KPS was rather low.  
 
 
2.3.3 Social Inter-Ethnic Climate at the Police Academy and in the Units 
 
Determining whether inter-ethnic relations at the police academy and in the units were signifi-
cantly better than relations between the different ethnic communities, in general, is crucial for 
answering the basic question of whether the approach of reconstituting the monopoly of force 
in ethnically divided countries with the instrument of multi-ethnic police is a viable option. 
For this reason, this aspect was covered broadly in the survey. 
 
2.3.3.1 Social Climate at the Academy 
 
As soon as the first class of cadets came to the academy, ethnically motivated tensions be-
tween Albanian and Serbian cadets as well as politically motivated obstruction became evi-
dent. Of the 20 Serbian cadets, who had been recruited for the first class, only nine showed up 
at the academy. This was partly due to the fact that they feared for their own safety in an 
Albanian-dominated environment, but also due to massive political and social pressure from 
the Kosovo-Serbian community and the Belgrade government to not co-operate with the inter-
national community. When two of those nine Serb cadets were arrested, following the accusa-
tion from an Albanian cadet that they had committed war crimes, all Serbian cadets left the 
academy in protest.176 However, a week later, 17 of the 20 Serb cadets were participating in 
the classes.177 
 
Apart from these incidents at the beginning, there were no further significant problems bet-
ween Albanian and Serbian cadets. In 2003, the majority of OSCE instructors (51.7 per cent) 
described the social climate in the classes as acceptable, 31 per cent as co-operative and 10.3 
per cent even as friendly, while only 3.4 per cent described it as tense or uncomfortable. None 
of the instructors described the climate as antagonistic (cf. chart A.11). The cadets of Septem-
ber 2003 gave even better ratings to the climate. While 27.8 per cent rated the climate at the 
KPSS as acceptable, 38.9 per cent said it was co-operative; and 29.6 per cent even called it 
friendly. Only 1.9 per cent felt it was uncomfortable, while another 1.9 per cent said it was 
antagonistic. But here again, former KPS cadets were more sceptical in their assessment. 
While 35.4 per cent said the social climate during their training had been acceptable and 36.6 
per cent recalled it as having been co-operative, only 9.1 per cent said it had been friendly. 
Moreover, eight per cent said the climate had been uncomfortable and more than ten per cent 
even said it had been tense. On the other hand, only 0.6 per cent recalled it as having been 
antagonistic (cf. chart A.12a).    
 
                                                 
174   Interviews with UNMIK police officers, Prizren and Prishtina, 28-30 May 2004. 
175  Cf. United Nations Security Council 2004c: 8; UNMIK 2004e; interviews with UNMIK Police represen-
tatives, Kosovo, March 2005. 
176  Cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 September 1999; Bennett 2001b: 4-8. 
177  Cf. UN News Service, 13 September 1999. 
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Ethnically motivated problems in classes. While 96.5 per cent of the September 2003 cadets 
who responded had never experienced ethnically motivated problems in their class (cf. chart 
A.13a), former cadets of previous classes had slightly different experiences. 21.1 per cent re-
called having recognized ethnically motivated problems in their classes, a view that corres-
ponds to the general assessment that the inter-ethnic climate had significantly improved since 
the start of the training programme (cf. chart A.13.b). Interestingly, those who had recognized 
ethnically motivated problems were almost exclusively Serbs. A third of the Serbian cadets of 
2003, and 41.8 per cent of former Serbian cadets said they had recognized such problems in 
their class (cf. charts A.13a and A.13.b). According to KPSS representatives, the positive 
development in the inter-ethnic climate came about for a number of reasons. First of all, all 
cadets were obliged to interact with members of other ethnic communities in order to 
successfully complete the training.178 In addition, the police instructors facilitated modern 
interactive teaching with class discussions, group work and role-playing exercises, which also 
forced the different ethnic groups to mix − at least in the classes.179 In this way, the cadets 
developed a professional and co-operative attitude towards members of other ethnic 
communities.  
 
Social activities after classes. Even though former cadets described the inter-ethnic social cli-
mate in more negative terms than the cadets of 2003, almost as many former cadets (91.9 per 
cent) as cadets of 2003 (94.4 per cent) reported that they had social contact with cadets be-
longing to other ethnic groups in their leisure time (cf. chart A.14).   
 
2.3.3.2 Social Climate in the Multi-Ethnic Units 
 
Until 2003, co-operative relations between the different ethnic groups hardly existed at most 
KPS stations. KPS officers refused to go on patrol in ethnically mixed units and more or less 
ignored each other at the police stations. When UNMIK station commanders began to force 
KPS officers to work in mixed units, this finally led to the development of more professional 
and co-operative interaction between the different ethnic groups. The improvement in the 
climate was further enhanced by the emergence of new moderate political leaderships at 
municipality level, which no longer tried to prevent the Serbian officers from co-operating 
with their Albanian and international counterparts.180 According to the survey and a number 
of interviews conducted with international and national police officers in Kosovo in 2003, the 
social climate in the multi-ethnic police units across Kosovo had, in general, become positive 
and helpful by that year. The relative majority (42.6 per cent) of UNMIK police officers (field 
trainers, station commanders, shift leaders, monitors) considered the climate to be acceptable, 
22.2 per cent viewed it as co-operative, and 9.3 per cent as friendly. However, 18.5 per cent of 
UNMIK officers were not so enthusiastic about the climate and described it as uncomfortable; 
3.7 per cent as tense; and another 3.7 per cent even as antagonistic (cf. chart A.11). The 
assessment by KPS officers was even more positive. While 32.4 per cent considered the inter-
ethnic climate to be acceptable, 44.4 per cent saw it as co-operative and 16.9 per cent as 
friendly, with only 3.4 per cent describing it as either uncomfortable or tense. None of the res-
pondents called it antagonistic (cf. chart A.17). A noticeable percentage of UNMIK police 
officers (40 per cent) had recognized structures of loyalty based on ethnic identity (cf. chart 
A.26).   
 
Ethnically motivated problems in the stations. Corresponding to the positive assessment of the 
inter-ethnic climate, the vast majority of KPS officers (86.5 per cent) stated they had never 
                                                 
178  Cf. OSCE 2000: 2f. 
179  Cf. Peake 2004: 19.  
180  Interviews with UNMIK and KPS police station commanders across Kosovo, September 2003.  
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been aware of any ethnically motivated problems within their units or in their police stations. 
Among the different ethnic groups, however, there were noticeable differences in the percep-
tion of ethnic problems. While 22 per cent of “other” minorities claimed they had been aware 
of such problems, 19 per cent of Serbs stated the same, while only 6.3 per cent of Albanians 
recalled such problems. Nevertheless, the vast majorities of Serbs (81 per cent) as well as 
those from other ethnic minorities (78 per cent) stated they had never recognized ethnically 
motivated problems (cf. chart A.18). 
 
Inter-ethnic social contacts after duty. The basically positive assessment of the social climate 
at multi-ethnic stations is supported by statements of 70.3 per cent of the responding KPS 
officers who claimed to have had social contacts with colleagues belonging to other ethnic 
groups after duty (cf. chart A.19). In view of the fact that there is little social interaction bet-
ween the different ethnic groups in Kosovo in general, this result of the survey is surprising.   
 
Problems of incorporating former combatants into the police. The majority of KPS officers 
(53 per cent) did not view the incorporation of former combatants as a threat to the efficient 
functioning of the multi-ethnic police. Nevertheless, 11.9 per cent perceived this as a danger, 
35.1 per cent stated they did not know. Among the different ethnic groups, the percentage of 
those who said that they did not know was largest among the Serbs (50.8 per cent). Not sur-
prisingly, the percentage of those who saw a danger in the incorporation of former comba-
tants, was also the largest among Serbs (16.9 per cent), followed by those of other ethnic 
minorities (14.8 per cent), whereas only 6.6 per cent of Albanians shared this opinion (cf. 
chart A.16). While the vast majority of Albanians did not perceive a threat in the incorpora-
tion of former combatants (which is not surprising, as 40 per cent of the KPS officers at that 
time were former UCK members), 32.3 per cent of Serbs and the majority of officers 
belonging to other ethnic minorities (51.9 per cent) shared this positive view (cf. chart A.16).         
 
Concerning problems in incorporating former combatants, a number of OSCE police 
instructors mentioned the long-term character of the process to overcome what has happened 
and the time span necessary to change peoples’ minds. Generally, this issue was not regarded 
as a problem as long as former combatants had not been involved in (war) crimes. The 
relative majorities of OSCE instructors (33.3 per cent) and UNMIK police officers (47.2 per 
cent) believed that the spirit and the principles of democratic policing could be conveyed to 
former combatants. On the other hand, 3.3 per cent of OSCE instructors and 13.2 per cent of 
UNMIK officers said that only certain aspects of these principles were transferable to former 
combatants, while 13.4 per cent of OSCE instructors and 24.5 per cent of UNMIK officers 
claimed that it is not possible at all to transfer these principles (cf. chart A.15). Interestingly, 
according to some UNMIK and OSCE officers, there seemed to be more tension between the 
older and more experienced Albanian police officers, who had already been on the police 
force in the 1980s, and younger, inexperienced police officers with a UCK background, based 
on the different level of professionalism, than between Serbs and former UCK members.181    
 
Effects of the March 2004 violence on the inter-ethnic climate. After the March 2004 riots, the 
inter-ethnic climate seriously deteriorated in a number of police stations and mistrust between 
Albanians and Serbs grew again.182 Serbian officers accused a number of their Albanian col-
leagues of misconduct (see 2.3.2.2). The most serious incidents happened at the police station 
in Strpce, until then one of the success stories of multi-ethnic policing in Kosovo. The Serbian 
station commander and his Serbian staff categorically refused to co-operate further with their 
Albanian colleagues and did not let the Albanians enter the station. When they also refused to 
                                                 
181  Interview with KPSS and UNMIK police officials, Vucitrn and Prishtina, May 2005. 
182  Interviews with KPS CAST members, Prishtina, 29 May 2004.   
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co-operate with other Albanian officers, brought in from other stations, UNMIK ended the 
blockade by dismissing the station commander and his Serbian deputy. Facing the potential 
consequences of their actions, Serbian staff of two other stations, which had also refused to 
co-operate with the Albanians any more, stopped their blockades and agreed to resume the 
work of ethnically mixed patrols.183 UNMIK police monitored the re-established mixed 
patrols for a couple of days. Since there were no incidents and no complaints about the perfor-
mance of the mixed units, the units went on patrol without the presence of UNMIK police 
monitors. At least on the surface, things had returned to normal by June 2004.184   
 
 
2.3.4 Public Perception of KPS Performance 
 
With respect to the performance of the KPS, the public perception between Albanians and 
Serbs differed in similar ways as regards crime and security. The Albanian population has 
been very satisfied with the KPS in recent years. From 95 per cent of respondents, who were 
satisfied or very satisfied with the performance of the KPS at the end of 2002, the figure went 
down only slightly to 90 per cent in July 2004. The Serbian minority, on the other hand, 
assessed the performance of the KPS much more negatively. Only 9.3 per cent were satisfied 
or very satisfied with the KPS at the end of 2002. This figure went down dramatically to three 
per cent at the beginning of March 2004 and further down to an all-time low of only 1.9 per 
cent in July 2004. Other minorities, however, viewed the KPS in a much better light. From 
90.6 per cent in 2002 the approval rate declined slightly to 85.3 per cent in July 2003.185 
Interestingly, Albanians and Serbs shared only one view, namely their rapidly increasing 
dissatisfaction with the performance of UNMIK police. While the approval rate of the 
Albanians for UNMIK police went down from 78.5 per cent in November 2002 to only 44.2 
per cent in July 2004, the approval rate among the Serb population went down from an 
already low figure of 22.9 per cent in November 2002 to 3.7 per cent in March and July 
2004.186 Regarding the ethnic neutrality of the KPS, only nine per cent of the Albanians, but 
63 per cent of Serbs believed the KPS was biased in favour of Kosovo-Albanians.187 
Moreover, four times as many Serbs as Albanians thought that officers of the same ethnicity 
would treat them less favourably.188 One can therefore conclude that there was high 
satisfaction with and trust in the KPS among the Albanians and non-Serb minorities in 
Kosovo, while the perception of the KPS in the Serb community was much worse even before 
the March riots. 
 
These figures roughly correspond to KPS officers’ perception of the multi-ethnic units’ ac-
ceptance by the population. While the vast majority of Albanian officers (74.6 per cent) and a 
bare majority of Serbian officers (53.9 per cent) perceived the multi-ethnic units as well-ac-
cepted by Albanian-dominated communities, a considerably smaller proportion (54.6 per cent 
of Albanians and 41.6 per cent of Serbs) saw the multi-ethnic units as well accepted by 
Serbian-dominated communities (cf. chart A.20). KPS officers considerably overrated their 
acceptance within this ethnic group. In 2003, only 5.6 per cent of UNMIK police officers per-
                                                 
183  Independent of these specific incidents, ethnically mixed patrols were suspended temporarily by UNMIK 
after the March 2004 riots, because some Serbian officers had been afraid to enter Albanian villages. On 
the other hand, UNMIK and the KPS had avoided provoking the Serbian population by sending Albanian 
officers into their villages. 
184  Cf. United Nations Security Council 2004c: 8; interview with UNMIK police representative, Prishtina, 20 
March 2005. 
185  At the time this report was finished, UNDP had not published figures for the other minorities for 2004. 
186  Cf. UNDP 2003: 32; UNDP 2004b: 31.   
187  Cf. UNDP 2004a: 24. 
188  Cf. ibid.: 34. 
 38
ceived ethnically mixed units as being accepted in all communities where they were patrol-
ling, while 44.4 per cent saw them as being accepted in most communities. 35.2 per cent of 
the UNMIK officers were more sceptical and believed mixed KPS units were only accepted in 
a few communities. Seven point four per cent even thought mixed units were not accepted at 
all in Kosovo (cf. chart A.21). Since the acceptance of multi-ethnic units had deteriorated 
drastically after the March 2004 events, UNMIK suspended the mixed patrols for several 
weeks as a consequence (see 2.3.3.2).  
 
 
2.3.5 Obstacles to the Build-up of a Democratic Multi-Ethnic Police Service 
 
In the CORE survey, OSCE instructors, UNMIK officers and KPS officers were asked to rate 
the relevance of the following negative factors, influencing the establishment of a multi-
ethnic, accountable, competent and democratic police force in Kosovo: 
  
• influence of political parties and groups as well as ethnic communities; 
• low acceptance of the KPS by the local population; 
• low salaries of the KPS officers, influencing their morale and favouring corruption; 
• influence of organized crime; 
• inappropriate legislation; 
• insufficient training of the KPS. 
 
Low salaries influencing the morale of the KPS officers in a negative way were seen as the 
biggest problem by all groups surveyed. Most respondents from each group (69.8 per cent of 
UNMIK observers, 74.1 per cent of OSCE instructors, and 67.2 per cent of KPS officers) 
rated this item as a big problem. The influence of political parties and groups of the different 
ethnic communities was listed second or third most frequently by OSCE instructors as well as 
by UNMIK and KPS officers. Opinions differed among the sample groups with respect to the 
relevance of the other items listed. While the influence of crime was listed fourth by OSCE 
instructors and KPS officers, UNMIK observers ranked the problem of the low acceptance of 
the KPS by the local population in fourth place. Interestingly, insufficient training of the KPS 
did not play a prominent role in the rankings, although it was usually mentioned in interviews 
as one of the biggest problems (cf. charts A.22 and A.23). While the problems of the reform 
of the judicial system are dealt with in section 2.2.5, some of the other problems mentioned 
here will be elaborated in more detail below. 
 
Politicization of the police was most apparent in the early recruitment phase and with respect 
to the promotion of police officers. While, for example, the UCK leadership insisted on a high 
quota for former UCK fighters within the KPS, the Serbian leadership in Mitrovica North 
insisted on the incorporation of former MUP officers within KPS for the Serbian villages 
north of the Ibar river.189 As for promotions, a number of KPS and even UNMIK officers 
claimed that there is sometimes an incompatibility between the performance and promotion of 
certain KPS officers, noting that the political affiliation of the officers might be a more im-
portant factor than performance in the decision.190 There are also allegations that different fac-
tions in the KPS would support different political parties (or different former UCK leaders) 
and would, as a result, therefore obstruct investigations into particular individuals.191 In July 
2005, when UNMIK announced a plan for establishing a ministry of interior and a ministry of 
                                                 
189  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law 2003c: 15.  
190  Interview with senior UNMIK police official, Prishtina, May 2005; UNDP 2004a: 28; Peake 2004: 22. 
191  Cf. Xharra/Hajrullahu/Salihu 2005. 
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justice by the end of 2005, international and local analysts expressed their concerns that the 
two biggest Kosovar parties, the LDK and PDK, would attempt to insert their own people into 
the new structures.192 
 
Lack of co-operation by citizens. While co-operation of citizens with the police increased in 
cases of minor offences and domestic violence (with the side-effect of an increase of such 
crimes in the statistics),193 UNMIK police and KPS complained about the lack of co-operation 
in cases of serious crimes. While the fear of revenge seemed to be the most important reason 
for non-co-operation on the Albanian side, the lack of confidence in the police appeared to be 
decisive for Serbian citizens.194 Furthermore, Serbian politicians in Kosovo put political pres-
sure on the Serbians to not co-operate with UNMIK police. While this pressure decreased to 
some extent, for example in North Mitrovica, there were cases in other enclaves where politi-
cal hardliners refused to co-operate with UNMIK police even when UNMIK police tried to 
investigate the murders of Serbian villagers.195 One reason for this poor co-operation between 
the population and the KPS might also be the lack of KPS-initiated contacts with the public. 
In the view of the Kosovars, the KPS appeared “to have adopted a relatively distant position 
vis-à-vis the public”,196 revealing deficits in existing community policing programmes and a 
lack of knowledge about existing security forums.197 Last but not least, there were two 
budget-related causes for the lack of information provided by the population. Due to the lack 
of financial resources, the police were neither able to offer any financial incentives for infor-
mation, nor to sufficiently fund the witness protection programme introduced in 2001.198  
 
Small arms proliferation. It is estimated that, in Kosovo, 333,000-460,000 illegal small arms 
are still in the hands of civilians199 despite several arms collection initiatives by KFOR, 
UNMIK and the PISG. This wide distribution of weapons among the population (Albanians 
and Serbians alike) severely hampers the implementation of the monopoly of force by the 
state. It provides considerable arms resources for organized crime, and even minor disputes 
between citizens may be “solved” by the use of weapons.200 In addition, the proliferation of 
small arms poses a severe risk to local and international police officers. By 2005, eight KPS 
and three UNMIK police officers had been killed in armed attacks.201   
 
Financial and infrastructural constraints. The international and national police alike had to 
cope with severe shortcomings in the infrastructure. On the arrival of UNCIVPOL in Kosovo, 
the local police infrastructure had been destroyed and there was a severe shortage of office 
space, office equipment, communication technology, police cars etc.202 Many police stations 
were without heating, electricity or reasonable sanitation, circumstances which have not 
improved much thus far, at least with respect to heating and sanitary facilities. A number of 
police stations outside the main cities still lack basic office technology. In 2004, the EU Com-
mission criticized the KPS’s lack of equipment, casting doubt on its capacity to carry out 
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investigations properly.203 In 2005, UNDP estimated that 38 Million Euros would be required 
to adequately outfit the KPS with vehicles, computers and other equipment.204 After the 
March 2004 riots, UNMIK and the KPS planned to provide all police stations in Kosovo with 
riot control equipment. By spring 2005, the implementation of this plan was far from com-
plete.205 
 
The KPS budget is completely financed by the PISG. UNMIK covers only the costs for the 
international police force. The 40 million Euros, which the 2003 Kosovo General Government 
Budget provided for the KPS, was, however, “deemed insufficient to meet the basic 
equipment and overhead needs of the force”.206 Even the increase of the police budget to 53 
million Euros in 2004207 did not meet the requirements, since the KPS needed more resources 
due to the accelerating transfer process of police responsibility from UNMIK police to the 
KPS in 2004. Because of the limited financial resources available, salaries of KPS officers 
remained low with an average income of only 254 Euros per month. As this is hardly enough 
to support a family,208 these low salaries provide a fertile ground for corruption.  
 
Corruption is endemic in the Balkans. Despite UNMIK’s attempts to fight the problem 
through “proactive legislation and creation of institutional capability”,209 legal and institu-
tional loopholes have persisted in Kosovo. As with the fight against organized crime, UNMIK 
was only able to concentrate on this problem after the ethnic and general crime rates had 
significantly declined in 2002. Since then, a number of high-profile corruption cases have 
been uncovered and several high-ranking local and international officials have been arres-
ted.210 UNMIK also established an Investigation Task Force comprising representatives from 
the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), the EU Anti-fraud Office and the 
UNMIK Financial Affairs Unit in order to conduct and co-ordinate actions to identify fraud 
and corruption within UNMIK and local institutions.211 In March 2004, UNMIK and the 
PISG launched an anti-corruption strategy. Its implementation, however, has remained weak. 
Abuse of internal controls and procurement mechanisms continue to be widespread.212  
 
Interestingly, although international and local police officers perceive the low KPS salaries to 
be the biggest obstacle for the establishment of an accountable democratic police force, the 
Kosovo citizens themselves perceive the KPS as one of the state institutions least affected by 
corruption. The KPS is seen as the second least corrupt institution after the Kosovo Protection 
Corps (KPC). Bearing in mind that the KPC – as the de facto successor organization of the 
UCK – profits from its image as an institution of war heroes, it is remarkable that the KPS 
received the second-best ratings overall and the best ratings from the non-Serb minorities 
without having this image.213 The state institution perceived as most corrupt in Kosovo is the 
customs service, followed by the Kosovo Government, the Kosovo Presidency, and the judi-
ciary.214 45.2 per cent of Albanian respondents, and 44.8 per cent of non-Serb minorities said, 
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in the UNDP survey, that the KPS was not at all corrupt, while only 6.7 per cent of Serbian 
respondents expressed this positive perception. The relative majority of the Serbian res-
pondents (25.3 per cent) were of the opinion that the KPS was very corrupt. Only 3.2 per cent 
of Albanians and 5.2 per cent of non-Serbian minorities shared this negative view.215 The 
majority (52 per cent) of the population expected a decrease in the corruption level in the next 
three years.216 This perception of the population was also mirrored by the fact that only 8.4 
per cent of the KPS officers surveyed by CORE claimed there had been attempts to bribe 
them. The figure of 91.3 per cent of KPS officers who had never been offered a bribe (cf. 
chart A.24) corresponds to the figure of 85.2 per cent of UNMIK police officers who had 
never become aware of attempted bribery at their station. 14.8 per cent of UNMIK police 
officers claimed they were aware of such cases (cf. chart A.25). Despite these surprisingly 
positive figures, UNDP proposed, in 2005, that the KPS Professional Standards Unit (PSU) 
receive more and better qualified staff, and more equipment in order to effectively fight 
corruption and other cases of misconduct within the KPS.217 
 
Inadequate health insurance and pensions. Another problem related to finances is the issue of 
inadequate health insurance and pensions for KPS officers and their families. This problem 
became more pressing every time a KPS officer was injured or killed on duty.218 International 
and local police officers used to collect money to provide the families of their deceased col-
leagues with at least a little financial support. However, UNMIK stated that the principal 
dependents of “KPS officers killed by any means of violence committed against” them while 
on duty should receive the same “full pension entitlement which would have been paid had 
the officer reached retirement age”, as well as “immediate financial compensation of a lump 
sum equivalent to one-year’s salary”.219 These shortcomings in the working conditions under-
mine the working morale of KPS officers and possibly discourage a lot of potentially good 
police officers from joining the local police force. 
 
 
2.4 Conclusions 
 
Bearing in mind that the whole law enforcement structure in Kosovo has had to be built from 
scratch since 1999, a lot has been achieved. More than 7,500 local police officers were sched-
uled to have finished their training by the end of 2005, and the command authority for almost 
all police branches has already been transferred to the KPS. From a quantitative point of view, 
UNMIK and OMIK have fully achieved their goal of building up a KPS. It is also remarkable 
that OMIK and UNMIK were successful in establishing multi-ethnic police units, which have 
developed a co-operative and sometimes even friendly inter-ethnic relationship in spite of the 
general mistrust and sometimes even hatred that exists between ethnic Serbs and Albanians.  
 
However, questions remain regarding the quality of a number of KPS officers and their 
suitability for effectively fighting organized crime and providing for the security of all 
Kosovars, including the Serbian minority population. It would seem that due to the pressure 
of recruiting and training a large number of police officers in a short period of time − not least 
to support the inadequate number of UNMIK police officers − a lot of applicants have been 
accepted, who, due to their educational deficits, lack of physical fitness or their criminal 
background, are not suitable. 
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The extremely limited timeframe for training and the limited number and, in part, the poor 
quality of trainers made it very difficult to train KPS officers thoroughly. The lack of training 
and equipment became particularly obvious in the riots in March 2004, when KPS officers 
were often heavily overtaxed by protecting the lives and property of the Serbian and Roma 
communities. The already low trust of the Serbian community in the KPS, including its 
Serbian officers, was further diminished by the March riots. On the other hand, the KPS 
enjoys huge support among the Kosovo-Albanians and most non-Serbian minorities, a fact 
which must be emphasized in light of the circumstance that the Kosovo-Albanians never 
before trusted the institution of the police. In addition, UNMIK police officers working in 
specialized areas such as the fight against organized crime have praised the skills and profes-
sionalism of their local colleagues without whom they would have had no chance to penetrate 
the networks of organized crime. Finally, compared to their counterparts in neighbouring 
countries, the domestic police seem to be less affected by the number of structural deficits 
typical of police apparatuses of transformation countries such as the level of politicization, 
centralization, and corruption. This was a positive side effect of establishing a police service 
from scratch. 
 
After the March 2004 riots, UNMIK and the KPS leadership promised more efforts in training 
and equipping the KPS, particularly with respect to riot control. They also promised to sort 
out those within the KPS who were guilty of grave misconduct. Even though UNMIK has 
already transferred authority over police stations to the KPS, its head of mission did not want 
to rule out the option of a further executive policing mandate for a future EU police mis-
sion.220 In view of the fact that the UNMIK police have been dominant in fighting organized 
crime, the KPS needs more specialists to be able to effectively fulfil functions such as close 
protection, intelligence, special investigation, enforcement, and forensics. 
 
In addition to further training and better equipment, much of KPS’s future performance and 
structure will depend on the overall political developments in Kosovo directly linked to the 
decision of the future status of the crisis province. Assuming the most probable result of the 
status talks, that of a “conditional independence” for Kosovo,221 it remains unclear whether 
the police structure will remain the same: Will former UCK structures be introduced? Will the 
future ministry of the interior along with the KPS become much more politicized? And will 
Serbian KPS officers stay in Kosovo and in the police service, or leave for Serbia proper? It 
will be one of the most important tasks for the EU − probably implemented in the framework 
of a monitoring mission − to ensure that the KPS survives in the form it was envisaged in 
June 1999. 
                                                 
220  Cf. UNMIK 2005h. 
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Chapter 3 South Serbia 
 
 
In 2000, Albanian rebels of the Liberation Army for Presevo, Medvedja und Bujanovac 
(UCPMB) attacked Serbian security forces in the south Serbian region bordering on Kosovo, 
to emphasize their demands for greater autonomy of Albanian-inhabited municipalities or the 
accession of the Presevo valley to Kosovo. Because the UCPMB withdrew after their attacks 
into the five-kilometre wide Ground Safety Zone between Serbia proper and Kosovo – access 
to which, according to the Military Technical Agreement of 1999 was restricted for Serbian 
security forces – Serbia had no means of putting an end to the UCPMB actions.222 After the 
fall of Milosevic in October 2000, the new government tried to reach a peaceful solution. In 
spring 2001, the then Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Nebojsa Covic, who was also the Presi-
dent of the Coordinating Body of the Federal and Republic of Serbia Governments respon-
sible for Southern Serbia and Kosovo, developed a plan for the peaceful termination of the 
crisis in South Serbia. 
 
 
3.1 Mandate 
 
The so-called “Covic Plan” laid out four objectives for the solution to the crisis: 
  
1. “The elimination of all kinds of threats […] to state sovereignty and the territorial in-
tegrity of the Republic of Serbia”; 
2. “The establishment of […] security […], freedom of movement […], ensured by the 
complete disbanding and disarmament of terrorists, by the demilitarisation of the re-
gion and by allowing the return of all the refugees to their homes”; 
3. “The development of a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional society, based on demo-
cratic principles and the respect of all human, political and minority rights”; 
4. “Prosperous and rapid economic and social development […]”.223 
 
Goal no. 3 was to be implemented with a view to the “harmonization of the ethnic structures 
of the employees in the civil services, […] with the ethnic structure of the population”,224 
meaning that Albanian police officers were to be integrated into the existing Serbian police in 
the three municipalities of Medvedja, Bujanovac, and Presevo. Ethnically mixed patrols were 
to be introduced, “when the indispensable conditions for that [were] fulfilled”.225 According 
to the Covic Plan, the restoration of security and peace also included the “withdrawal of extra-
ordinarily engaged military and police forces, return or remaining of the regular police of 
mixed ethnic composition in settlements (stations, patrols and other forms of regular activi-
ties) and of regular military units, including the appropriate units at the line towards Kosovo 
and Metohija and the border units at the border with Macedonia”.226 
 
Ethnically mixed units were to be established, composed of a number of experienced Serbian 
and former Albanian police officers and 400 new police officers, of which more than half 
would be of Albanian ethnicity. Those 400 new officers were to be trained at the police acade-
my in Mitrovo Polje in three phases by May 2002.227 The newly established OSCE Mission to 
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225  Covic 2001: 80. 
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227  Cf. OSCE 2001e: 4. 
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the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (OMiFRY),228 which had already assisted the Serbian 
authorities in restructuring and training their law enforcement agencies in general, was ready 
to provide the training for this new Multi-Ethnic Police Element (MEPE) and offered 32 
police trainers.229 The first training phase was to consist of just three five-day refresher cour-
ses for 40 former Albanian and Serbian officers to enable the first multi-ethnic police patrols 
to be established quickly. In the second training phase, those 40 officers were to receive an 
additional five-week training. The third training phase, designed for new recruits, was to 
cover twelve weeks of basic police training, followed by a 16-week field training, delivered 
by Serbian instructors.230 The tentative start for the first training phase was 21 May 2001.231   
 
 
3.2 Building up the Multi-Ethnic Police Element 
3.2.1 Recruitment 
 
To be eligible for recruitment, MEPE cadets had to be between 20 and 27 years old, have a 
secondary-school education, be in good physical and mental health and have no criminal 
record.232 By August 2001, more than 500 candidates had applied. Serbian, Albanian and 
OSCE representatives jointly carried out the selection. The UCPMB insisted on its members 
being incorporated into the MEPE. A compromise was reached stating that former UCPMB 
fighters would neither be preferentially treated nor rejected.233 However, while the Serbian 
side claims that 30 per cent of the Albanian officers were former UCPMB fighters, Albanian 
representatives insist that former fighters make up less than five per cent of the Albanian 
MEPE officers.234 Although the Albanian community in the Presevo valley represents two-
thirds of the population, the co-ordination body set a 60 to 40 ratio in favour of the 
Albanians.235 With respect to the incorporation of women, the OSCE struggled to convince 
women to apply. Because of the low number of female applications received by the original 
deadline of August 2001, the OSCE started a media campaign in September 2001 to 
encourage women to join the police.236 In the end, only 28 women (seven Albanians/ 21 
Serbs) took part in the academy training.237   
       
 
3.2.2 Academy Training 
 
The first two training phases were run by five OSCE instructors, supported by two Serbian 
police instructors. Sixty Albanian and Serbian officers completed these courses in July 2001. 
The first six ethnically mixed teams had already started patrols in May 2001.238 The actual 
academy training began in August 2001. During the twelve-week training, the cadets received 
lessons in general policing (e.g. criminal and traffic law, code of conduct, human rights, 
democratic policing and ethnic diversity), instruction in operational police skills (e.g. use of 
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force, defensive tactics and disarming), firearms training and tactical training.239 The training 
curriculum was basically copied from that of the OSCE police academy in Kosovo and 
adjusted to suit certain specific aspects of Serbian police law.240 Thirty-four Serbs and 64 
Albanians took part in the first course. Since the OSCE was not able to quickly deploy the 32 
police instructors it had promised, 13 instructors were borrowed from the police academy in 
Kosovo.241 The academy was run by an OSCE police instructor in co-operation with a Serbian 
counterpart from the Ministry of Interior. Most classes were taught in English and translated 
into Serbian and Albanian; classes given by local instructors were taught in Serbian and 
consecutively translated into Albanian when requested by the cadets. By July 2002, 253 
Albanians, 128 Serbs, two Roma and three cadets of other minorities had graduated from four 
basic training courses.242 
 
3.2.2.1 Evaluation of the Training by Former MEPE Cadets 
 
In the CORE survey of October 2004, the twelve-week basic training received pretty good 
ratings. Of the former cadets, 42.2 per cent said they had been extremely satisfied with the 
training, 31.4 per cent said they had been very satisfied. While almost a quarter (24.5 per 
cent) of the former cadets had been only fairly satisfied, no more than two per cent had been 
more or less dissatisfied with the training (cf. annex, chart A.2). With respect to the evaluation 
of police instructors, the relative majority of MEPE officers (38.2 per cent) were extremely 
satisfied with their former OSCE instructors, while 29.3 per cent were very satisfied and 30.1 
per cent fairly satisfied. Only 2.4 per cent said they had been more or less dissatisfied with the 
OSCE instructors (cf. chart A.3). Local instructors were even better evaluated. 41.5 per cent 
of respondents said they had been extremely satisfied with the local instructors, and 32.5 per 
cent were very satisfied, while 22.8 per cent reported that they had only been fairly satisfied. 
Just 3.3 per cent said they had been more or less dissatisfied with their local trainers (cf. chart 
A.4). OSCE instructors received their best ratings for their motivation for work (50.9 per cent 
excellent / 28.7 per cent very good) and for their readiness to speak about problems after 
training classes (51.8 per cent excellent / 19.1 per cent very good, cf. chart A.5e). These 
factors were rated less enthusiastically for the Serbian instructors (motivation for work: 40.5 
per cent excellent / 32.4 per cent very good; readiness to talk about problems after classes: 
44.1 per cent excellent / 20.7 per cent very good) (cf. chart A.6e).   
 
Assessment of resources available. The relative majority (42.9 per cent) of the former MEPE 
cadets assessed the time frame for the basic training as moderately sufficient; 38.1 per cent 
said it was sufficient; 19 per cent, however, considered it to be insufficient. With respect to 
the material resources available for training, the assessment was less positive. While the ma-
jority (52.9 per cent) said the material resources were moderately sufficient, only 25.7 per 
cent said they were sufficient and almost as many (21.4 per cent) considered them to be insuf-
ficient (cf. chart A.8).  
 
3.2.2.2 Assessment of Qualification of the Cadets 
 
Former OSCE instructors differed in their assessment of the suitability of local cadets. Views 
ranged from only 10-25 to 75-90 per cent of local officers being suitable for the job.243 
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Educational deficits and a lack of professional attitude, in part due to the politicization of the 
cadets (meaning that a number of those unsuited had been given the job because of political 
pressure) were seen as the cadets’ biggest deficits.244 
 
 
3.2.3 Field Training  
 
The 16-week field training was conducted by Serbian police officers on the job, since MEPE 
officers were to be incorporated into existing police structures.245 However, the new MEPE 
officers, instead of being integrated into daily police work at police stations, were mostly 
deployed in groups of six or eight to police containers, often located in remote areas in the 
countryside, where they did not receive adequate field training −  if they received any at all. 
As in the case of Kosovo, field training was also hampered by a lack of structure in the pro-
gramme as well as by the uneven interests and teaching abilities of local trainers.246 The train-
ing offered usually did not afford any opportunity to practice or apply new skills.247 In the 
end, the standing of these new officers was pretty low among their colleagues, who had 
undergone the regular six-month basic training.248 
 
Assessment of resources available. The assessments of the resources available for the field 
training were as modest as for the basic training. The relative majority (48.2 per cent) of the 
former MEPE cadets assessed the training time and 56.8 per cent the availability of material 
resources, as only moderately sufficient. 14.3 per cent rated the time frame, and 19.8 per cent 
rated material resources as insufficient. 37.5 per cent rated the time frame and 23.5 per cent 
the material resources as sufficient (cf. chart A.9). 
 
Additional training provided by the OSCE mission. In April 2002, in an effort to improve the 
poor policing skills of the MEPE officers, the Law Enforcement Department (LED) of 
OMiFRY offered a follow-up course for MEPE as part of the Modern Policing Course, which 
the LED had already developed for the entire Serbian police force. The course focused on five 
specific topics of democratic policing including law enforcement and the community, com-
munication, use of force, defensive tactics, and a legal update. By December 2002, over 600 
officers from South Serbia had participated in this additional training.249 Since the Serbian 
MoI had not introduced any measures to further improve the performance of the MEPE offi-
cers after the end of the original MEPE training in 2002, the OSCE mission (meanwhile 
renamed OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro (OMiSaM)250) provided south Serbian 
police officers with an additional Police Development Program in 2003. By 2004, a total of 
620 officers had been re-trained in one-week courses to improve their skills on issues such as 
tactical communication, community policing, drug identification, infectious diseases, officer 
survival, weapon disarming and searching vehicles and people.251      
 
To enhance field training and mentoring in Serbia, OMiSaM provided a six-week Trainer 
Development Program in 2003 and 2004 for 98 Serbian officers, about ten of them coming 
from South Serbia.252 In addition, the mission reassigned three police trainers to the Presevo 
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valley to improve in-service training and community policing in the region.253 OMiSaM also 
proposed that the MoI should provide its MEPE officers with an intensive training course of 
at least two months, covering areas in which MEPE officers still showed a serious lack of 
skill. Areas to be covered were investigative skills, confidence building, community policing 
and police station management.254 Finally, in 2004, the OMiSaM and the Serbian authorities 
established the South Serbia Working Group, comprised of the mayors and police chiefs of 
Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja, police officials from Vranje and Leskovac as well as 
representatives from the MoI, the co-ordination body and the OSCE. The initial focus was on 
an in-service training programme for all police officers in the three south Serbian municipali-
ties, conducted by Serbian instructors who had passed the OSCE’s Trainer Development 
Course. The OSCE mission’s LED and the Serbian MoI jointly conducted a training needs 
assessment and developed a training curriculum.255 Community policing and police manage-
ment were again high on the training agenda. The training started in March 2005.256  
 
Additional training provided by other international actors. In 2001, the Serbian MoI named 
the OSCE mission as the co-ordinator of international police reform activities because a num-
ber of other international organizations (Council of Europe, European Agency for Reconstruc-
tion) and states (Australia, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and the US) 
were also present with their own projects, often focusing on the same issues. For example, 
five of the actors mentioned offered projects on fighting organized crime, at least three were 
engaged in border police assistance, and three supported Serbia in the field of forensics. How-
ever, OMiSaM complained about the unwillingness of a number of international actors to co-
ordinate their actions with the OSCE, leading to a duplication of work and, even worse, 
allowing the Serbian MoI to pit “one organization against the other in an attempt to get as 
much out of the international community as possible”.257 In June 2004, the MoI and OMiSaM 
signed a memorandum of understanding on joint co-ordination of international assistance. 
This helped to improve co-ordination in certain fields such as border policing, but in other 
fields such as criminal intelligence or community policing co-ordination was still insuffi-
cient.258     
 
 
3.2.4 Efforts to Win the Trust of the Local Population  
 
In November 2003, the OSCE started a Community Policing Programme in South Serbia to 
improve the relationship between the police and the population. The programme consisted of 
several components: 
 
• a two-day management training course for senior police officers to teach them basic 
management skills for running police stations in a professional manner; 
• a drug-awareness programme at schools in South Serbia; 
• a school-resource officer programme, in which police officers would go to schools to 
enhance confidence building; 
• the establishment of Community Advisory Groups (CAGs). These were fora where re-
presentatives of local municipalities, religious groups, the chamber of commerce and the 
local police could meet regularly for open discussions on security concerns of all groups 
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represented. The CAGs were to be engaged in supervising police activities, enhancing 
community participation in police decision-making and encouraging the police to be 
more responsive and responsible.259  
 
In addition to the CAGs, which functioned at the very basic community level, the OSCE envi-
saged the establishment of Municipal Safety Councils (MSCs) at the municipality level. Each 
MSC was to be composed of the mayor, the head of administration, the chief of police and 
representatives of public services such as education, health, social welfare and public utility 
companies. The MSCs, arranging consultations with the CAGs, were to have an advisory role 
to the Municipal Assemblies in defining the main safety issues of the municipalities.260 In 
November 2004, OMiSaM started a number of community safety workshops in the three 
south Serbian municipalities. Here, local actors had the opportunity to exchange views on 
community safety issues with police experts from the UK.261  
 
Another OSCE programme in the area of community policing was the training and deploy-
ment of Community Policing Officers (CPOs). The OSCE envisaged the introduction of 60 
CPOs, who would link the 40 police containers with the villages surrounding them. Each 
village would have its own CPO, who would facilitate the exchange of information and views 
between the community members and the police. In the training and mentoring phase, the 
OSCE would provide at least three mentors to reinforce the CPOs’ knowledge of the commu-
nity policing philosophy.262  
 
 
3.2.5 Excursus: Reform of the Judicial and Penal System 
 
In addition to deep-seated corruption, the judicial system also suffered from a severe lack of 
independence from political influence. Judges were appointed by the ruling party (-coalitions) 
in parliament. Judges obviously unsuited for applying the law could, therefore, make careers 
thanks to their political connections.263 The EU Commission criticized the inefficiency of the 
courts, which caused a huge backlog of unsolved cases.264 While citizens’ trust in the judi-
ciary slightly increased after the fall of Milosevic in October 2000 (42 per cent saying they 
had trust, 49 per cent that they had no trust), by summer 2003, the level of trust had again fal-
len to only 33 per cent.265  
 
In an effort to ensure the independence of judges, parliament adopted five laws in 2001 that 
led to the establishment of two independent bodies; the High Council of the Judiciary inten-
ded to nominate judges and court presidents; and the Grand Personnel Council tasked with 
ascertaining grounds for removing judges and court presidents. However, by 2003, several 
amendments to the 2001 laws ultimately led to the replacement of those two independent 
bodies with a parliamentary board responsible for proposing judges and court presidents. The 
Minister of Justice assumed the authority to remove judges.266 The EU Commission com-
plained that the introduction of the state of emergency, following the assassination of Prime 
Minister Djindjic in March 2003, led to legislative and personnel changes in the judiciary 
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based on irregular procedures. For example, the Serbian parliament decided to retire 35 judges 
without the legally required involvement of the Supreme Court.267 The deficits of the judici-
ary were even more acute in South Serbia, where Albanians had almost no representation in 
the judicial system. At the end of 2003, there was only one Albanian judge working in 
Presevo, only ten Albanians were working in the court administration in Presevo and one in 
the court administration in Bujanovac. The introduction of legal apprentice jobs for Albanians 
in the courts and prosecutors’ offices was seen as the beginning of a long process of fairly 
representing Albanians in the judiciary.268  
 
Since the judicial system suffered from a lack of qualified judges and prosecutors, OMiFRY, 
ODIHR and the Serbian government had discussed measures to improve the training for 
judges, prosecutors and lawyers. As a consequence, in April 2001, the Belgrade authorities 
established the Judicial Training Centre, a national institute for education and retraining of 
judges, prosecutors and lawyers. The OSCE took a seat on the Centre’s Advisory Board.269 
However, efforts to improve the quality of judges and prosecutors had little success, as almost 
two years later, both judges and prosecutors were still dissatisfied with the quality and organi-
zation of seminars as well as the lack of opportunities to attend them due to a shortage of 
funds.270 In 2001, another issue of concern to the OSCE mission and its partner organizations 
was the low salaries for both judges and public prosecutors (170 Euros a month on average), 
leading to a loss of qualified personnel, who preferred working for the private sector and, at 
the same time, preparing the ground for corruption (see 3.3.6). Following the advice of 
OMiSaM and other agencies, the Serbian government agreed to double the salaries.271  
 
Reform of the penal system. Based on a joint needs assessment study by the Council of Europe 
and OMiFRY, the ODIHR and the Serbian government agreed, in 2001, on a programme for 
penal reform including legislative review, study visits, and professional training for the staff 
and administrators of the penal system.272 In 2003, an OSCE/UN monitoring mission des-
cribed the overall conditions in prisons, notably in detention centres, as a serious cause for 
concern. Furthermore, in connection with the state of emergency and the police operation 
“Sabre” in 2003, several international organizations and NGOs reported cases of ill treatment 
even including torture. The EU Commission was critical about those claims not being fully 
investigated by the Serbian authorities. In 2004, the Commission also complained that the 
comprehensive reform of the prison system was still only in a preparatory phase.273      
 
 
3.2.6 Police-Related Law Reform 
 
In 2001, to adapt Serbian legislation to European standards and to improve the effectiveness 
of the police in fighting crime, the Serbian government began introducing new police-related 
legislation such as a criminal procedure law, and a law defining organized crime.274 However, 
the government’s attempt to revise the old Serbian police law from 1991 faced severe difficul-
ties. A draft police law, introduced to parliament in 2002, was still waiting for approval in 
mid-2005 due to the political stalemate in the Serbian Parliament.275 The MoI was more 
successful in introducing a code of ethics for its police officers in 2003, developed in co-
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operation with the OSCE mission.276 While the implementation of the code has not yet been 
evaluated, the suitability of other legal reforms can be assessed: The frequent revision of the 
criminal procedure law (four times between 2001 and 2004) demonstrates the immature state 
of the new legislation.277  
 
 
3.3 Taking Stock of Reform Efforts    
3.3.1 Establishment of Multi-Ethnic Police Units  
 
With the completion of the basic training courses in June 2002, OMiFRY had achieved its 
goals with respect to the number of MEPE officers recruited and trained. However, with only 
about 280 Albanians being part of the MEPE, the Albanian share of police officers did not 
fully correspond to the percentage of Albanians within the south Serbian population despite 
the announced intention to that effect in the Covic Plan. According to the Helsinki Committee 
for Human Rights in Serbia, Albanian police representation in Medvedja, where Albanians 
made up 26.17 per cent of the population, was 12.1 per cent in 2002. In Bujanovac, 40 per 
cent of the police officers were Albanian, while 54.69 per cent of the general population were 
Albanians. In Presevo, where 89.10 per cent of the population were Albanians, only 50 per 
cent, (according to ICG only 30 per cent) of the police officers belonged to that community.278 
On the other hand, bearing in mind that the police in those three municipalities had included 
only a handful of Albanian officers before May 2001, this development represented a great 
improvement. Presevo had an Albanian Chief of Police, while the Serbian and Montenegrin 
police chiefs of Bujanovac and Medvedja had Albanian deputies. Moreover, the Albanian 
community was consulted during the appointment process.279          
 
One point which continued to concern the OSCE mission and particularly the Albanian popu-
lation in South Serbia was the high number of Serbian police officers, who had participated in 
fighting the UCK in Kosovo in 1998/1999, and who had been deployed to South Serbia after 
the withdrawal of Serbian police from Kosovo in June 1999. Some of those officers were sus-
pected of having committed war crimes in Kosovo. The Serbian Ministry of Interior had pro-
mised to rotate those officers to other regions of Serbia and replace them with MEPE offi-
cers.280 However, this process was still far from being completed by 2005.281 
 
Most MEPE officers were deployed in small ethnically mixed units in 40 newly set-up police 
containers within or on the outskirts of Albanian-dominated and ethnically mixed villages in 
the Presevo valley. Others worked at fixed police stations in towns. Three years after the 
beginning of the first MEPE training course, the OSCE and the Serbian MoI stressed that all 
MEPE officers had been incorporated into the structures of the regular Serbian police and that 
the term MEPE was, therefore, no longer appropriate.282 However, the work of the officers 
deployed in containers was restricted to guarding their containers, doing foot patrols or opera-
ting the radios. This severely hampered the development of their general policing skills,283 
                                                                                                                                                        
274  Cf. Paunovic 2004: 28f. 
275  Cf. ibid: 29. 
276  Cf. ibid: 30. 
277  Cf. ibid: 33. 
278  Cf. Trivunovic 2004: 274; International Crisis Group 2003b: 18.  
279  Cf. Trivunovic 2004: 18.  
280  Cf. International Crisis Group 2003b: 18. 
281  Interviews with OMiSaM representatives, Belgrade and Bujanovac, October 2004. 
282  Interviews with representatives of the Serbian MoI and OMiSaM, Belgrade and Bujanovac, October 
2004. 
283  Interviews with OMiSaM representatives, Belgrade and Bujanovac, October 2004. 
 51
which led to the assessment by the elder and more experienced Serbian officers that the multi-
ethnic units were still “a largely separate and less capable entity”.284 Furthermore, Albanian 
officers had not been promoted since the beginning of the training. The Serbian MoI justified 
this with the lack of higher education of most Albanian officers as well as a lack of work 
experience among the new police officers. A first attempt to promote two Albanian officers 
failed, because the officers had left the police college in Belgrade before completing their 
advanced training, “leaving allegations of intimidation behind”.285 
 
Another issue that contradicts the assertion that the MEPE officers have been integrated into 
Serbian police structures has been the lack of co-operation between Serbian Gendarmerie and 
the multi-ethnic police units. In cases where the Gendarmerie conducted search operations in 
Albanian-dominated municipalities, the multi-ethnic units were not informed, let alone 
involved in the operations.286 Obviously, there was mistrust on behalf of the Gendarmerie. 
The exclusion of the multi-ethnic units from such operations represented another missed 
opportunity for building confidence among the minority population in the state security 
organs. Another example of a severe lack of co-operation between the Gendarmerie and 
multi-ethnic police was an incident, in which the Gendarmerie beat one Albanian police offi-
cer and arrested three others, but did not inform the local chief of police about the reasons for 
the arrest or about the whereabouts of the officers. The response of the Gendarmerie to public 
complaints on such practices was usually quite simply: “We have our reasons”.287   
 
As an important step to genuine integration of the multi-ethnic units into the regular police 
force, the OSCE pushed in 2004 for the reduction and consolidation of the containers and the 
establishment of more permanent sub-stations, in which the new police officers would “carry 
out the same administrative functions as the main police stations [...] and have the capacity to 
develop local initiatives to prevent crime and undertake criminal investigations.”288 These 
changes would also allow normal career development and rotation of staff between field offi-
ces and main police stations.289 By the end of 2004, the Serbian authorities seemed to be wil-
ling to consider this proposal and, by late spring 2005, they had started reducing the number 
of containers.290 
 
 
3.3.2 Performance of the MEPE  
3.3.2.1 Crime Development 
 
According to the chiefs of the police in Medvedja, Bujanovac, and Presevo, the situation in 
2004 had very much improved compared to the tense security situation in 2000/2001. There 
were no “terrorist attacks” in 2004 in contrast to multiple threats and hand-grenade attacks 
against Albanian MEPE officers in 2002 and 2003.291 The situation of public order was char-
acterized as very satisfying. Even the large number of rallies to support the UCPMB, which 
had taken place since 2001, had passed without any violence. No ethnic conflicts had been 
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reported. Ordinary crime rates had declined (e.g. by 40 per cent in Medvedja) significantly 
within the previous three years and were on the same level as in the rest of Serbia. The biggest 
problem, according to the police chiefs, was large-scale smuggling of cigarettes and weapons 
from Kosovo and the trafficking of women to Kosovo. Co-operation with UNMIK police and 
KFOR in fighting smuggling was characterized as good, but with room for improvement.292  
 
This positive assessment of the security situation in South Serbia was not shared by all citi-
zens of the three municipalities. One-third of the Serbs (33.3 per cent) and 40.8 per cent of the 
Albanians felt unsafe in their municipalities. Furthermore, only about one half of each ethnic 
group (52.8 per cent of the Albanians and 45.5 per cent of the Serbs) had the feeling that their 
property was secure.293 However, when asked in another poll, conducted on behalf of the 
OSCE and the MoI, what crimes and issues posed the biggest problems in South Serbia, a 
clear majority of all respondents in the three south Serbian municipalities (55 per cent) did not 
mention serious crimes, but considered dumping of waste and rubbish to be the biggest prob-
lem in the region, followed by bad traffic behaviour of fellow citizens (40.9 per cent). Public 
disorder ranked third with 31.9 per cent. Classic crimes such as property theft were seen by 
only 26.2 per cent as a problem, again followed by minor issues such as parking problems 
(25.7 per cent) and stray animals (25.4 per cent). Serious crimes such as murders (2.2 per 
cent), sexual assault (two per cent), assault (6.2 per cent), domestic violence (5.5 per cent) or 
juvenile delinquency (5.5 per cent) did not seem to be of much concern to the general pub-
lic.294  
 
In another survey by the South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms 
and Light Weapons (SEESAC), inhabitants of the three municipalities assessed the different 
factors threatening general security in South Serbia. While 53 per cent of Serbian “household 
heads” (HH)295 said that general security was not threatened, only 15 per cent of Albanian HH 
shared this view. Interestingly, 43 per cent of Albanian HH felt that general security was most 
threatened by the Serbian Gendarmerie, followed by 14 per cent who identified the military as 
a threatening factor. Crime and corruption were only mentioned by three per cent of the 
Albanian HH. In sharp contrast to this view, Serbian HH neither mentioned the Gendarmerie 
nor the army as a threatening factor for general security. Their perception of security threats 
focused on terrorism (eight per cent) and inter-ethnic conflicts (seven per cent). Similar to the 
Albanian HH crime and corruption were also not assessed as particularly threatening (five per 
cent).  
 
With respect to their personal security, both Serbian HH (71 per cent) and Albanian HH (43 
per cent) assessed the situation significantly more positively. Again, for the Albanian HH the 
Gendarmerie posed the biggest threat to personal security (25 per cent), whereas Serbian HH 
considered crime and corruption (9 per cent) as the biggest threat for their personal securi-
ty.296 Comparing the security situation of 2003 with that of a year before, 50 per cent of 
Albanian HH said it had improved and pointed to the MEPE introduction as a major contribu-
ting factor. Twenty-seven per cent said it had remained the same. Most Serbian HH (60 per 
cent) said that security had remained the same, while 25 per cent claimed it had improved. 
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Only nine per cent of the Albanian and seven per cent of the Serbian HH perceived the 
security situation as worse compared to the year before.297  
 
3.3.2.2 Demonstrated Skills and Level of Professionalism 
 
As mentioned above, MEPE officers had insufficient field training and had few opportunities 
to develop general policing skills by learning on the job. Therefore, in the international and 
local perception, their policing skills were rated rather low. MEPE officers, Serbs and 
Albanians alike, appeared to be far less experienced than their long-serving colleagues. 
According to one police chief, a number of Albanians selected should not be in the police, 
because they had only been included to protect Albanian interests. In his view, 50 per cent of 
the officers were suitable to do their job or needed only a little more training, while 50 per 
cent needed a lot more training. This rather negative assessment of the policing skills of 
Albanian police officers was (of course) not shared by MEPE officers themselves. The rela-
tive majority (31.9 per cent) even said that all MEPE officers were suitable for police work, 
while another 12.6 per cent thought that more than 90 per cent were suitable. The second big-
gest fraction of respondents (22.7 per cent) said that between 75-90 per cent of the officers 
were suitable. Just 15 per cent believed that only between 50-75 per cent of the officers were 
suited. Even less favourable perceptions were given only by a small fraction of respondents 
(cf. chart A.10). 
 
A written test covering several important policing domains, conducted by OMiSaM in South 
Serbia with 183 police officers with different educational backgrounds and work experience, 
revealed that MEPE officers (with the exception of officers in Medvedja) scored significantly 
lower than their colleagues who had passed the Police High School and regular Serbian Basic 
Police Course training.298 While the subject of community policing was best dealt with, issues 
such as traffic safety, human rights and the penal code proved to be the areas with which they 
were least familiar.299  
 
The human rights record of the Serbian police. While there are no reports available dealing 
specifically with human rights violations by members of the new multi-ethnic contingents, a 
number of reports focus on the human rights record of the Serbian police in general. Accor-
ding to the Serbian Humanitarian Law Center (HLC), there have been no “serious incidents of 
police misconduct against members of ethnic communities since the fall of Milosevic”.300 
However, while relations between Albanians, other minorities and the police may have 
improved significantly in Serbia, Roma are still targets of racial discrimination and police 
brutality.301 Even the Serbian government admitted that, between 2003 and 2004, nineteen 
police officers were involved in physical attacks against Roma.302 According to Human 
Rights Watch and Amnesty International, since 2004, human rights advocates, NGOs and 
parts of the media have become prime targets of intimidation and physical attacks by nation-
alistic circles in Serbia that continue to have close ties to parts of the police or the Serbian 
State Security Agency (BIA). Such intimidation and attacks occurred particularly in cases in 
which human rights activists demanded the investigation of (war) crimes committed by Serbs. 
In South Serbia, for example, a human rights lawyer was beaten up by a police officer, appar-
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ently because he had recently represented a client who was beaten up by the same police offi-
cer.303 According to the HLC, members of the police and BIA also threatened a number of 
people in South Serbia, so that they would not give evidence to the HLC about the secret bur-
ning and burying of corpses of Kosovo-Albanians in May 1999 in South Serbia.304 Even if the 
police or the BIA were not directly involved in such intimidation or attacks, they were, at the 
very least, indifferent, neither preventing nor investigating those incidents. Sharing this atti-
tude were a number of members the judiciary who failed to prosecute such cases, thus perpe-
tuating the climate of impunity for these kinds of crimes.305  
 
In general, the HLC considered the “frequency with which police officers continue to use 
excessive force during identity checks, arrests, detention in police stations, and investigatory 
interrogations”306 to be the most pressing human rights problem. According to HLC, the rea-
son for such cases of police misconduct was rooted in the absence of proper police work on 
collecting material evidence.307 Torture was used to gain evidence. Prosecutors were again 
passive about investigating such offences.308 During the operation “Sabre” and the state of 
emergency in 2003, sixteen persons were tortured by the police according to Amnesty Inter-
national. However, the MoI confirmed “only” six cases.309 In addition to cases of torture, the 
police frequently violated the rights of citizens by not informing suspects of their rights.310 
HLC considered members of the Gendarmerie to be the greatest threat to human rights in 
Serbia.311 They earned a particular reputation for routinely using excessive force when dealing 
with crowd control, staffing checkpoints or conducting searches. The Albanian population in 
South Serbia, in particular, continued to complain about the discriminatory and menacing 
behaviour of the Gendarmerie as well as its actions to prevent Albanians from working in 
fields close to the Kosovo border. There were also complaints about beatings and seizures of 
money as well as house searches without court orders (see 3.3.4).312  
 
In order to fight and penalize police misconduct, the post of General Inspector at the MoI was 
established in June 2003. This official was supposed to investigate all allegations of police 
abuse. However, the work of the General Inspector was quite critically assessed by the HLC, 
since he confirmed, for example, only one of six cases of police misconduct that the HLC had 
presented to him. In 2005, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia complained 
that the office of the General Inspector was still not fully operational, because of a shortage of 
personnel, financial resources and the lack of regulations defining its competencies. The 
OSCE mission proposed that the General Inspector be accountable to the parliament and not 
to the MoI.313 The General Inspector himself complained that his powers were restricted from 
the very top of the Ministry of Interior.314     
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3.3.3 Social Inter-Ethnic Climate at the Police Academy and in the Units 
3.3.3.1 Social Climate at the Academy 
 
Since the police academy of Mitrovo Polje is located outside the Presevo valley (near Nis) in 
a non-Albanian area, there was initially concern that Albanian MEPE applicants would not 
want to participate in the training so far away from their own community. The OSCE, 
however, responded to these worries by offering a bus service from Mitrovo Polje to 
Bujanovac every two weeks. Former OMiFRY police instructors described the inter-ethnic 
atmosphere at the academy as acceptable.315 MEPE officers recalled the climate at the police 
academy even more positively. While 23.1 per cent said the climate had been acceptable, 44.6 
per cent called it co-operative, and 28.9 per cent even described it as friendly. Only 1.7 per 
cent recalled it as uncomfortable or tense (cf. chart A.12a). 89.1 per cent of MEPE officers 
had never been aware of any ethnically motivated problems at the academy. Interestingly, 
Albanian officers were much less aware of any ethnically motivated problems. Only 2.7 per 
cent of the Albanian MEPE members had ever been aware of such problems. Among the 
Serbian officers, who had been in the minority position at the academy, however, a quarter of 
the respondents recalled such problems (cf. chart A.13a). Underlining the good inter-ethnic 
climate at the police academy, almost 90 per cent of the former cadets claimed they had social 
contact with cadets belonging to other ethnic groups after the training sessions (cf. chart 
A.14).  
 
3.3.3.2 Social Climate in the Multi-Ethnic Units 
 
MEPE officers described the inter-ethnic climate at police containers and police stations in 
quite positive terms. The relative majority of 36.2 per cent called the climate friendly, while 
33.6 per cent called it co-operative, and 24.1 per cent thought it was acceptable. Only 5.2 per 
cent felt the climate to be uncomfortable, and 0.9 per cent thought it was tense. None of the 
respondents described the climate as antagonistic (cf. chart A.17). This positive assessment 
was shared by representatives of the MoI and OMiSaM. The good climate involved a 
professional and good working relationship.316 The vast majority of respondents from both 
ethnic groups (81 per cent of Serbs / 89.3 per cent of Albanians) also stated they had never 
been aware of ethnically motivated problems in their units. Among those who had at least 
once been aware of such problems, Serbs were in the majority (19 per cent of Serbs / 10.7 per 
cent of Albanians, cf. chart A.18). A remarkable majority of the officers (82.1 per cent) also 
claimed to have social contact after duty with colleagues belonging to other ethnic groups (cf. 
chart A.19). The majority of MEPE officers (55.1 per cent) were not concerned about the 
effects the incorporation of former combatants would have on the efficient functioning of the 
multi-ethnic units. As in the case of Kosovo, Serbs were more sceptical than Albanians. 23.3 
per cent of Serbs, but only 5.3 per cent of Albanians were afraid of negative effects (cf. chart 
A.16). 
  
 
3.3.4 Public Perception of MEPE Performance 
 
In 2004, the Albanian population in the three municipalities was more enthusiastic about the 
performance of the multi-ethnic police than were the Serbs. While the majority of Albanians 
(55.2 per cent) rated the performance of MEPE as good and nine per cent even as excellent, 
only 25.6 per cent of Serbs thought that the police performance was good, and 13.4 per cent 
said the performance was excellent. Correspondingly, only 5.7 per cent of the Albanians said 
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the performance was poor, while almost a quarter of the Serb respondents (24.3 per cent) were 
of that opinion. Furthermore, 25.5 per cent of the Albanians and 33 per cent of the Serbs rated 
the MEPE performance as fair.317 While it could be expected that the perceptions of 
Albanians and Serbs on the MEPE would differ, the actual difference in perceptions is 
remarkably small. 
 
When asked who should be responsible for security in the region, the differences in opinions 
between Albanians and Serbs were more significant. Serbian respondents preferred the 
existing MUP forces (39 per cent), followed by the army (23 per cent), and the Gendarmerie 
(seven per cent). Only two per cent of the Serb respondents preferred the multi-ethnic police 
units. In sharp contrast, 24 per cent of the Albanian respondents preferred the multi-ethnic 
police, 19 per cent the MUP forces, only one per cent the army and none of the Albanians 
mentioned the Gendarmerie.318 What can be said definitively is that the majority of south 
Serbian citizens felt that the police had reformed since 2001. Not surprisingly, Albanians 
appreciated the effects of the reform more than Serbians did. Eleven per cent said the police 
department had reformed completely, 42.5 per cent said it had mostly reformed, and 35 per 
cent said it had reformed somewhat. Only three per cent of the Albanian respondents said 
there had been no noticeable reform. Serbian respondents were somewhat less enthusiastic 
about the reform endeavours, with only 5.8 per cent saying that the police had completely 
reformed, 32.7 per cent saying it had mostly reformed, and the relative majority of 
respondents saying it had only reformed somewhat. 11.9 per cent of Serb respondents stated 
that the police had not reformed at all since 2001.319 According to the respondents, the 
behaviour of the police had improved visibly since the introduction of police reform 
measures, although more needed to be done.320 Already by 2002, a quarter of respondents had 
noticed “much better treatment” by the police and 45.5 per cent mentioned “somewhat better 
treatment”.321 
   
Corresponding to the general public perception of the police, the majority of MEPE officers 
felt accepted by the population in Serbian-dominated municipalities (high acceptance: 31.9 
per cent / relatively high acceptance: 32.8 per cent) as well as in Albanian-dominated 
municipalities (high acceptance: 39.8 per cent / relatively high acceptance: 28 per cent). 
However, 25 per cent of the Albanian officers perceived their acceptance in Serbian-
dominated municipalities to be low. Interestingly, compared to the Albanian respondents, 
Serbs felt better accepted in municipalities, which were dominated by “the other ethnicity”, 
since only 16.3 per cent of Serbian respondents rated their acceptance in those areas as low 
(cf. chart A.20). 
 
  
3.3.5 Obstacles to the Build-up of a Democratic Multi-Ethnic Police Service  
 
From the pre-determined categories of answers in the CORE survey, a clear majority of 
MEPE officers (57 per cent) selected the low salaries of police officers as the biggest obstacle 
to establishing an accountable and democratic police force, because low salaries influence the 
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working morale of the police and favour corruption. Other important obstacles perceived by 
significantly lower percentages of officers were the influence of organized crime (31.5 per 
cent), inappropriate legislation (30.8 per cent) and the influence of political parties and groups 
(30 per cent). More than a quarter of the officers also rated the insufficient training of MEPE 
officers (27.4 per cent) and the low acceptance of the MEPE by the local population as big 
obstacles (25.8 per cent, cf. chart A.23). In the following, some of these problems will be 
analysed in more detail.  
 
The politicization of the police was even seen by police officers as one of the biggest 
obstacles to the creation of an accountable, democratic police force. In the case of South 
Serbia, there was the specific problem of the politically influenced decision-making in the 
MEPE recruitment. In addition, OMiSaM, in its efforts to reform the Serbian police service in 
general, had to struggle with the deeply politicized structures of the police. Until 2005, the 
Serbian Minister of Internal Affairs was still the head of the police force and kept direct 
command, e.g. over the Directorate for the Suppression of Organized Crime.322 The OSCE 
complained that Serbian politicians mistakenly had understood police accountability to mean 
political control of the police. Quite the contrary, operational independence, control and res-
ponsibility had to become the rule within the police service.323 The draft police law, which 
was still waiting for approval by parliament in the summer of 2005, at least envisaged steps 
for the separation of the police service from the MoI, with the police director being selected 
through public advertisement and competition.324  
 
Centralization. During the Milosevic area, politicization also involved the centralization of 
police structures. Like de-politicization, the de-centralization process, meaning the devolve-
ment of authority from the MoI to the local police commanders, did not go as smoothly as 
desired by the OSCE and its international and Serbian partners. However, since devolving 
authority to local commanders was a prerequisite for effective and responsive community 
policing, OMiSaM urged the MoI to further decentralize its command structures.325   
 
Lack of co-operation by citizens. While the majority (59.4 per cent) of south Serbian citizens 
stressed that they would be willing to co-operate with the police in solving problems in their 
community, there was still a significant percentage (40.6 per cent) of the respondents who 
were not willing to co-operate.326 However, bearing in mind that most Albanians in South 
Serbia had, until 2001, objected to any co-operation with the police, these figures are quite 
positive. The introduction of ethnically mixed patrols had led to a significant increase of trust 
in the police and therefore also to the increased willingness to co-operate with the police. 
Since more than 64 per cent of respondents in the three municipalities at the end of 2002 had 
also said that they would appreciate “some sort of education of the citizens about co-operating 
with the police”,327 one can assume that the public information initiatives and confidence-
building measures within the framework of the OSCE’s community policing programme led 
to a further increase in the willingness of citizens to co-operate with the police.     
 
Small arms proliferation. In 2004, the south Serbian population frequently said that firearms 
were present throughout the Presevo valley. However, each ethnic group claimed that only the 
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327  Ibid.: 58. 
 58
other group possessed firearms.328 The majority of Albanians (62 per cent) said that the 
control of firearms would not increase security in South Serbia, while the majority of Serbian 
respondents (52 per cent) were of the opposite opinion. Interestingly, despite the fact that 
Albanians were generally more sceptical than Serbian respondents about the positive effect on 
security of handing in illegal weapons, the Albanians were actually much more willing to 
hand in their weapons in exchange for community development projects in their 
municipalities.329       
 
Corruption. In the 2004 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, Serbia and 
Montenegro was in place 97 together with Algeria, Lebanon, Nicaragua and Macedonia with 
an index of 2.7 (10 being the most “clean”).330 Police corruption in particular is a problem, 
which has been widely perceived by the Serbian population, local NGOs and international 
actors.331 According to a public perception survey from 2002, the police department was rated 
as the second most corrupt institution among state organs, only “outplayed” by the customs 
service and directly followed by the privatization agency, tax offices, the judiciary, and the 
agency for foreign investment.332 Moreover, people in South Serbia assessed police corruption 
even more harshly than people in other Serbian regions.333 Although the public perceived its 
police as quite corrupt, it seemed that the vast majority were not willing to participate in the 
“corruption game”, since “only” 16.8 per cent of the police officers responding in the CORE 
survey claimed they had been offered bribes (cf. chart A.24). 
 
In 2002, when the Serbian government seemed to be ready to fight corruption, the Anti-
Corruption Council was set up. The council, which was made up of respected persons, was 
tasked with investigating the largest corruption cases in Serbia, and advising the government 
on new legislation. It immediately proposed the drafting of several laws, e.g. laws on the 
declaration and registration of property owned by public officials, on conflicts of interest, and 
on the financing of political parties. However, by the end of 2003, parliament had only adop-
ted a law on party financing. Even after the assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic in March 
2003, when it became obvious how deeply interlinked organized crime, politics and the police 
were, the “political will to tackle corruption” in government, public administration and the 
judiciary “stayed somewhat weak”.334 The EU Commission, in 2004, kept demanding com-
prehensive anti-corruption strategies and pointed to the continuing lack of political support for 
the Serbian anti-corruption institutions, with the government sometimes even behaving ob-
structively.335    
 
Financial constraints. As with other broken promises of the Serbian government with respect 
to the financial support of the Presevo valley, adequate funding of the multi-ethnic police 
force in South Serbia had still not been provided by the end of 2004. The poor equipment of 
the police as well as the low salaries of police officers (between 300 and 350 Euros a month) 
did not help to boost the working morale.336 MEPE officers deployed in the police containers 
were subjected to extreme working and living conditions.337 Basic equipment such as radios, 
forensic kits or computers was either missing in most containers, or so antiquated that it was 
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rather useless.338 Therefore, the OSCE proposed the replacement of the containers with 
permanent dwellings and the provision of badly needed vehicles and equipment. However, 
this required significant funding not foreseen in the state budget .339  
 
 
3.4 Conclusions 
 
The establishment of multi-ethnic police units and their deployment in the three south Serbian 
municipalities has led to a significant increase in confidence in the local police among large 
segments of the population. People got used to seeing multi-ethnic patrols, and contact be-
tween the population and the police improved, not least because Albanians could now talk in 
their mother tongue to representatives of the state organs. The establishment of police con-
tainers inside and on the outskirts of villages in remote areas gave the population the chance 
to develop personal contact with the police. Community policing projects initiated by the 
OSCE were further important steps in confidence-building. The establishment of Community 
Advisory Groups and Municipal Safety Councils, and the deployment of Community Policing 
Officers in the villages will, it is hoped, improve the relationship between the population and 
the police even more. This is particularly necessary for the Serbian population, which is still 
rather sceptical about the suitability of Albanian police officers to serve all ethnic com-
munities in a professional manner.  
 
Both Albanians and Serbs are sceptical about the policing skills of many MEPE officers. 
These officers’ inadequacies do not result primarily from the twelve-week basic academy 
training, which though much shorter than the usual police training provided by the Serbian 
MoI, was useful for teaching basic policing skills. The primary problem is the in-service 
training provided by the Serbian authorities − or rather the lack thereof − particularly for 
MEPE officers stationed in the police containers. Hopefully, the new in-service training 
programme, jointly developed by the OSCE and the Serbian MoI in 2004 and scheduled to 
start in 2005, will bridge this gap. 
 
A lot remains to be done with respect to the integration of the MEPE into the regular police 
force. Although representatives of the MoI insist that the integration of the MEPE has already 
been successfully completed, the reality on the ground shows a different picture. The 
“former” MEPE officers are not given the full spectrum of police tasks and, in this respect, 
they are not taken seriously by the local population, nor by long-serving police officers. In 
addition, the MoI does not seem to be interested in promoting Albanian police officers, again 
causing resentment among the Albanians. Unfortunately, multi-ethnic police units are also not 
used as a confidence-building instrument in police raids and search operations conducted by 
the Serbian Gendarmerie.  
 
Other obstacles to the establishment of an accountable and efficient democratic police force 
involve structural deficiencies in the police inherited from the communist and Milosevic peri-
od: centralization, politicization, widespread corruption and the connection between elements 
of the police and organized crime. Finally, at least two political challenges will determine the 
future of the multi-ethnic police reform in South Serbia: the further implementation of the 
Covic Plan and the developments in Kosovo. Since the Serbian government, in spite of its 
announcements made in 2001,340 has done nothing to promote the economic development of 
the three municipalities, and because of the continuing presence of large army and Gendar-
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merie units, which are strictly rejected by the Albanian population, the possibility of another 
round of violence by Albanian extremists cannot be ruled out. In the 2004 local elections, 
radical Albanian parties won the majority of seats in the municipal assembly of Presevo 
making it more difficult for the moderate Albanian mayor of Presevo, Riza Halimi, to mediate 
between the different ethnic groups. The killing of a 16-year-old ethnic Albanian boy by Ser-
bian army border troops, in January 2005, led to enraged protests by thousands of Albanians 
against the presence and the behaviour of the military, and to the renewed call from all 
Albanian political parties for the withdrawal of army and Gendarmerie units and their replace-
ment by multi-ethnic police units.341 The only positive aspect of this recent crisis is the reacti-
vation of the co-ordination body for South Serbia.342 In addition to security issues, the co-
ordination body announced it would focus on issues of economic recovery, infrastructure, 
education, justice, health, media and culture.343 It is to be hoped that this time the co-ordina-
tion body will be able to convince the government to fulfil its obligations to South Serbia. 
Finally, so long as the political status of Kosovo is not resolved, the Presevo valley will con-
tinue to be the subject of speculation about a possible territorial exchange including the 
northern part of Kosovo and the Presevo valley. These strategic uncertainties can only be 
resolved by reaching a decision on the final political status for Kosovo. 
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Chapter 4 Macedonia 
 
 
For a long time, Macedonia was perceived by many as an ”island of peace in an ocean of 
inter-ethnic quarrels”. While it was commonly known that deep-seated tensions existed be-
tween ethnic Macedonians and Albanians, Western observers were reassured by the fact that 
Albanian parties were consistently represented in Macedonia’s governing coalitions. This led 
them to overlook the growing ethnic segregation in the country, which, together with a ple-
thora of unresolved social and political problems, created the potential for the explosive inter-
ethnic conflict that erupted in spring 2001. The fighting started in January 2001, when the so-
called National Liberation Army (Ushtria Clirimitare Kombetare – UCK), which used the 
same abbreviation as the Albanian fighters in Kosovo, attacked several police stations and 
patrols in a number of villages along the border with Kosovo, and declared those villages 
“liberated areas”. The poorly trained and badly equipped Macedonian police were not able to 
prevent further attacks. Fighting escalated and, by August 2001, the UCK had gained control 
over the Albanian-dominated town of Tetovo as well as the northern suburbs of the capital 
Skopje.344 Sixty members of the Macedonian military and police forces were killed and sev-
eral officers kidnapped.345 While the UCK had initially fought for the liberation of the 
Albanians in Macedonia, from March on it demanded equal constitutional rights and treat-
ment for the Albanian population.346 Under heavy diplomatic pressure from the EU and the 
USA, the four most important ethnic Albanian and Macedonian parties, with the approval of 
the UCK, finally signed the Ohrid Framework Agreement on 13 August 2001. In exchange 
for substantial political reforms favouring the Albanian community, the agreement put an end 
to the fighting and guaranteed the territorial integrity of Macedonia.347  
 
 
4.1 Mandate 
 
The Ohrid accord called on the OSCE to support the Macedonian authorities in reforming the 
police, particularly by creating ethnically mixed units to be deployed in the crisis region to re-
establish the state’s monopoly of force.348 The USA offered its International Criminal 
Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) to quickly train a first group of ethnic 
Macedonians and Albanians by December 2001. By July 2003, about 1,000 Albanian officers 
were to be integrated into the Macedonian police. By 2004, the Macedonian police force was 
to generally reflect the ethnic composition and distribution of the country’s population.349 The 
OSCE offered 60 police advisers and 17 instructors to implement these tasks. The training 
curriculum developed by the OSCE, in co-operation with the Macedonian Ministry of the 
Interior (MoI), foresaw a three-month basic training at the police academy in Idrizovo to be 
followed by six months of in-service training provided by Macedonian police officers.350  
 
In February 2002, the OSCE and the EU initiated a co-operative effort for police reform in 
Macedonia. Two police experts from the EU were seconded to the OSCE Police Development 
Unit (PDU) of the OSCE Spillover and Monitor Mission to Skopje.351 In December 2003, the 
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EU significantly expanded its police-related activities in Macedonia by deploying the EU 
Police Mission “Proxima”. The mandate of the 180 Proxima police officers included monitor-
ing and advising Macedonian police authorities on issues such as: 
 
• “the consolidation of law and order, including the fight against organised crime […], 
• the practical implementation of the comprehensive reform of the Minister of the Interior, 
including the police, 
• the operational transition towards, and the creation of a border police [...], 
• the build up of confidence between the local police and the population, 
• enhanced cooperation with neighbouring States in the field of policing.”352  
 
Proxima activities were to be co-ordinated with OSCE efforts and bilateral police projects of 
other international actors (see 4.2.3).353 Since the OSCE had cancelled its field training activi-
ties in 2002, Proxima officers took charge of monitoring the performance of multi-ethnic 
police units at the police stations in the crisis region.354 
 
 
4.2 Building up the Multi-Ethnic Police  
 
In December 2001, the first class of 106 ethnic Albanian and Bosniak police officers gradu-
ated from ICITAP’s basic training course. At the beginning of 2002, the OSCE assumed the 
responsibility for police training (see 4.2.2).  
 
 
4.2.1 Recruitment 
 
In Article 5.3 of Annex C of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, the OSCE was asked to assist 
the Macedonian authorities in the recruitment, selection and promotion process.355 Applicants 
had to meet the following minimum requirements: be aged between 18 and 25, have comple-
ted the 4th degree of secondary school, and be a citizen of the country. The OSCE also aimed 
for a significant representation of women.356 The OSCE mission stressed the point that politi-
cal parties should not influence the selection process. However, in 2002, the mission criticized 
the ongoing politicization357 of the recruitment process.358 In co-ordination with the European 
Commission Justice and Home Affairs Team (ECJHAT), the OSCE formulated a transparent 
recruitment procedure and submitted it to the Macedonian MoI, which officially welcomed 
this initiative. However, due to slow legal changes, the new selection criteria had still not 
been introduced by 2003. According to OSCE and EU representatives, all political parties 
(ethnic Macedonian as well as Albanian and Roma) continued to try to incorporate as many 
party members as possible into the multi-ethnic police element, disregarding professional 
requirements. Some of the applicants obviously lacked any motivation to become police offi-
cers. However, they joined the police due to pressure from parties, communities or clans.359 
With respect to the incorporation of former UCK fighters, there were no public political 
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debates. Within the administration, ethnic Albanians were responsible for the recruitment.360 
No official figures are available on the number of former UCK members in the multi-ethnic 
police units. From a pool of 2,900 applicants, 101 cadets were selected for the first training 
course. 
       
 
4.2.2 Academy Training 
 
Basic training was started on 11 February 2002 at the police academy in Idrizovo, which 
required complete refurbishment by the OSCE due to its extremely poor state of repair. A 
number of classrooms were still not usable by the beginning of the first weeks of training. By 
the end of 2002, the OSCE had provided 2.2 million Euros for completing this task.361  
 
The twelve-week basic training, jointly provided by Macedonian and international police 
instructors, included topics such as policing in a democracy, constitutional framework, human 
rights, use of force, police ethics and code of conduct, community policing, patrol procedures, 
arrest and detention, effective communication and traffic accident management. The curricu-
lum contained elements from both the then current Macedonian curriculum and the one the 
OSCE had developed in Kosovo. Because some of the lessons did not really correspond to 
some aspects of Macedonian law, they had to be adjusted. However, even after that, the new 
curriculum still had some shortcomings, since it dealt extensively with issues of traffic poli-
cing or investigations, which were not necessary for basic training, while, on the other hand, 
neglecting important issues such as vandalism or domestic violence.362 Although the OSCE 
mission officially praised the effectiveness of its Macedonian counterparts, police instructors 
privately complained about the outdated teaching style of a number of their Macedonian col-
leagues. Moreover, teaching was severely hampered by the inability of a number of Albanian 
cadets (about 15-20 per cent) to follow the lessons, because they did not speak Macedonian. 
As a result, Macedonian-language courses had to be offered to those Albanian officers, other-
wise they would not have been able to pass the exams.363 By July 2003, a total of 1,156 police 
officers had graduated from basic training, among them 103 ethnic Macedonians. 15 per cent 
of the cadets were women. About nine per cent of the cadets did not pass the final exams.364   
 
4.2.2.1 Evaluation of Training by Cadets 
 
In 2004, the majority of the police cadets were quite satisfied with the basic training. A total 
of 31.5 per cent of the respondents said they were extremely satisfied with the courses, 37.1 
per cent reported that they were very satisfied. On the other hand, 23.6 per cent were only 
fairly satisfied, and 5.6 per cent were even more or less dissatisfied (cf. chart A.2). Former 
cadets, who had participated in the basic training courses in 2002 and 2003, expressed some-
what less satisfaction. Only 27.4 per cent said they had been extremely satisfied, 32.9 per cent 
had been very satisfied, and 30.1 per cent were fairly satisfied. Only 1.4 per cent recalled 
more or less dissatisfaction (cf. chart A.2). As in the case of Kosovo, the increase in satisfac-
tion might have been induced by the extension of training time as well as by the improved 
skills of the Macedonian instructors, who had undergone instructor training during the prece-
ding two years. 
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In evaluating the OSCE police instructors, the relative majorities (32.3 per cent each) of the 
cadets of 2004 were very or fairly satisfied, while 26 per cent were extremely satisfied and 9.4 
per cent were more or less dissatisfied (cf. chart A.3). Local instructors received somewhat 
better evaluations. A total of 30.2 per cent of the responding cadets said they were extremely 
satisfied and 37.5 per cent that they were very satisfied. 24 per cent were fairly satisfied with 
the local instructors. Only 4.2 per cent expressed more or less dissatisfaction (cf. chart A.4). 
Again, as in the case of Kosovo, former cadets gave the OSCE instructors much better ratings 
than they did their national instructors. A total of 26.7 per cent had been extremely satisfied 
with the internationals, and 41.9 per cent very satisfied. 20 per cent recalled only fair satisfac-
tion, and 5.8 per cent had been more or less dissatisfied (cf. chart A.3). On the other hand, 
while 25.3 per cent of the former cadets had been extremely satisfied with the local instruc-
tors, only 27.6 per cent stated that they had been very satisfied (compared to 41.9 per cent for 
OSCE instructors). The relative majority of former cadets (37.9 per cent) reported that they 
had been fairly satisfied with their countrymen. 5.7 per cent had been more or less dissatisfied 
(cf. chart A.4).  
 
The same tendency was clear with respect to specific criteria such as the instructors’ moti-
vation for work, their readiness to solve problems or their readiness to speak about problems 
after classes. While the vast majorities (between 60 and 73.2 per cent) of the cadets of 2004 
rated the local instructors in these respects as excellent (cf. chart A.6c), the proportion of 
OSCE instructors, who got the same good marks, was significantly smaller (between 45.8 and 
46.8 per cent, cf. chart A.5c). Again, the former cadets were more critical in assessing their 
instructors. Although the relative majorities (between 32.9 and 48.2 per cent) were willing to 
call the performance of local as well as international instructors excellent with respect to the 
additional quality aspects, a significant minority of the former cadets (between 8.2 and 16.3 
per cent) also characterized the performance of the local and international instructors in these 
aspects as only fair. 10.7 and 9.4 per cent, respectively, even characterized the readiness of 
the local or international instructors to speak about problems after classes as poor. Internation-
al instructors’ motivation for work and their readiness to solve problems were also assessed as 
poor by 9.4 per cent of the former cadets (cf. charts A.5d and A.6d). The general improve-
ment of the ratings for local instructors might have been based on their growing teaching 
competencies due to the OSCE train-the-trainer programme. 
 
Assessment of the resources available. The vast majority of the cadets of 2004 assessed the 
time frame for the basic training as well as the material resources as sufficient (68.9 and 60 
per cent, respectively). About a quarter of the cadets called the time frame and the material 
resources moderately sufficient (23.3 and 27.1 per cent, respectively), 7.8 per cent considered 
the time frame and twelve per cent the material resources to be insufficient. Again, former 
cadets were more critical. While only one-third of them rated the time frame and the material 
resources as sufficient (34.3 and 34.9 per cent, respectively), 57.1 per cent considered the time 
frame and 49.2 per cent the material resources to be only moderately sufficient. Similar to the 
cadets of 2004, 8.6 per cent assessed the time frame and 15.9 per cent the material resources 
as insufficient (cf. chart A.8). This more critical assessment is not surprising, as the refurbish-
ing of the police academy had not been finished at the start of the academy training in Febru-
ary 2002. While the majority of the OSCE instructors interviewed considered the material re-
sources to be moderately sufficient, their views on the personnel resources were divided with 
equal numbers of respondents calling them sufficient, moderately sufficient or insufficient. 
Particularly at the beginning of the training, there were too few international and national in-
structors (cf. chart A.7).    
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4.2.2.2 Assessment of Qualification of the Cadets 
 
The majority (50 per cent) of the OSCE instructors surveyed in 2004 stated that 50-75 per 
cent of the cadets were suitable to become police officers, while one-third of the respondents 
thought that only 25-50 per cent were suitable for the police job (cf. chart A.10). OSCE in-
structors considered the politicization of cadets to be the biggest deficit in those cadets they 
thought unsuited for police work, followed by criminal background and enduring ethnic hat-
red. Educational deficits were considered only as the fourth biggest deficit among those who 
were assessed as being unsuited for the job.365  
 
 
4.2.3 Field Training  
 
Together with the MoI, the OSCE’s PDU developed a field-training programme for 439 
senior and mid-level police officers. In accordance with Macedonian law, field training lasted 
for six months and was given by Macedonian officers.366 Since the field training faced similar 
problems as the training in South Serbia due to a lack of skills and motivation of the local 
field trainers (called mentors), the OSCE mission developed a special field-training course for 
500 mentors and a Police Field Training Manual to provide them with a better understanding 
of their tasks. However, since the mentors did not receive extra payment for their additional 
work, the success of the field training depended on individual motivation.367 To improve the 
field training, the OSCE mission also deployed Field Training Co-ordinators to police stations 
tasked with evaluating the performance of the cadets as well as their mentors. In 2002, the 
PDU monitored the field training of 640 cadets.368 Surprisingly, for many OSCE monitors, the 
head of the PDU terminated the monitoring of the field training in May 2003.369 In 2004, 
police officers of the EUPOL Proxima mission took charge of monitoring. According to 
Proxima representatives, some aspects of field training such as crime scene investigations 
were in fact useless, since there was no appropriate equipment available for these tasks.370 
 
In addition to the training problems caused by shortages in resources, the field training was 
also hampered by legal constraints that limited the responsibilities of the cadets. Trainees 
were neither allowed to carry firearms nor to execute policing tasks independently, which 
made it impossible for them to gain experience in daily police work. Station commanders cri-
ticized the lack of knowledge of the law among the new recruits implying that there might be 
a problem with violating citizens’ rights. Longer-serving officers also complained about the 
lack of self-defence skills, which could endanger the new recruits as well as their colleagues 
on duty. Due to all these problems, the new officers still lacked skills and experience after the 
probation period.371   
 
Evaluation of field training by officers of the multi-ethnic units. Corresponding to the rather 
critical evaluation of the field training by international police officers, the relative majority of 
local officers (27 per cent) considered the field training to have been only fairly satisfying. On 
the other hand, 40 per cent of the officers rated the field training either as extremely (21.6 per 
cent) or very satisfying (16.3 per cent, cf. chart A.2b). A quarter of the officers (24.4 per cent) 
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assessed the time frame of the field training as sufficient, while the majority said it was mod-
erately sufficient, and 12.2 per cent called it insufficient. With respect to material resources, 
their assessment was slightly better. A total of 33.3 per cent recalled them as sufficient, the 
majority (53.8 per cent) as moderately sufficient, and 12.8 per cent as insufficient (cf. chart 
A.9).     
 
Additional police training initiatives by the OSCE. In order to better train cadets for their 
examinations, the PDU introduced a two-week In-service Training Programme in October 
2002.372 The PDU also started a four-week Instructor Development Course for Macedonian 
police instructors to train them in modern teaching techniques (including adult-learning prin-
ciples, classroom management, lesson planning and communication skills).373 This was in 
reaction to criticism by OSCE instructors of the outdated teaching style of local police in-
structors. By 2004, a total of 359 Macedonian instructors had completed this course.374 Also 
in 2002, the PDU developed a three-week Reform Training Programme for all Macedonian 
uniformed police officers, in which about 6,000 officers were made familiar with the same 
training issues as the new cadets in the multi-ethnic classes. Training focused on human 
rights, policing in a democracy, gender awareness, trafficking in human beings, domestic 
violence, officer safety, and drug identification.375 In August 2002, a total of 3,500 police 
officers were also provided with a one-day Election Security Training to prepare them for 
ensuring the security of the upcoming elections. Training focused primarily on crowd control 
during campaign rallies and securing polling stations on election day in line with international 
policing practices and in accordance with the new national election law.376 
 
Since the some 1,000 Albanian police officers, who were trained by July 2002, did not yet 
correspond to the ethnic Albanians’ share of the Macedonian population, which required 
about 1,700 Albanian police officers, the OSCE started a sixth training course in April 2004 
including 280 Albanian cadets. In line with the new Macedonian Law on the Police Academy, 
basic training was significantly extended from three to twelve months, while field training 
was shortened from six to three months. Academy training now also included topics such as 
preventing crimes against the environment and psychology of personality.377 Specialized 
training courses focused on trafficking in drugs and human beings and on human rights. In ad-
dition, training was started on the new police Code of Ethics, which had been prepared by the 
MoI, the Council of Europe and the OSCE. By June 2005, a total of 4,500 officers from dif-
ferent departments, including special police units such as the “Tigers”, had received human 
rights training.   
 
Additional training by other international actors. In addition to the OSCE and EUPOL 
Proxima, several other international actors implemented police reform projects in Macedonia, 
among them the European Commission (EC), the EC Police Reform Project (ECPRP), the 
European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR), the Council of Europe (COE), ICITAP, the 
UK’s International Development Programme (DFDI), the UK’s operation REFLEX378, as 
well as the Dutch government.  
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Proxima was primarily in charge of monitoring, mentoring and advising police personnel and 
leadership. From the initial five programmes (Criminal Police Programme, Border Police Pro-
gramme, Uniformed Police Programme, State Security and Counterintelligence Programme, 
and Internal Control and Law Enforcement Monitoring Programme), the mission reduced its 
activities to three programmes on Organised Crime, Public Peace and Order, and Border 
Police, giving particular attention to upper and middle management. Within the Public Peace 
and Order Programme, Proxima, together with the OSCE, supported the establishment of Citi-
zen Advisory Groups (see 4.2.4).379     
 
The European Commission was present with a number of initiatives, e.g. within the frame-
work of the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization 
(CARDS) programme. It appointed a long-term advisor to the police academy and deployed 
the Resident Police Reform Project Team (ECPRP) of five experts to guide the overall reform 
process. The European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) maintained, under CARDS, a port-
folio of police-related projects (co-ordinated by Proxima) providing monitoring, advisory sup-
port and technical assistance. The EAR also provided technical support for the refurbishment 
of the police academy. The EAR’s advisory support, co-ordinated with the OSCE, focused on 
selection and enrolment procedures, curriculum format and content, verification of educa-
tional standards and promotion of EU best police education practice.380 The Council of 
Europe assisted the Macedonian MoI in leadership and communication training and in stress 
management. The ECPRP, OSCE and CoE jointly trained the MoI’s senior staff in leadership 
and management skills. The US’ ICITAP, in addition to providing training to the first multi-
ethnic class, assessed more than 20 municipalities in an effort to evaluate their capacity and 
willingness to adopt community policing practices. The UK’s DFID worked on community 
policing, and the UK’s Operation Reflex focused on the fight against crime. The Dutch gov-
ernment was also involved in community policing, and closely co-operated with the OSCE 
and the MoI on police open days. 
 
Although all organizations emphasized their willingness to co-operate closely, the danger of 
duplication could not be eliminated, particularly in the field of community policing where at 
least five different actors were engaged. To avoid duplication, the OSCE, the ICITAP, 
Proxima and the DFID initiated the co-ordination of meetings in March 2005. In addition, 
there were monthly video conferences held between the OSCE and the EU. Moreover, all ac-
tors demanded increased leadership from the MoI. Similar to the reform process in Serbia, the 
MoI tried to play one donor organization off against the other to get as much from the interna-
tional community as possible.381  
 
 
4.2.4 Efforts to Win the Trust of the Local Population  
 
As provided for under the Ohrid agreement, the deployment of multi-ethnic police patrols in 
some 80 villages was a key means of restoring law and order in the crisis region and gaining 
the trust of the (mainly Albanian) population for the police. In October 2001, the first multi-
ethnic patrols were sent to five pilot villages accompanied by EU and OSCE monitors. Their 
initial tasks included establishing contact with the mayors to learn about their concerns. The 
first patrols, each consisting of three ethnic Macedonian and Albanian officers, lasted for only 
a few hours and were conducted in a calm atmosphere.382 After a week of almost no incidents, 
                                                 
379  Cf. European Union Police Mission Proxima 2005a: 5. 
380  Cf. European Agency for Reconstruction 2004b. 
381  Interviews with EUPOL Proxima representatives, Skopje, May 2004. 
382  CNN 2001; OSCE 2001d: 4; OSCE 2001f; Reuters 2001a; Frankfurter Rundschau, 23 October 2001. 
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light-armed police units were deployed around the clock.383 In December 2001, patrols were 
extended to 15 villages. The return of the police was facilitated by an intensive information 
campaign by the government, the OSCE and the EU. Initially the multi-ethnic units focused 
on traffic policing and investigating minor criminal acts. As another step of confidence-
building, 90 per cent of the police checkpoints in the crisis area, many manned by special 
police units, were dismantled by January 2002.384 By June 2002, a 24-hour multi-ethnic police 
presence was officially implemented in all 80 villages in the crisis area.385 
   
An assessment by the PDU on the practices of the Macedonian police, conducted in April 
2002, revealed severe deficiencies in their relationship with the public. Consequently, the 
PDU developed several community policing programmes. Within the framework of the so-
called New Approach to Policing, the PDU assisted the Macedonian MoI in: 
 
• Establishing Citizens Advisory Groups (CAGs). Similar to the Community Advisory 
Groups in South Serbia, the Macedonian CAGs were meant to be fora for representa-
tives of the local communities and the police to discuss a broad range of security issues 
from traffic safety, local crime and illegal dumping of garbage to surrendering illegal 
firearms. By 2005, fifty CAGs had been established covering more than 200 villages. 
Their regular meetings were considered to be one of the most important confidence-buil-
ding instruments.386 
• Facilitating workshops and seminars for MoI representatives and citizens on joint prob-
lem solving. In 2003, a total of 1,254 police officers participated in seminars provided 
by the PDU’s Community Police Trainers (CPTs). In 2004, three hundred members of 
CAGs were trained on issues such as local self-governance, partnership building, prob-
lem solving and writing project proposals.387 
• Training Community Relations Co-ordinators (CRCs). Thirty-two selected police offi-
cers of mixed ethnicity had two weeks of training in November 2003 to acquire the spe-
cial skills needed for establishing and maintaining co-operation with all community 
groups in the CAGs. Training covered issues of assessment and goal development, com-
munications and confidence-building, conflict resolution and mediation as well as liai-
sing with the media. After completing the PDU-delivered training, the future CRCs went 
to the Netherlands for a week to experience community policing activities in practice.388 
• Training local Community Police Trainers. In April 2005, fifty Macedonian police train-
ers completed their Expanded Community-Based Policing Training. Their task was to 
train about 7,000 uniformed police officers in all regions of Macedonia in community 
policing issues.389  
• Launching a nationwide TV campaign in March 2004 to promote co-operation between 
the police and the citizens.390 
• Sending community policing officers into schools, where they visited about 15,000 
pupils in the first half of 2005, and informed them about police officers’ duties, chil-
dren’s rights and the principles of community behaviour. These officers, talked, for 
                                                 
383  Cf. Reuters 2001b; Latifi 2001.  
384  Cf. Der Standard, 13 December 2001; Die Presse, 14 December 2001; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  
27 December 2001; Berliner Zeitung, 18 January 2002; OSCE 2001h. 
385  Cf. OSCE Spillover and Monitor Mission to Skopje, Police Development Unit 2003: 2. 
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387  Cf. OSCE 2004e: 25; OSCE Spillover and Monitor Mission to Skopje, Police Development Unit 2004: 3; 
OSCE 2004j. 
388  Cf. OSCE 2003c; OSCE 2004f. 
389  Cf. OSCE 2005b. 
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instance, about safe conduct (including how to avoid street violence) and other issues 
such as road safety or security at home.391 
• Jointly hosting Police Open Days in a number of cities in 2004, at which children in par-
ticular were addressed to make them feel comfortable in the presence of police offi-
cers.392        
 
 
4.2.5 Excursus: Reform of the Judicial and Penal System 
 
According to the constitution of 1991 and the Law on Courts, courts in Macedonia are auto-
nomous and independent.393 However, the EU Commission, in its Stabilisation and Associ-
ation Report in April 2002, pointed to several “serious weaknesses”394 of the judiciary. Prob-
lems mentioned included a backlog of cases (particularly of high-profile corruption cases),395 
and the politicization of the judiciary, as judges were elected by the parliament. Therefore, the 
party affiliation of a candidate was sometimes more important than his or her professional 
merits. In addition, the lack of judges from minority groups was criticized.396 Only five per 
cent of judges in lower courts and nine per cent in appeals courts were Albanians.397 The EU 
Commission also pointed to the need for a revised system of judicial training. The European 
Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) proposed a legal reform that would base the selection of 
judges and prosecutors on professional criteria and adequate training. While judges received 
training at the Centre for Continuing Education, the EAR complained that there were no train-
ing centres at all for prosecutors or attorneys.398 Other serious deficits criticized by interna-
tional and national observers were the widespread corruption, conflicts of interests and nepo-
tism within the judiciary.399 In an effort to restore public confidence in the legal system and to 
help ensure the right to a fair trial, the Rule of Law Unit of the OSCE mission, in 2003, 
helped create a coalition of 18 NGOs under the label All for Fair Trials, that formed a net-
work for monitoring domestic trials. The mission also organized a training programme for 
lawyers, law students and human rights activists to prepare them for trial observation.400     
 
By 2004, these problems had still not been resolved and the EU Commission criticized the 
slow progress in strengthening the rule of law.401 Proxima also severely criticized the state of 
co-operation and co-ordination between the different elements of the criminal justice system, 
particularly the repeated failure of the judiciary to prosecute known criminals after their arrest 
by the police. Proxima’s Head of Mission described the judiciary as marred and complained 
about the “lack of accountability in the judiciary”.402 In December 2004, in response to EU 
criticism, the Macedonian government adopted a national strategy for judicial reform outlin-
ing a number of legislative and constitutional changes to increase efficiency and to free courts 
from political influence.403 However, by June 2005, the draft proposals sent to parliament had 
still not been adopted. Moreover, international and local experts doubted the will of the 
                                                 
391  Cf. OSCE 2005c. 
392  Cf. OSCE 2004i; OSCE 2004k. 
393  Cf. All for Fair Trials 2004: 21.  
394  Commission of the European Communities 2002: 7. 
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government to resolutely reform the judiciary and to ease its grip on the judiciary. They were 
concerned about a number of issues including the fact that the draft proposals did not include 
any measures to make the Republic Judiciary Council more independent of the parliament 
when appointing new judges.404 The bad image of the Macedonian judiciary became obvious 
once more in a Brima-Gallup survey in 2005: 72 per cent of Macedonians said they did not 
trust the courts, making the courts the least trusted state institution in the country.405 
 
Reform of the prison system. The reform of the prison system appeared on the agenda in 
January 2005, when the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) showed interest in getting the support of the 
OSCE Misson’s Rule of Law Unit. The prison system, in particular the prison in Idrizovo, 
suffered from a severe lack of adequate detention facilities and well-trained personnel.406 Cor-
ruption among prison employees and widespread drug dealing in the prisons were other prob-
lems. In order to strengthen security, the MoJ and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) considered 
transferring up to 80 soldiers to serve as prison guards.407    
 
 
4.2.6 Police-Related Law Reform 
 
Several legal reforms had been conducted in the mid-1990s with respect to the organization 
and duties of the police (Criminal Code, Law on Criminal Procedure, Law on Internal Affairs, 
Law on Organization and Operation of the State Administrative Bodies). However, in 2002, 
the international community still considered the legal framework of the police, with its over-
centralized structure, politicization, and the lack of a clear division of responsibilities between 
the police and the military, to be incompatible with EU standards.408 Finally, in August 2003, 
after lengthy consultations with the European Commission and the OSCE mission, the 
Macedonian government adopted a Strategy for Police Reforms.409 Issues regarded by the EU 
as most pressing included “more devolution of decision-making within the service, a merit-
based career system, (and an) increased level of transparency of decision making and oper-
ations.”410 More than 14 new laws were to be adopted and more than 100 legal acts to be 
amended by October 2005,411 among them laws on the fight against organized crime, 
including a law on undercover operations and one on witness protection.412 An important new 
law, which was already enacted in 2003, was the Law on the Police Academy. It provided the 
legal basis for expanding the role of the police academy and aimed at developing local 
training capacity.413  
 
In 2004, the MoI also indorsed a Code of Ethics for the police, which it had developed in co-
operation with the PDU and the Council of Europe. The code covered issues ranging from the 
way work was conducted and the aims of the police, to the legal basis for its functions, its 
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organization, and the qualifications, selection process, employment and training of police offi-
cers right up to the ultimate responsibility for and the control of the police.414  
 
 
4.3 Taking Stock of Reform Efforts 
4.3.1  Establishment of Multi-Ethnic Police Units 
 
By July 2003, the OSCE PDU had trained 1,156 police officers at the academy in Idrizovo, 
among them 103 ethnic Macedonians. In an additional course, 280 ethnic Albanians were 
trained by spring 2005 (see 4.2.2).415 By the end of 2004, 16.9 per cent of the 8,216 uniformed 
Macedonian police officers were ethnic Albanians.416 This was still less than the required 25 
per cent for equal representation. Among the criminal police, the percentage of Albanian offi-
cers was substantially lower (1.7 per cent). Furthermore, representation of Albanians in mana-
gerial positions among the uniformed police was only 1.1 per cent. The very small number of 
career professionals among Albanian officers had its roots in their lack of university de-
grees.417 This was also due to the attitude of ethnic Macedonian station commanders, who, be-
fore 2001, routinely denied ethnic Albanian officers permission to attend universities. Al-
though this attitude has changed since 2001, there was still no career planning system within 
the police in 2004.418      
 
The incorporation of the new officers did not happen as smoothly as envisaged. Due to their 
lack of skills and inexperience − superiors were particularly critical of the new officers’ lack 
of knowledge in criminal law and their limited defence techniques419 − station commanders 
were frequently reluctant to include them in daily police work right away,420 and gave them 
only unchallenging tasks. In an OSCE survey, one-third of the new officers said that, most of 
the time, they were busy with things that were “under their level of ability”,421 for example all 
kinds of administrative jobs. In 2001 and 2002, the deployment of multi-ethnic patrols in the 
crisis region was more a symbolic gesture to win the confidence of the Albanian population. 
In a number of cases, police were deployed to Albanian villages, where they had not been pre-
sent even long before the crisis of 2001. Due to the tensions during the (re-)deployment pro-
cess, patrol duties were initially limited to controlling traffic and did not include crime inves-
tigation.422 By 2004, however, according to statements by the MoI, the police had reached the 
goal of providing full duties by proactively patrolling, conducting routine police tasks such as 
traffic monitoring and responding to emergency calls from the population. Informally, inter-
national observers pointed to a number of villages in which the police units still acted very 
cautiously (see 4.3.3) to avoid tensions with the population.423  
 
The biggest obstacle for the full integration of Albanian officers into the police lay with the 
special police units, whose leadership was very reluctant to incorporate Albanians because 
they did not trust them. In 2005, there was still not a single Albanian officer present in these 
forces. Since tensions were particularly high between the special police and the Albanian 
population, the inclusion of Albanian officers would have been a significant confidence-
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building step.424 The continuing latent tensions between ethnic Albanians and the special po-
lice were probably one significant factor that prevented the Macedonian government from de-
ploying special police units in the Skopje suburb of Kondovo in December of 2004 and in the 
summer of 2005 to disarm a group of armed Albanian criminals that had gathered around the 
notorious Agim Krasniqui, a former UCK leader wanted by the police (see 4.3.2.1).           
    
 
4.3.2 Performance of the Multi-Ethnic Police  
4.3.2.1 Crime Development 
 
Although the newly trained police officers make up less than 17 percent of the overall number 
of uniformed police officers,425 the attitude of the population towards the multi-ethnic ele-
ments are, nevertheless, influenced by the level of crime and the feeling of safety among the 
citizens.  
 
While both the general security situation and the perception of it noticeably improved after 
the fighting ended in August 2001, violent crimes also increased until 2003, particularly in the 
former crisis region. This resulted from fights between rival Albanian gangs for control over 
territory, brothels or smuggling routes. Many innocent people became victims of those crimes. 
Moreover, armed robberies and kidnappings for ransom became increasingly common.426 
However, in 2004, the numbers of murders (56) and attempted murders (64) dropped for the 
first time in years (from 75 and 69 respectively in 2003). No murders were attributed to ethnic 
hatred or political causes.427 The general decrease in the number of victims of crime continued 
during 2005. However, while capital crimes decreased, the number of petty thefts started to 
rise again. Cases of theft and damage to property, predominately in rural areas, remained at 
the same level. While ethnic Macedonians were more affected by petty theft, Albanians suf-
fered more from aggravated theft and property damage.428 And while 17.4 per cent of 
Albanians felt there was a threat to their personal security, only 6.5 per cent of ethnic 
Macedonians were worried in this respect. Ethnic Macedonians (26.3 per cent) as well as 
Albanians (29.8 per cent) considered street crime to be the biggest threat to their personal 
security. While organized crime was perceived as the biggest threat by 3.5 per cent of ethnic 
Macedonians, Albanians were much more worried about this kind of threat (20 per cent). 
Interestingly, 78.6 per cent of all respondents felt more secure in their own municipalities than 
in other regions of Macedonia.429 In general, the relative majority (40.4 per cent) of all res-
pondents said that the security situation had improved over the last three years, while 8.2 per 
cent thought it had become worse.430     
    
Newspaper headlines in 2004 and 2005 focused on a handful of incidents, in which a number 
of former UCK fighters attacked the police. At the end of October 2004, the OSCE mission 
received reports of an armed presence in the village of Kondovo, led by Agim Krasniqi, a 
well-known local criminal and former UCK fighter, who had been involved in a series of 
incidents over the preceding months before. The group, believed to be between 20 and 50, 
possessed heavy weapons. Patrols by multi-ethnic police units were stopped so as not to cause 
any deterioration of the situation. Albanian politicians continued talks with Krasniqi until 
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mid-December in an attempt to convince him to resolve the situation peacefully. The 
Albanian coalition partner in the government, the DUI, led by the former rebel leader Ahmeti, 
insisted on a peaceful solution of the crisis, fearing serious political attacks from Albanian 
opposition parties if a police raid were to lead to bloodshed.431 Finally, the Albanian inter-
locutors succeeded and the armed men either disappeared (for instance, Krasniqi left for 
Kosovo), or swapped their uniforms for civilian attire and put their weapons aside. Police 
resumed patrolling in and around Kondovo, but continued to be careful not to come into direct 
contact with villagers and not to provoke any confrontations.  
 
In March 2005, however, Krasniqi returned. In June 2005, when four members of the 
Macedonian special police unit “Alpha” entered Kondovo to arrest him, they were assaulted 
and temporarily detained. Despite this incident, multi-ethnic patrols, which had re-entered the 
village in the spring, continued. Krasniqi told the media that he would defend himself with 
weapons including the shelling of Skopje if the police were to try to arrest him or if a single 
villager were hurt. The DUI was in the same difficult situation it had been in at the end of 
2004.432 On 12 July 2005, the police station in Vratnica, a village on the border with Kosovo, 
was attacked with explosive devices. Three days later, the police station in Bit Pazar in Skopje 
was attacked in a similar fashion. Both attacks caused only material damage. The MoI linked 
both incidents to the ongoing crisis in Kondovo. 
 
By summer 2005, the situation had been “solved”, for the time being, when Krasniqi voluntar-
ily showed up on 18 August in front of an investigative judge, who decided that this proved 
that he would be available for trial. Subsequently, the arrest warrant against Krasniqi was 
withdrawn. Krasniqi’s release immediately sparked fury among the public in Macedonia. The 
president severely criticized the decision, and opposition parties claimed there was a deal be-
tween the government and Krasniqi. This was categorically denied by the government. The 
public prosecutor’s office also denied having offered an amnesty and claimed that none of the 
charges against Krasniqi had been dropped. Despite their opposing views on the decision of 
the investigative judge, the president and the government maintained that the stability and 
integrity of Macedonia had not been challenged by the events in Kondovo, Vratnica and Bit 
Pazar. International observers from the EU and OSCE supported this view.433     
 
4.3.2.2 Demonstrated Skills and Level of Professionalism  
 
EUPOL Proxima officers were not very enthusiastic about the professionalism of the multi-
ethnic police units. The relative majority (22.2 per cent) of Proxima officers, who rated the 
quality of the newly trained officers,434 stated that 50-75 per cent of the new officers were sui-
ted for their jobs. While 11.1 per cent of the Proxima officers said that even more than 90 per 
cent of the newly trained police officers were suited for their jobs, the same percentage of res-
pondents answered that only 25-50 per cent were suited (cf. chart A.10). Smaller fractions of 
the Proxima officers called either 75-90 or 10-25 per cent of the new Macedonian officers 
suitable for the job (cf. chart A.10). The members of the multi-ethnic units gave their national 
colleagues noticeably better evaluations. Almost 30 per cent of the respondents claimed that 
more than 90 per cent or even all of the newly trained officers were suited to do police work. 
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Another quarter of respondents considered 75-90 per cent of their colleagues to be suitable 
(cf. chart A.10). The largest coincidence between local and international officers was in consi-
dering 50-75 per cent of the new officers as suitable (cf. chart A.10).       
 
In interviews, Proxima officers mentioned educational and physical deficits as decisive fac-
tors for the unsuitability of a number of officers. In some cases, the enduring ethnic hatred 
among certain officers was also considered a reason for their unsuitability.435 However, the 
most serious performance deficiency of the multi-ethnic as well as the special police was their 
inaction against criminal organizations in some Albanian villages in the crisis region, but also 
close to Skopje. The reasons were primarily of a political nature. In order not to jeopardize the 
quite fragile confidence of the Albanian population in the police, police patrols ignored 
certain criminal activities in Albanian-dominated villages, in particular cross-border 
smuggling. As in the case of Kondovo, a strong and confrontational approach would have 
risked alienating the community again. However, it was not only the Albanian coalition part-
ner, which desperately tried to avoid a confrontation. The international community had also 
put pressure on the Macedonian authorities to avoid any measures, which could lead to an 
escalation of violence.436 However, complaints by ordinary Albanian villagers that the police 
were not doing enough to protect citizens from criminal gangs were increasing.437  
 
In addition to these political obstacles, police work was also hampered by structural defi-
ciencies rooted in the police apparatus. Even when the opportunity presented itself for police 
officers to arrest wanted criminals, appropriate action was frequently not taken because of 
heavily centralized lines of command and operational procedures that did not allow for auto-
nomous rapid action. Low-ranking officers were simply afraid of making their own deci-
sions.438 This was the case in all areas of police duties, even in the work of the traffic 
police.439 According to Proxima representatives, deficiencies in police work were also a result 
of the lack of funding, since police officers did not have sufficient equipment (cars, radios 
etc.) to conduct patrols.440  
 
Fight against organized crime. In the fight against organized crime, the MoI relied on its 
special police forces, which consisted exclusively of ethnic Macedonians. Multi-ethnic units 
were often not informed about police raids, let alone involved in such police activities, 
because commanders of the special police units distrusted the Albanian police officers and 
feared they would leak information to Albanian criminals.441 This lack of co-operation not 
only increased tensions between the population and the police, but in several cases also 
allowed suspects to escape.442 Co-operation, however, was not only deficient between the spe-
cial police units and the multi-ethnic police, but also between the special and criminal police 
and the judiciary.443 The co-ordination of activities of different branches of the police and the 
judiciary was one of the primary tasks of the new department against organized crime estab-
lished by the MoI in February 2005.444    
 
                                                 
435  Interviews with EUPOL Proxima police representatives, Macedonia, May 2004. 
436  Interview with senior representative of the international community, Skopje, June 2005. 
437  Cf. Peake 2004: 36; Matveeva et al. 2003: 44f.  
438  Cf. International Crisis Group 2003a: 5; European Union Police Mission Proxima 2005b. 
439  Interviews with EUPOL Proxima representatives, Skopje, May 2004. 
440  Ibid.  
441  Ibid. 
442  Cf. International Crisis Group 2003a: 5. 
443  Cf. Commission of the European Communities 2004a: 32. 
444  Cf. Southeast European Times 2005. 
 75
The human rights record of the Macedonian police. While there are no reports available 
which deal particularly with human rights violations by members of the new multi-ethnic con-
tingents, a number of reports focus on the human rights record of the Macedonian police in 
general. Several reports of Amnesty International alleged police ill-treatment and torture of 
crime suspects. Furthermore, Amnesty stressed that in many cases “the alleged ill-treatment 
has had an ethnic or racial component […] in that the victims’ minority ethnicity of Muslim 
faith appeared to have been one, if not the, primary factor in the alleged ill-treatment”.445 
Moreover, Amnesty International complained that despite the frequency of allegations of 
police ill-treatment or torture, the number of prosecutions of police officers for such offences 
was “so low as to be almost negligible”.446 Even if there were investigations against police 
officers, such cases were usually dismissed as unfounded “despite at times compelling evi-
dence to the contrary”.447 In addition to the use of excessive force, the Macedonian Helsinki 
Committee also mentioned other violations of the law by the police such as searches without 
court warrants, and putting people into custody in police stations illegitimately. According to 
the Helsinki Committee, arrests without warrants even increased in 2004.448 In more than 500 
cases, there had been no court orders available for the infamous “informative talks”.449 
Amnesty International stressed that, despite an overall decrease of police ill-treatment in 
2004, allegations of ill-treatment by police officers continued.450 The Helsinki Committee got 
information on cases of “indicated torture and inhumane or humiliating behaviour”451 
involving 35 victims. In contrast to the reports of earlier years, members of ethnic minorities 
were no longer the primary group of victims.452   
 
The Helsinki Committee continued to criticize the failure of state institutions to investigate 
and sanction such misconduct, and highlighted in particular the inappropriate roles the MoI’s 
Unit for Professional Standards and Internal Control and the Ombudsman played in this 
context. According to the Helsinki Committee, the internal control unit had not managed to 
establish itself as an independent body capable of conducting its own investigations. The 
results of the restructuring of the unit as well as the introduction of procedures for citizens’ 
complaints in 2004 remain to be seen. The Ombudsman, according to the Helsinki Com-
mittee, had failed to engage in the resolution of sensitive problems involving state authorities 
who had violated the constitutional and legal rights of citizens.453 
 
 
4.3.3  Social Inter-Ethnic Climate at the Academy and in the Units 
4.3.3.1  Social Climate at the Academy    
 
The social climate between the different ethnic groups was generally described as pretty good. 
The relative majority (43.6 per cent) of the cadets of 2004 characterized the climate as co-
operative, 34.1 per cent even said it was friendly (cf. chart A.12a). Basically, OSCE 
instructors confirmed this positive view. The majority of instructors interviewed called the 
climate co-operative (cf. chart A.11). 10.6 per cent of the cadets said that the climate was 
acceptable. While only 5.3 per cent of the respondents thought that the climate was uncom-
                                                 
445  Amnesty International 2003a: 2. 
446  Amnesty International 2003b: 1. 
447  Ibid.: 1; Helsinki Committee for Human Rights of the Republic of Macedonia 2003: 5. 
448  Cf. Helsinki Committee for Human Rights of the Republic of Macedonia 2003: 5. 
449  Interview with Goran Kalajdziev, Macedonian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Skopje, May 
2004. 
450  Cf. Amnesty International 2005b: 2.    
451  Helsinki Committee for Human Rights of the Republic of Macedonia 2004: 5. 
452   Cf. ibid.: 5. 
453  Cf. ibid.: 5 and 7. 
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fortable, even smaller fractions (3.2 per cent each) believed the climate was tense or even 
antagonistic (cf. chart A.12a). Corresponding to this generally positive assessment, only 8.2 
per cent of the respondents claimed that they had recognized any ethnically motivated prob-
lems at the academy. The majority of those cadets were of Macedonian ethnicity (11.6 per 
cent of Macedonians, 5.7 per cent of Albanians; cf. chart A.13a).   
 
Former cadets were not as enthusiastic as the current ones about the social climate during 
their time at the academy. The relative majority (36.5 per cent) of the respondents character-
ized the climate only as acceptable, 30.2 per cent called it co-operative and 18.8 per cent 
friendly (cf. chart A.12b). The percentage of those who recalled any ethnically motivated 
problems was also higher than in the class of 2004. 19 per cent mentioned such problems; in 
this case the majority of those complaining were Albanians (23.5 per cent of Albanians; 9.1 
per cent of Macedonians, cf. chart A. 13b). Although former cadets assessed the inter-ethnic 
climate less favourably than the cadets of 2004, the percentage of those who claimed to have 
had social contact with cadets belonging to other ethnic groups (93.3 per cent) was almost as 
high as with the cadets of 2004 (95.9 per cent, cf. chart A.14). 
 
4.3.3.2 Social Climate in the Multi-Ethnic Units 
 
46.6 per cent of EU police monitors characterized the social climate within the multi-ethnic 
police units as acceptable, 20 per cent said the climate was co-operative, and 6.7 per cent 
called it friendly (cf. chart A.11). Again, local police officers characterized the climate in 
more positive terms. 27.4 per cent said it was acceptable, 37.4 per cent stated that it was co-
operative, and 28.6 per cent even characterized it as friendly (cf. chart A.17). While only 5.5 
per cent of local officers said that the climate was uncomfortable or tense, almost 27 per cent 
of EU police monitors held that view. Hardly any of the respondents called the climate 
antagonistic (cf. charts A.11 and A.17).  
 
80 per cent of all officers of the multi-ethnic units felt accepted by their colleagues regardless 
of their ethnicity.454 85 per cent of the officers also felt included by their colleagues.455 The 
majority (about 50 per cent) of ethnic Albanian and Macedonian officers said that they were 
not treated better by superiors who shared their own ethnicity than by superiors of the other 
ethnicity. However, 30 per cent of ethnic Albanians and 16 per cent of ethnic Macedonians 
indicated that they were treated better by superiors who shared the same ethnicity.456 
Corresponding to these figures were statements from EUPOL Proxima observers, of whom 
17.9 per cent had recognized exclusive structures of loyalty at their station based on ethnic 
identity (cf. chart A.26). 
 
13.1 per cent (almost exactly as many as in Kosovo or South Serbia) of the responding police 
officers had, at least once, recognized ethnically motivated problems within their units or at 
their stations. On the other hand, almost 87 per cent had never noticed such problems. 
Interestingly, in Macedonia (in contrast to Kosovo and South Serbia) it was the ethnic 
Albanians (19.6 per cent) who more often remembered ethnically motivated problems than 
their colleagues from the other ethnicity (5.6 per cent, cf. chart A.18). The good inter-ethnic 
climate was underlined by statements from over 82.8 per cent of the respondents that they had 
social contact after duty with colleagues belonging to other ethnic groups (cf. chart A.19). 
 
                                                 
454  Cf. OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje 2004a: 22. 
455  Cf. ibid.: 28. 
456  Cf. ibid.: 27. 
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Officers of the multi-ethnic units were more sceptical than their colleagues in Kosovo and 
South Serbia with respect to the influence of former combatants on the units. In contrast to 
Kosovo (53 per cent) and South Serbia (55.1 per cent), only a relative majority of officers in 
Macedonia (46.3 per cent) perceived no threat to the efficient functioning of the multi-ethnic 
units by the incorporation of former combatants. 20 per cent did perceive such a threat. Ethnic 
Macedonian officers, in particular, were sceptical. 27.8 per cent of them were concerned 
about the incorporation of former combatants. Interestingly, 15.7 per cent of ethnic Albanians 
also expressed this concern (compared to only 6.6 and 5.3 per cent of Albanians in Kosovo 
and South Serbia, cf. chart A.16). The majority of EUPOL Proxima observers (53.3 per cent) 
believed that the spirit and the principles of democratic policing were conveyable to former 
combatants. On the other hand, more than one-third of the respondents said that those 
principles could not be conveyed at all (30 per cent), or that only certain aspects could be 
conveyed (6.7 per cent, cf. chart A.15).  
 
 
4.3.4 Public Perception of the Performance of the Multi-Ethnic Police   
 
In mid-2004, 31 per cent of ethnic Albanians had gained trust in the multi-ethnic police, while 
26 per cent did not trust those units. However, with respect to the Macedonian police in 
general, 61 per cent of ethnic Albanians still did not trust the police.457 Ethnic Macedonians 
were more sceptical of the multi-ethnic units − 48 percent did not trust them. It must be 
added, however, that ethnic Macedonians were also critical with respect to the Macedonian 
police in general. Only 38 per cent trusted the ethnic Macedonian police, while 43 per cent 
did not.458 According to a survey conducted by the Macedonian MoI in 2003, a total of 23.4 
per cent of the respondents stated that the police did their job well, while the majority (50.8 
per cent) did not agree with this.459 By 2004, the majority of ethnic Albanians and Mace-
donians alike were still disappointed by the performance of the police. They cited a lack of 
presence and of pro-activity on the part of the police to actually deter or apprehend crimi-
nals.460 However, members of the Albanian community felt more confident with the police 
after the establishment of multi-ethnic units. Many of them said that they no longer lived in 
fear of ethnic Macedonian policemen. Many Albanians began to believe that the actions of the 
police were in the public’s interest and not simply in the interest of the state. Albanians 
praised the improved possibilities for communication with the police; and misunderstandings 
between Albanians and the police, which were due to the different language and cultural 
backgrounds seemed to belong to the past.461 Ethnic Macedonians, who live in predominately 
Albanian-inhabited areas, still felt insecure and insufficiently protected by the police. For this 
reason, about 2,700 internally displaced ethnic Macedonians, who had fled from their homes 
during the crisis in 2001, had not returned by 2004.462 
 
In contrast to the generally sceptical perception of the police, the officers of the multi-ethnic 
police element perceived themselves as much better accepted by the public. The majority 
(54.1 per cent) of the responding ethnic Macedonian officers rated their acceptance in ethnic 
Macedonian communities as relatively high, and 32.4 per cent even rated it as high, while 
only 10.8 per cent felt that their acceptance was low. Ethnic Macedonian officers even felt 
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458  Cf. ibid.: 6. 
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462  Cf. Matveeva et al 2003: 36; Norwegian Refugee Council 2004.  
 78
quite well accepted in Albanian-dominated communities with a majority (51.4 per cent) of the 
respondents reporting a relatively high acceptance, and 18.9 per cent rating acceptance as 
high. One-third of the ethnic Macedonian respondents thought there was only low acceptance 
(18.9 per cent) or did not give an assessment (10.8 per cent). Albanian respondents were 
slightly more sceptical regarding their acceptance by ethnic Macedonian communities. How-
ever, a relative majority (37.3 per cent) still rated their acceptance as fairly high, and 21.6 per 
cent even considered it to be high. 23.5 per cent perceived only low acceptance and 17.6 per 
cent did not respond. With respect to their own community, Albanian officers seemed to be 
even more convinced about their acceptance than did the ethnic Macedonian officers. While 
39.6 per cent rated their acceptance in ethnic Albanian communities as fairly high, the relative 
majority of the respondents said that their acceptance was high. Only 5.7 per cent rated their 
acceptance as low. 11.3 per cent did not respond (cf. chart A.20). These results of the CORE 
survey were even topped by those of a survey conducted by the OSCE mission, in which 92 
per cent of the ethnic Albanian officers felt accepted by ethnic Albanian citizens.463  
 
The police officers’ general overestimation of their public acceptance may have resulted from 
their desire to give a positive picture of themselves in the survey. The very positive assess-
ment of the Albanian officers with respect to their acceptance in their own community may 
also be due to the fact that Albanian officers were regarded as traitors by the Albanian com-
munity before the introduction of the multi-ethnic police project.464 In light of this past, the 
relationship has indeed improved substantially since August 2001. EUPOL Proxima monitors 
were rather cautious in assessing the acceptance of multi-ethnic units among the population. 
While only three per cent saw them as being accepted in all communities, a majority (51.5 per 
cent) said that the multi-ethnic units were accepted in most of the communities. A quarter 
(24.2 per cent) regarded them as being accepted in few communities only, and 6.1 per cent did 
not believe they were accepted in any community (cf. chart A.21).  
 
   
4.3.5 Obstacles to the Build-up of a Democratic Multi-Ethnic Police Service  
 
Choosing from among the pre-determined answers in the CORE survey (see 2.3.5), the vast 
majority of local police officers rated the influence of political parties and groups as the big-
gest obstacle to police reform. A similar view was expressed by OSCE and EU officers for 
whom this item was the second most frequently cited big obstacle (OSCE instructors 66.7 / 
Proxima police observers 88.9 per cent). However, even more Proxima observers (96.3 per 
cent) perceived the low salaries and their negative effect on the morale of the local police offi-
cers as a big problem, a view also confirmed by a high percentage of OSCE instructors (60 
per cent) and local police officers (54.3 per cent). Interestingly, local police officers perceived 
their low salaries as being slightly less important, since “only” 54.3 per cent called this a big 
problem. This assessment differed from those of Kosovar and south Serbian police officers 
who ranked this problem as the most important one. It is also interesting that 75 per cent of 
the OSCE instructors mentioned the unrepresentative ethnic composition of the police as a big 
problem, while EU observers and local officers (22.2 / 31.3 per cent) ranked this problem as 
substantially less important. Another problem, on which views differed significantly, was that 
of insufficient training, which 70.4 per cent of EU Proxima observers judged to be a big prob-
lem, while only 16.7 per cent of OSCE instructors (who had been responsible for the training) 
and 38.7 per cent of the local officers shared this view. The influence of organized crime was 
rated as a big problem by local police officers (55.3 per cent) as well as by Proxima observers 
(76.9 per cent, cf. charts A.22 and A. 23).       
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Politicization. Police units directly affiliated with certain political parties such as the “Lions”, 
which was created by then VMRO-DPMNE-Minister Ljube Boskovski, no longer exist.465 In 
the process of recruiting the multi-ethnic police, the OSCE was able to limit the influence of 
political parties. Nevertheless, international observers keep complaining that political parties 
still try to influence personnel and operational matters within the police on the central and 
local levels alike.466 The most obvious recent example was the Kondovo case (see 4.3.2.1). 
 
Centralization. As mentioned above, the over-centralization of the police severely hampers its 
performance and was therefore criticized by international reformers. To solve the problem, 
the MoI made decentralization the central focus of its Police Reform Strategy in 2003. The 
aim was to create nine police districts with autonomous decision-making authority to increase 
efficiency and professionalism on the local level. The decentralization process was meant to 
tighten the links between the population and the local police, making use of the community 
policing officers in each station as well as the Citizens Advisory Groups in all municipalities. 
Each of the nine districts would be led by a commander responsible for operations and 
managing resources. Within the nine districts, 39 police stations would be established. 
However, the heads of police were still yet to be identified by August 2005. Their election 
process faced severe challenges, and the MoI was concerned that the election of the heads of 
police by local authorities would increase the influence of local politicians. Local authorities 
rejected these fears as unfounded arguing that the MoI had the right to propose candidates 
from which the municipal councils had to select. If the councils rejected two lists of candi-
dates, the MoI had the right to choose a candidate from a list proposed by the councils. In 
addition, the MoI had the option of replacing local police chiefs through the Sector for Profes-
sional Standards and Internal Control in case a police chief was found guilty of abuse.467 In 
view of these difficulties, the goal of realizing decentralization by 2006 does not seem achiev-
able. 
 
Lack of co-operation by citizens. In cases of street damage and threats to civilians, only 61.6 
per cent of people affected reported the incident to the police. Almost 40 per cent did not 
report such incidents. They explained their behaviour by saying that the police were not 
effective, or that they were afraid of the police (37.5 per cent).468 However, 89.3 per cent of 
respondents said they would call the police if they were robbed. Among those who would call 
the police in cases of a robbery, ethnic Macedonians (93.4 per cent) were much more willing 
to do so than were ethnic Albanians (77 per cent).469          
 
Small arms proliferation. Between 350,000 and 750,000 small arms and light weapons are in 
the hands of Macedonian citizens. An estimated 100,000 to 450,000 of them are held illegally. 
The distribution of arms is fairly equal between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians.470 A large 
number of weapons were distributed during the armed conflict in 2001. Ethnic Albanians 
received weapons from Albania and Kosovo as well as from ethnic Albanian political parties 
who had the authority to distribute firearms licences to their supporters. Ethnic Macedonians 
received weapons either from Macedonian political parties or from the MoI as members of the 
police or as villagers in predominantly Albanian regions. However, even before the conflict, a 
widespread “gun culture” existed among ethnic Macedonians and Albanians alike.471 What 
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seems to be different now, compared to the period before 2001, is that firearms are more 
visible and more likely to be used in crimes, and that the numbers of victims and incidents 
involving automatic weapons are rising.472  
 
Financial constraints. Of the 39.3 million Euros needed for police reform in 2005, the 
Macedonian state budget could only provide 3.2 million Euros.473 Without the financial assist-
ance of the international community, primarily the European Commission, the reform would 
have had no chance at all. Due to the financial constraints, the low salaries of police officers 
(about 250 Euros a month) have not been raised.474   
 
Corruption. According to Transparency International’s 2004 Corruption Perceptions Index, 
Macedonia received a rating of 2.7 (10 being the most “clean”), ranking the country (together 
with Serbia and Montenegro) in 97th place among the 146 countries surveyed. Compared to 
2003, Macedonia has slightly improved its standing, moving up 9 places.475 The Transparency 
International Global Corruption Barometer of 2004 shows that the Macedonian judiciary is 
ranked as the most corrupt institution followed by the customs service, political parties and 
medical services. The police service follows in fifth place.476 That many people expect to gain 
from bribing police officers can be seen from the fact that about 30 per cent of the respon-
dents to the CORE survey stated that they had been offered bribes (cf. chart A.24). These 
figures were noticeably higher than in Kosovo (8.7 per cent) and South Serbia (16.8 per cent). 
Correspondingly, significantly more international police observers had been aware of cases of 
attempted bribery at their stations in Macedonia (29.6 per cent) than in Kosovo (14.8 per cent, 
cf. chart A.25). 
    
To fight corruption, a State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption has been established 
under the new Anti-Corruption Law; and the new Professional Standards Unit within the MoI 
seems to be willing to fight police corruption proactively. This is indicated by the significant 
increase in the number of corruption cases brought by the MoI.477 Nevertheless, the head of 
the EUPOL Proxima mission complained in March 2005, that, since Proxima’s arrival in 
2003, only one large-scale anti-corruption operation had been conducted by the MoI.478 In 
2004, the State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption complained that it did not have 
access for its inquiries to any of the ministries with the exception of the MoI.479 Another ob-
stacle to effective action by the State Commission was rooted in the Anti-Corruption Law 
itself, which did not confer any investigative powers on the Commission.480 In 2005, with the 
assistance of the Stability Pact and CoE’s Programme against Corruption and Organised 
Crime in South-eastern Europe (PACO), the government prepared new laws for a more effec-
tive fight against corruption, e.g. amendments to the Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure 
Code, the Law for the Prevention of Corruption, and the Witness Protection Law. However, 
the international community considered the way these laws were implemented 
inappropriate.481 International advisers were still looking for a decisive and successful anti-
corruption policy.482 The Macedonian public was even more critical about developments in 
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the fight against corruption. The vast majority of the population (64 per cent) did not expect 
any decrease in corruption in the next three years.483     
 
 
4.4 Conclusions 
 
Similar to South Serbia, the OSCE and its partner organizations, together with the national 
MoI, have had considerable success in establishing multi-ethnic police units that were able to 
re-enter Albanian villages in the former crisis region, thereby (re-)establishing basic elements 
of the state’s monopoly of force. Communication between the police and the villagers has 
developed. In the course of decreasing tensions, most of the some 170 former police check-
points around the villages have been dismantled. Altogether, this means a significant turning 
away from the confrontational policing approach of the years before 2002. However, the 
negative trade-off for this new “soft” policing approach has been that the fight against crime 
has frequently been conducted in an inconsistent manner so as not to “provoke” new tensions. 
Multi-ethnic police units have been hampered in their actions by orders from their superiors to 
only focus on minor criminal incidents, traffic, and administrative service. On the other hand, 
the new officers’ inadequate skills and inexperience have not enabled them to conduct regular 
police work effectively. Increasingly, this has led to the complaint by the population, inclu-
ding ethnic Albanians, that the police do not provide sufficient security against criminal 
gangs, a problem which has been noticeably on the rise in the former crisis region.   
 
The lack of policing skills among the newly trained officers has also been the main reason for 
the limited success in integrating multi-ethnic units into the regular police, and for the slug-
gish promotion of Albanian officers. To truly achieve equal representation of Albanians in the 
police, as demanded by the Ohrid Framework Agreement, several hundred more Albanians 
need to be recruited and integrated into all branches of the police. However, deep cuts in the 
public administration of Macedonia as demanded by the IMF, which require the downsizing 
of the police force, in combination with the simultaneous additional appointments of ethnic 
Albanians, will almost certainly lead to renewed tensions between the two communities. The 
integration of Albanian officers has been particularly inadequate with respect to the special 
police, still exclusively composed of ethnic Macedonians. This has created a situation in 
which the authorities are no longer able to enforce the law as in the “Kondovo” case, because 
any bloodshed among Albanian villagers, as a result of a police raid by “ethnically pure” 
Macedonian special forces, would almost certainly lead to the resignation of the Albanian co-
alition partner in the government. While even ordinary Albanians have increasingly de-
nounced the inactivity of state institutions against Albanian criminal organizations, the ethnic 
Macedonian majority has been particularly upset. This has further decreased the already low 
trust in the regular and the multi-ethnic police as well.       
 
The poor reputation of all rule-of-law agencies has also developed as a result of the severe 
structural problems of politicization, over-centralization, and endemic corruption inherited 
from the past. These deficiencies can only be remedied if comprehensive security sector re-
forms are implemented consistently. The police reform strategy of December 2003, the imple-
mentation of which had not really started by the beginning of 2005, requires protracted efforts 
from the government and assistance from its international partners. In view of these multiple 
problems, the termination of Proxima and its replacement with a much smaller EU Police 
Assistance Team (EUPAT) in December 2005,484 and the further downsizing of the OSCE’s 
PDU do not seem to be the appropriate measures. Furthermore, although the OSCE, the EU 
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and the Macedonian government were insisting in the summer of 2005 that the security 
situation in Macedonia was stable despite the “Kondovo” crisis, the impact of the political and 
security developments in Kosovo on Macedonia cannot be predicted. 
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Chapter 5 Summary of Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
 
 
5.1 Findings of the Three Case Studies 
 
A critical assessment of the implementation of the three mandates reveals mixed results. That 
the missions were able in all three cases to recruit and train as many officers as planned was a 
clear success. So far, about 7,500 officers have been trained and deployed in ethnically mixed 
units in Kosovo, 400 in South Serbia, and 1,500 in Macedonia.  
 
Furthermore, a general climate of professionalism and comradeship has developed at the 
police academies and in the multi-ethnic units. This was more easily achieved in South Serbia 
and Macedonia, where the level of violence during the conflicts was rather low. Nevertheless, 
it is remarkable that, in these two countries, inter-ethnic communication and co-operation 
within the police is significantly better than in their respective societies as a whole. The most 
surprising finding, however, concerns Kosovo. In spite of the significantly higher level of 
inter-ethnic violence during the Kosovo conflict, the inter-ethnic social climate at the Kosovo 
Police Service School and in the multi-ethnic units was judged to be almost as good as in 
South Serbia and Macedonia. This is the result of the extensive use made by UNMIK and 
OMIK of their capacity for intervention. After initially having been forced to live and work 
together in order not to lose their jobs, police officers of different ethnic groups developed the 
basic co-operative attitudes necessary for the joint execution of their tasks. This positive result 
is by no means cancelled out by the inter-ethnic problems the KPS experienced following the 
March 2004 riots. On the contrary, it is encouraging that inter-ethnic problems occurred only 
in a few police stations and that the multi-ethnic composition of the KPS in general was not 
endangered.       
 
A third positive achievement is the level of confidence in the new police that was reached in 
all three cases, particularly among the Albanian population, but also among Bosniaks, Turks, 
and Roma. In Kosovo, the local police enjoy a very good reputation, and in South Serbia and 
Macedonia, the Albanian communities have begun to turn to the multi-ethnic police with their 
concerns. This would have been almost unthinkable for the mono-ethnic police forces before 
2001.   
 
However, a number of failures and deficiencies must also be acknowledged. Unlike the ethnic 
Albanian population, ethnic Serbs and Macedonians view the multi-ethnic units with much 
scepticism, in the case of Kosovo, even with open rejection. In the Serb-dominated northern 
part of Kosovo, even Serbian KPS officers are not respected by the population. The Serbian 
population in this region prefers to rely on the parallel security structures still maintained by 
the Belgrade government. In the other Serbian enclaves across Kosovo, the attitude of the 
population towards the KPS is more positive. However, the population there is forced to 
accommodate itself to the KPS, as parallel Serbian security structures do not exist. In South 
Serbia and Macedonia, the acceptance of the multi-ethnic units is also rather low within the 
regular police apparatus, most visibly expressed by the inadequate integration of these units 
into the existing structures. In particular, co-operation between multi-ethnic units and special 
police forces tasked with fighting organized crime and terrorism continues to be difficult. 
 
The prime reason for this lack of integration is the inadequate training of the new police offi-
cers. The poor level of education of many ethnic Albanian police applicants represents a sig-
nificant obstacle to their further training. Structural and conceptual deficiencies of the training 
programmes themselves also play a role in the inadequate skills of these newly trained 
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officers. As far as the basic academy training is concerned, the most important problems 
resulted from the need to teach an enormous syllabus within a very short period of time. 
Because lessons given by international instructors had to be translated from English into Ser-
bian, Albanian or Macedonian, the already short training time was additionally cut by half or 
even two-thirds. Moreover, basic training suffered in South Serbia and Macedonia from too 
many theoretical lessons and the lack of knowledge and old-fashioned teaching styles of local 
police instructors. The deficiencies in the field training were primarily related to training 
periods that were too short to allow the new police officers to transfer their theoretical know-
ledge into practical experience. This problem of time was aggravated by a lack of personnel 
resources. Inadequate numbers of international and local field trainers did not permit intensive 
mentoring of the new officers. Moreover, field trainers had quite different levels of know-
ledge and motivation. Consequently, the substance of the field training could not be suffi-
ciently standardized.  
 
In addition to educational deficits, in all three cases, a number of local police officers were 
not suitable because of their criminal background or other negative personality traits. Never-
theless, these officers were recruited due to political pressure exerted by representatives of all 
ethnic communities. As the OSCE only played a supporting role with respect to the recruit-
ment process in South Serbia and Macedonia, the organization’s options for intervention were 
rather limited. In Kosovo, where the OSCE and the UN had the sole responsibility for 
recruiting, they had severe problems in getting reliable information about the applicants, 
because relevant documents had vanished during the war. Last but not least, the pressure to 
integrate as many “minority officers” as possible, within an extremely short period of time, 
led the international organizations to give a chance to candidates who were unsuitable. 
 
The results of the case studies do not permit a clear assessment of the impact of the 
incorporation of former combatants on the functioning of the police. Relevant perceptions of 
international and local police officers indicate that former combatants do indeed represent an 
obstacle to the proper functioning of the police despite the fact that the majority of them so far 
have not stood out in a negative way during training or on duty. 
 
Other reasons for the frequently unprofessional performance of new police officers were rela-
ted to specific structural deficiencies of the post-socialist police forces in Serbia and Mace-
donia. The over-centralized command structures in Serbia and Macedonia are a significant 
obstacle to autonomous decision-making among lower-ranking police officers. Centralized 
structures also give way to political interference in operational measures and in the career 
development of individual police officers. A thorough reform of the Serbian and Macedonian 
police laws, which could contain these problems and adjust the performance of the police ser-
vices to EU standards, is still far from complete. A related problem, providing fertile ground 
for corruption, is the low salaries of police officers. While the reputation of the police, in this 
respect, is quite poor in general, the Kosovar police still enjoy considerable trust among the 
Albanian population.   
 
Finally, effective police work is seriously hampered in all three cases by the low level of co-
operation between the police and the judiciary, and particularly by the severe deficiencies 
within the judiciary itself. Inefficient, corrupt, politicized and biased courts undermine the law 
enforcement actions of the police, thereby weakening the state’s monopoly of force. 
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5.2   Conclusions 
 
The record of international efforts in creating multi-ethnic police services in the Balkans is 
rather limited and based on brief experience only. Nevertheless, important steps towards 
achieving initial operational readiness of these new police services have been made.  
 
In all three cases, the key problem remains the low and functionally inadequate level of train-
ing and, in consequence, the qualifications of the multi-ethnic units. However, while UNMIK 
has put a lot of effort into reducing these deficits and, with a few exceptions, has transferred 
the operational authority to the local police, police authorities in South Serbia and Macedonia 
are reluctant to integrate the new multi-ethnic units into the regular police forces, particularly 
the criminal police and the special units. If the integration problem remains unresolved and 
the special units remain ethnic domaînes reservées, there is a real danger that the concept of 
multi-ethnic police could degenerate into a mere symbolic gesture. This would not only mean 
stagnation, but would also involve the risk of serious regression. Once the population and the 
officers themselves have come to the conclusion that multi-ethnic units represent a second or 
third choice and thus cannot be taken seriously, the whole concept of employing multi-ethnic 
police to build peace in post-conflict situations will be called into question. While, at the 
beginning, it was reasonable and necessary to focus on the quantitative goal of deploying a 
sufficient number of multi-ethnic units as soon as possible, the focus must now – and for the 
years to come – be on improving the performance of the new officers if the concept of multi-
ethnic police is not to be undermined. 
 
Winning the trust of all ethnic population groups is even more difficult than establishing the 
police’s operational readiness. This requires a process of ethno-political rethinking – within 
all ethnic communities – which cannot be initiated and supported by administrative means, 
such as job incentives or disciplinary measures. What is needed is a true, voluntary and broad-
ly autonomous learning process, something that is much more difficult to achieve. A neces-
sary condition for such learning processes − but not a sufficient one − is that multi-ethnic 
units must prove in practice that they are capable of securing the rights of all ethnic groups in 
an even-handed manner. And precisely this has, so far, been a serious problem in all three 
cases. As important as favourable political conditions are – i.e. moderate politicians, confi-
dence-building programmes and projects such as community policing or community advisory 
groups – the core question for building confidence is whether the multi-ethnic police are ca-
pable of functioning as a reliable guarantor of the state’s monopoly of force. So far, this has 
only been partially achieved in all three mission areas. 
 
Therefore, it is essential that the international actors continue their efforts to professionalize 
the new police services in the Balkans. The member states of the OSCE, the EU and the UN 
have recognized that the establishment of sound and accountable security institutions is a cru-
cial element of sustainable post-conflict peace-building in the Western Balkans, which would 
allow them, at some point, to pull out their troops from the region. Furthermore, the EU mem-
bers have also become aware of the fact that the creation of effective police forces is indis-
pensable for combating organized crime in the region, that also threatens the security of 
European states. Since the Balkan states cannot be expected to solve these problems on their 
own, it is in the best interest of EU states to provide long-term support for the reform of the 
police and other elements of the security sector.  
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5.3 Recommendations 
 
Police reform in post-conflict transformation societies is a complex and challenging 
endeavour. It needs sustained support, as the final outcome of reform efforts cannot be deter-
mined within two or three years. For this reason, international actors must be prepared to 
engage in police reforms for longer periods.  
 
Provision of personnel. The different tasks of international police personnel, ranging from 
training, monitoring, and advising up to armed law enforcement, require more specialized 
staff and more training before and during missions. There is an urgent need for more and 
better-qualified instructors, both at the academies and in the field. These instructors, in turn, 
should undergo pre-mission training in order to be brought to the same level of competence 
and to familiarize themselves with mission-specific training programmes. This is essential to 
ensure standardized teaching of course content. In addition to instructors, police reform 
missions require an even larger number of monitors and advisers, who can be co-located at 
police stations and even at the ministerial level to monitor the implementation of police 
reforms and provide assistance to their local counterparts.   
 
With respect to the three cases analysed, it would have been advisable to extend the EU police 
presence in Macedonia with the same number of personnel following the termination of the 
Proxima mandate in December 2005. The implementation of police reforms in Macedonia 
actually only started in January 2005 and is far from complete. Macedonian authorities will 
need further monitoring and advice from the EU and the OSCE if they are to have the chance 
of adjusting their security sector to EU standards and fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria for 
EU accession. The same applies to the Serbian authorities. As for Kosovo, the police mission 
will have to continue its work for the years to come, either under the umbrella of the UN or of 
the EU. In addition to trainers, monitors and advisers, the Kosovo mission needs international 
specialists for combating organized crime and riot control – since the KPS does not yet have 
sufficient capabilities to effectively fulfil these tasks on their own. 
 
Provision of material and conceptual resources. In order to set up missions quickly and avoid 
repeating mistakes already made, pre-mission planning, including mission-specific needs-
assessment in the field is needed at the earliest possible stage. Mission-specific training curri-
cula must consider local legal and cultural specifics to avoid impracticable training content. 
International organizations should therefore establish analytical and planning units, run data-
bases with standard curricula, and compare and evaluate the existing training concepts of the 
different missions. 
 
Experience has shown that basic academy training should not be less than twelve weeks if the 
necessary minimum content is to be taught. The three cases have also demonstrated the 
importance of including a significant number of practical training sessions. With respect to 
field training, there is a need for more intensive mentoring and better integration of new offi-
cers into daily police work to give them the opportunity to acquire practical experience. 
 
As for material resources, police training missions need start-up kits containing basic office 
and classroom equipment. The three case studies have also shown the need for considerable 
financial resources for the refurbishment of training facilities. With respect to the fight against 
organized crime, host countries will need high-tech equipment, in particular IT equipment and 
equipment for forensics and crime scene management.  
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At the same time, donor co-ordination should be improved to avoid duplication and in-compa-
tibility of donated equipment and training programmes. The development of a related data-
base, covering international police assistance projects, would be a great help to programme 
co-ordinators. The “Inventory Initiative” on “Security Sector Reform in South Eastern 
Europe”, a database project carried out by the Centre for International Security Studies 
(YCISS) at York University,485 is a first important step in this direction. However, a more 
extensive database covering all regions in which the UN, the OSCE and the EU are engaged 
in security sector reforms is needed. 
 
Implementation of reform programmes. With respect to the sustainability of police reforms, 
the international community cannot avoid exerting considerable political pressure on the host 
states to implement new legislation regulating the tasks and structures of the police forces. 
This is essential for making police work more effective, de-politicizing the police, dis-
mantling over-centralized command structures, making career developments more trans-
parent, fighting human rights violations and other forms of police misconduct, isolating radi-
cal political groups, and strengthening the co-operation between the police and the judiciary.  
 
In Kosovo, the international community must ensure that the positive achievements of the 
KPS are not reversed by radical forces, should the province gain (conditional) independence 
from Serbia. In the cases of South Serbia and Macedonia, sustained political pressure will be 
necessary to achieve the integration of multi-ethnic units in all branches of the police, particu-
larly in the special police units. 
 
Efforts to win the trust of all ethnic groups. Finally, more efforts are needed to win the trust of 
ethnic Serbians and Macedonians in the multi-ethnic police. Only if this is achieved, can one 
really speak of successful integration. The creation of Crime Prevention Councils (Kosovo), 
Community Advisory Groups (South Serbia) and Citizens Advisory Groups (Macedonia) at 
municipality level, and the introduction of specifically trained Community Policing Officers 
are important steps in this direction. International missions, in co-operation with civil so-
cieties, must also continue to put more effort into explaining the overall purpose and proper 
functioning of such institutions to the local population. 
 
                                                 
485  This project is implemented on behalf of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (Working Table III 
on Security Issues), see http://ssr.yciss.yorku.ca/ (30 July 2005).  
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Annex 1: List of Abbreviations 
 
 
BDI/DUI Democratic Union for Integration (Macedonian political party) 
BIA  Bezbednosno-Informativna Agencija (Serbian Security Intelligence Agency) 
 
CAG  Community Advisory Group (in South Serbia) 
CAG  Citizen Advisory Group (in Macedonia) 
CARDS Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (by the 
EU) 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
CoE Council of Europe 
CORE Centre for OSCE Research 
CPO Community Policing Officer (Kosovo/South Serbia) 
CPT Community Police Trainer (Macedonia)   
CPU  Close Protection Unit (Kosovo) 
CRC  Community Relations Co-ordinator (Macedonia) 
 
DEPD  Department of Police Education and Development (of OMIK) 
DFID  Department for International Development (of the UK) 
 
EC  European Commission 
ECJHAT European Commission Justice and Home Affairs Team  
ECPRP  European Commission Police Reform Project  
EU  European Union 
EUPOL European Police  
 
FTO  Field Training Officer 
 
HH Household Head (category used by SEESAC in a 2003 survey in Serbia) 
HLC  Humanitarian Law Center (NGO in Serbia) 
 
ICG  International Crisis Group 
ICITAP International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (of the USA) 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IOM  International Organisation for Migration 
 
JAC  Joint Advisory Council on Provisional Judicial Appointment 
 
KCS  Kosovo Correctional Service  
KFOR  Kosovo Force 
KJI  Kosovo Judicial Institute 
KLC  Kosovo Law Center 
KPS  Kosovo Police Service 
KPS-CAST Kosovo Police Service Counselling And Support Team 
KPSS  Kosovo Police Service School 
 
LDK  Democratic League of Kosovo 
LED  Law Enforcement Department (of OMiFRY, later OMiSaM) 
 
MEPE  Multi-Ethnic Police Element (South Serbia)  
MoD  Ministry of Defence 
MoI  Ministry of the Interior 
MoJ  Ministry of Justice 
MSC  Municipal Safety Council (South Serbia) 
MTA  Military Technical Agreement 
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MUP Ministarstvo Unutrasnjih Poslova (Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs) 
 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization 
 
ODIHR  Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE)  
OIOS  Office of Internal Oversight Services (UN) 
OMiFRY  OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
OMIK  OSCE Mission in Kosovo 
OMiSaM OSCE Mission in Serbia and Montenegro  
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
OUP Odeljenje Unutrasnjih Poslova (Organisational structure in Serbia in charge of 
policing at the municipal level). 
PACO Programme against Corruption and Organised Crime in South-eastern Europe 
(programme of the Council of Europe) 
PDK  Kosovo Democratic Party 
PDU Police Development Unit (of the OSCE Spillover and Monitor Mission to Skopje) 
PISG Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (Kosovo) 
PSU Professional Standards Unit (of the KPS) 
 
ROSU  Regional Operation Support Unit (of the KPS) 
REFLEX A multi-agency taskforce established in the UK to tackle organised immigration crime 
 
SEESAC South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons 
SOP  Standard Operating Procedure 
SPMU  Strategic Police Matters Unit (at the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna) 
SPU  Special Police Unit 
SRSG  Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
SWAT  Special Weapons and Tactics (training course) 
 
TI  Transparency International 
 
UBK Uprava za bezbednost i kontrarazuznavanje / Directorate for Security and 
Counterintelligence (Macedonia) 
UCK  Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves / Kosovo Liberation Army   
UCK  Ushtria Clirimtare Kombetare / National Liberation Army (in Macedonia)  
UCPMB Ushtria Clirimtare e Presheves Medvexhes dhe Bujanovicit / Liberation Army of 
Presevo, Medvedja und Bujanovac (South Serbia) 
UK  United Kingdom 
UN  United Nations 
UNCIVPOL United Nations Civilian Police (Kosovo) 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
USA  United States of America 
 
VMRO-DPMNE/ Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party of 
IMRO–DPMNU Macedonian National Unity   
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Annex 2: Tables with Statistical Data 
 
 
Table A.0:  Returned Questionnaires and Return Rates 
 
 Kosovo Macedonia South Serbia 
Cadets 61 = 47% 
Ethnicity: 
                52 Albanians 
                  6 Serbs  
                  3 “Others” 
97 = 97% 
Ethnicity: 
               53 Albanians 
               43 Macedonians 
                 1 “Others”  
- 
Local Police Officers 178 = 71.2% 
Ethnicity: 
                83 Albanians 
                68 Serbs  
                27 “Others” 
102 = 68% 
Ethnicity: 
               54 Albanians  
               38 Macedonians 
               10 “Others” 
126 = 84% 
Ethnicity: 
          80 Albanians 
          46 Serbs 
Intl. Instructors 30 = 60%   6 = 100% 5 = 17% 
Intl. Monitors 54 = 54% 33 = 66% - 
 
In the following tables, the sample sizes (n) sometimes do not correspond exactly to the total 
sample sizes of Table A.0. This is due to the fact that, in a number of cases, not all members 
of a sample group answered a question, since they were not in the position to do so (for 
example, if they had to evaluate a specific training course, which they had not attended pre-
viously). In addition, some respondents did not answer a question in the right way (for 
example, by choosing more answer possibilities than allowed. In both cases, those “missing” 
answers were not taken into account in the survey. Instead, only the valid answers, which 
were calculated by the SPSS programme (“valid percentages”), were used in the survey.     
 
 
Table A.1: Level of Co-operation between International Actors in the Felds of Recruiting, Screening 
and Training Local Police Officers 
 
A.1 Please rate the co-operation between the OSCE and UNMIK / OSCE and EU in the fields of 
recruiting, screening and training local police officers  
 Kosovo Macedonia 
 OSCE Instructors UN Monitors EU Monitors 
 n = 27, in % n = 48, in % n = 20, in % 
 Recruit-
ing 
Screen-
ing 
Train-
ing 
Recruit-
ing 
Screen-
ing 
Train- 
ing 
Recruit-
ing 
Screen-
ing 
Train-
ing 
Grade of 
co- 
operation 
         
Excellent    3.7   3.7 14.8   6.1   6.3 14.6   5.3   5.0   0.0 
Good 44.4 44.4 63.0 51.0 33.3 50.0 31.6 25.0 38.1 
Fair 11.1 33.3 22.2 16.3 27.1 18.8 10.5 25.0 19.0 
Bad 33.3 11.1   0.0   6.1   8.3   2.1 15.8 10.0 14.3 
Don’t 
know   7.4   7.4   0.0 20.4 25.0 14.6 36.8 35.0 28.6 
 
 
 91
Table A.2: Local Cadets’ and Officers’ Level of Satisfaction with Basic Training Courses  
 
A.2 Please rate your satisfaction with the basic training courses you attended 
 Kosovo Macedonia South Serbia 
 Cadets Officers Cadets Officers Officers 
 n = 58 
 in % 
n = 162  
in % 
n = 89 
 in % 
n = 73 
 in % 
n = 102 
 in % 
Extremely 
satisfied 46.6 28.4 31.5 27.4 
 
42.2 
Very  
Satisfied 25.9 27.8 37.1 32.9 
 
31.4 
Fairly  
Satisfied 27.6 38.3 23.6 30.1 24.5 
More or less 
dissatisfied   0.0   4.9   5.6   1.4   2.0 
Don’t know 
   0.0   0.6   2.2   8.2   0.0 
 
 
Table A.2a: Kosovar Officers’ Level of Satisfaction with Field Training and Specialized Training 
 
A.2a Please rate your satisfaction with the field training and specialized training you received 
 Officers in Kosovo 
 
 Field 
training 
Specialized training 
  First Line 
Supervisor  
Mid-level 
Manage-
ment 
Criminal 
Investi-
gation 
Traffic 
Accident 
Investi-
gation 
Emer-
gency 
Response 
Driving 
Basic 
Drivers 
Theory 
 
 n = 119 
 in % 
n = 31  
in % 
n = 13 
 in % 
n = 30 
 in % 
n = 12 
 in % 
n = 66 
in % 
n = 47 
 in % 
Extremely 
satisfied 21.8 29.0 23.1 26.7 
 
16.7 
 
34.8 
 
14.9 
Very  
satisfied 32.8 48.4 69.2 53.3 
 
41.7 
 
39.4 
 
40.4 
Fairly  
satisfied 37.0 19.4 0.0 16.7 33.3 24.2 40.4 
More or less 
dissatisfied 7.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 
Don’t know 
 0.8 3.2 7.7 3.3 8.3 1.5 2.1 
 
 
 92
Table A.2b: Macedonian Officers’ Level of Satisfaction with Field Training and Specialized Training 
 
A.2b Please rate your satisfaction with the field training and specialized training you received 
 Officers in Macedonia 
 
 Field 
training 
Specialized training 
  In-Service 
Training 
Reform 
Training 
Program 
Election 
Security 
Trafficking in 
Human Beings 
Municipal 
Emergency 
Management 
Authority 
 n = 37 
 in % 
n = 52  
in % 
n = 33 
 in % 
n = 48 
 in % 
n = 36 
 in % 
n = 25 
in % 
Extremely 
satisfied 21.6 25.0 15.2 18.8 
 
19.4 
 
24.0 
Very  
satisfied 16.3 30.8 27.3 39.6 
 
30.6 
 
12.0 
Fairly  
satisfied 27.0 25.0 15.2 10.4 13.9 12.0 
More or less 
dissatisfied 8.1 11.5 0.0 8.3 27.8 4.0 
Don’t know 
 27.0 7.7 42.4 22.9 8.3 48.0 
 
 
Table A.3: Local Cadets’ and Officers’ Level of Satisfaction with OSCE Police Instructors 
 
A.3 How satisfied are/were you with the OSCE Police Instructors 
 Kosovo Macedonia South Serbia 
 Cadets Officers Cadets Officers Officers 
 n = 61 
 in % 
n = 174 
in % 
n = 96 
 in % 
n = 86 
 in % 
n = 123 
 in % 
Extremely 
satisfied 42.6 12.1 26.0 26.7 38.2 
Very  
Satisfied 26.2 37.9 32.3 41.9 29.3 
Fairly  
Satisfied 27.9 45.4 32.3 20.9 30.1 
More or less 
dissatisfied   1.6   2.9   9.4   5.8   2.4 
Don’t know 
   1.6   1.7   0.0 26.7   0.0 
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Table A.4: Local Cadets’ and Officers’ Level of Satisfaction with Local Police Instructors 
 
A.4 How satisfied are/were you with the local/national Police Instructors? 
 Kosovo Macedonia South Serbia 
 Cadets Officers Cadets Officers Officers 
 n = 61 
 in % 
n = 172 
in % 
n = 96 
 in % 
n = 87 
 in % 
n = 123 
 in % 
Extremely 
satisfied 62.3 18.0 30.2 25.3 41.5 
Very  
satisfied 24.6 23.8 37.5 27.6 32.5 
Fairly  
satisfied 11.5 37.2 24.0 37.9 22.8 
More or less 
dissatisfied   1.6 13.4   4.2   5.7   3.3 
Don’t know 
   0.0   7.6   4.2   3.4   0.0 
 
 
Table A.5a: Kosovar Cadets’ Assessment of OSCE Police Instructors’ Teaching Capabilities 
 
A.5a Please rate the teaching capabilities of the OSCE Police Instructors 
Cadets in Kosovo 
 
 Teaching 
capability 
Language 
proficiency 
Capability 
to communi-
cate 
Motivation 
for work 
Readiness to 
solve ethnic 
problems in 
class 
Readiness to 
speak about 
problems after 
training 
 n = 49 
 in % 
n = 46 
in % 
n = 50 
 in % 
n = 53 
 in % 
n = 50 
 in % 
n = 47 
in % 
Excellent 49.0 41.3 38.0 49.1 52.0 40.4 
Very good 16.3 17.4 24.0   9.4 20.0 19.1 
Good 28.6 32.6 26.0 24.5 22.0 19.1 
Fair   4.1   6.5 12.0 17.0   6.0 17.0 
Poor   2.0   2.2   0.0   0.0   0.0   4.3 
 
 
Table A.5b: Kosovar Officers’ Assessment of OSCE Police Instructors’ Teaching Capabilities 
 
A.5b Please rate the teaching capabilities of the OSCE Police Instructors 
Officers in Kosovo 
 
 Teaching 
capability 
Language 
proficiency 
Capability 
to communi-
cate  
Motivation 
for work 
Readiness to 
solve ethnic 
problems in 
class 
Readiness to 
speak about 
problems after 
training 
 n = 136 
 in % 
n = 118 
in % 
n = 128 
 in % 
n = 136 
 in % 
n = 126 
 in % 
n = 121 
in % 
Excellent 25.7 12.7 22.7 27.2 31.7 30.6 
Very good 33.1 35.6 28.9 23.5 24.6 31.4 
Good 29.4 22.0 32.8 31.6 24.6 18.2 
Fair 19.3 18.6 13.3 16.2 15.1 15.7 
Poor   1.5 11.0   2.3   1.5   4.0   4.1 
 
 
 
 
 94
Table A.5c: Macedonian Cadets’ Assessment of OSCE Police Instructors’ Teaching Capabilities 
 
A.5c Please rate the teaching capabilities of the OSCE Police Instructors 
Cadets in Macedonia 
 
 Teaching 
capability 
Language 
proficiency 
Capability 
to communi-
cate  
Motivation 
for work 
Readiness to 
solve ethnic 
problems in 
class 
Readiness to 
speak about 
problems after 
training 
 n = 96 
 in % 
n = 95 
in % 
n = 96 
 in % 
n = 94 
 in % 
n = 93 
 in % 
n = 93 
in % 
Excellent 39.6 31.6 45.8 46.8 46.2 46.2 
Very good 27.1 20.0 24.0 23.4 24.7 19.4 
Good 24.0 27.4 20.8 21.3 18.3 24.7 
Fair   7.3 11.6   5.2   7.4   6.5   7.5 
Poor   2.1   9.5   4.2   1.1   4.3   2.2 
 
 
Table A.5d: Macedonian Officers’ Assessment of OSCE Police Instructors’ Teaching Capabilities 
 
A.5d Please rate the teaching capabilities of the OSCE Police Instructors 
Officers in Macedonia 
 
 Teaching 
capability 
Language 
proficiency 
Capability 
to communi-
cate 
Motivation 
for work 
Readiness to 
solve ethnic 
problems in 
class 
Readiness to 
speak about 
problems after 
training 
 n = 86 
 in % 
n = 85 
in % 
n = 84 
 in % 
n = 85 
 in % 
n = 85 
 in % 
n = 85 
in % 
Excellent 39.5 27.1 38.1 48.2 35.3 41.2 
Very good 26.7 21.2 22.6 17.6 23.5 21.2 
Good 19.8 27.1 23.8 16.5 17.6 21.2 
Fair 11.6 18.8 10.7   8.2 14.1   7.1 
Poor   2.3   5.9   4.8   9.4   9.4   9.4 
 
 
Table A.5e: South Serbian Officers’ Assessment of OSCE Police Instructors’ Teaching Capabilities 
 
A.5e Please rate the teaching capabilities of the OSCE Police Instructors 
Officers in South Serbia 
 
 Teaching 
capability 
Language 
proficiency 
Capability 
to communi-
cate  
Motivation 
for work 
Readiness to 
solve ethnic 
problems in 
class 
Readiness to 
speak about 
problems after 
training 
 n = 109 
 in % 
n = 112 
in % 
n = 108 
 in % 
n = 108 
 in % 
n = 108 
 in % 
n = 110 
in % 
Excellent 42.2 29.5 48.1 50.9 43.5 51.8 
Very good 25.7 25.0 22.2 28.7 28.7 19.1 
Good 14.7 24.1 14.8   8.3 14.8 17.3 
Fair 12.8 13.4   9.3   5.6   6.5   4.5 
Poor   4.6   8.0   5.6   6.5   6.5   7.3 
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Table A.6a: Kosovar Cadets’ Assessment of Local Police Instructors’ Teaching Capabilities 
 
A.6a Please rate the teaching capabilities of the local Police Instructors 
Cadets in Kosovo 
 
 Teaching 
capability 
Language 
proficiency 
Capability 
to communi-
cate 
Motivation 
for work 
Readiness to 
solve ethnic 
problems in 
class 
Readiness to 
speak about 
problems after 
training 
 n = 56 
 in % 
n = 50 
in % 
n = 53 
 in % 
n = 53 
 in % 
n = 49 
 in % 
n = 50 
in % 
Excellent 71.4 64.0 67.9 64.2 77.6 74.0 
Very good 17.9 20.0 15.1 17.0 10.2 16.0 
Good   3.6   4.0   9.4   3.8   6.1   4.0 
Fair   5.4   6.0   7.5 13.2   4.1   4.0 
Poor   1.8   6.0   0.0   1.9   2.0   2.0 
 
 
Table A.6b: Kosovar Officers’ Assessment of Local Police Instructors’ Teaching Capabilities 
 
A.6b Please rate the teaching capabilities of the local Police Instructors 
Officers in Kosovo 
 
 Teaching 
capability 
Language 
proficiency 
Capability 
to communi-
cate 
Motivation 
for work 
Readiness to 
solve ethnic 
problems in 
class 
Readiness to 
speak about 
problems after 
training 
 n = 128 
 in % 
n = 116 
in % 
n = 117 
 in % 
n = 127 
 in % 
n = 116 
 in % 
n = 110 
in % 
Excellent 21.9 19.0 13.7 23.6 19.0 23.6 
Very good 26.6 26.7 28.2 23.6 24.1 23.6 
Good 22.7 21.6 29.9 29.1 23.3 24.5 
Fair 23.4 24.1 20.5 20.5 23.3 20.0 
Poor   5.5   8.6   7.7   3.1 10.3   8.2 
 
 
Table A.6c: Macedonian Cadets’ Assessment of Local Police Instructors’ Teaching Capabilities 
 
A.6c Please rate the teaching capabilities of the local Police Instructors 
Cadets in Macedonia 
 
 Teaching 
capability 
Language 
proficiency 
Capability 
to communi-
cate  
Motivation 
for work 
Readiness to 
solve ethnic 
problems in 
class 
Readiness to 
speak about 
problems after 
training 
 n = 95 
 in % 
n = 96 
in % 
n = 97 
 in % 
n = 90 
 in % 
n = 94 
 in % 
n = 95 
in % 
Excellent 61.1 79.2 73.2 70.0 60.6 70.5 
Very good 26.3   8.3 14.4 14.4 21.3 14.7 
Good   9.5   6.3 10.3 12.2 12.8 10.5 
Fair   2.1   3.1   2.1   1.1   3.2   3.2 
Poor   1.1   3.1   0.0   2.2   2.1   1.1 
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Table A.6d: Macedonian Officers’ Assessment of Local Police Instructors’ Teaching Capabilities 
 
A.6d Please rate the teaching capabilities of the local Police Instructors 
Officers in Macedonia 
 
 Teaching 
capability 
Language 
proficiency 
Capability 
to communi-
cate  
Motivation 
for work 
Readiness to 
solve ethnic 
problems in 
class 
Readiness to 
speak about 
problems after 
training 
 n = 85 
 in % 
n = 85 
in % 
n = 84 
 in % 
n = 86 
 in % 
n = 85 
 in % 
n = 84 
in % 
Excellent 32.9 43.5 42.9 38.4 32.9 36.9 
Very good 30.6 22.4 22.6 20.9 14.1 11.9 
Good 23.5 24.7 21.4 20.9 30.6 27.4 
Fair 10.6   7.1 10.7 16.3 15.3 13.1 
Poor   2.4   2.4   2.4   3.5   7.1 10.7 
 
 
Table A.6e: South Serbian Officers’ Assessment of Local Police Instructors’ Teaching Capabilities 
 
A.6e Please rate the teaching capabilities of the local Police Instructors 
Officers in South Serbia 
 
 Teaching 
capability 
Language 
proficiency 
Capability 
to communi-
cate  
Motivation 
for work 
Readiness to 
solve ethnic 
problems in 
class 
Readiness to 
speak about 
problems after 
training 
 n = 113 
 in % 
n = 113 
in % 
n = 112 
 in % 
n = 111 
 in % 
n = 110 
 in % 
n = 111 
in % 
Excellent 54.0 54.9 45.5 40.5 40.9 44.1 
Very good 18.6 15.9 19.6 32.4 27.3 20.7 
Good 15.0 12.4 23.2 18.9 17.3 19.8 
Fair   8.0   7.1   6.3   6.3   9.1   5.4 
Poor   4.4   9.7   5.4   1.8   5.5   9.9 
 
 
Table A.7: OSCE Instructors’ Assessment of the Sufficiency of Basic Training Resources 
 
A.7 Please rate the sufficiency of basic training resources 
 Kosovo Macedonia 
 OSCE Instructors OSCE Instructors 
 Personnel Resources Material Resources Personnel Resources Material Resources 
 n = 23, in % n = 25, in % n = 6, in % n = 6, in % 
Sufficient 
 
39.1 56.0 33.3 33.3 
Moderately 
sufficient 
60.9 36.0 33.3 50.0 
Insufficient 
 
  0.0   8.0 33.3 16.7 
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Table A.11:  Assessment of Social Climate in Classes and at Police Stations by International 
Instructors and Monitors 
 
A.11 How would you describe the interethnic climate in the classes and at the police stations? 
 Kosovo Macedonia 
 OSCE Instructors UN Monitors OSCE Instructors EU Monitors 
 n = 29, in % n = 54, in % n = 6, in % n = 30, in % 
Antagonistic   0.0   3.7   0.0   0.0 
Tense   3.4   3.7   0.0   6.7 
Uncomfortable   3.4 18.5   0.0 20.0 
Acceptable 51.7 42.6 33.3 46.6 
Co-operative 31.1 22.2 50.0 20.0 
Friendly 10.4   9.3 16.7   6.7 
 
 
Table A.12a:  Assessment of Social Climate in Classes by Local Cadets 
 
A.12a How would you describe the social climate between the ethnic Serbian and Albanian/ethnic 
Macedonian and Albanian groups within in your class? 
 Kosovo Macedonia South Serbia 
 Cadets  Cadets  Officers 
 n = 54, in % n = 94, in % n = 121, in % 
Antagonistic   1.9   3.2   0.0 
Tense   0.0   3.2   1.7 
Uncomfortable   1.9   5.3   1.7 
Acceptable 27.8 10.6 23.1 
Co-operative 38.9 43.6 44.6 
Friendly 29.6 34.1 28.9 
 Alban. 
n = 45 
Serbs 
n = 6 
Others 
n = 3 
Maced. 
n = 43 
Alban. 
n = 50 
Others 
n = 1 
Serbs 
n = 44 
Alban. 
n = 77 
 in % in % in % in % in % in % in % in % 
Antagonistic   0.0 16.9   0.0   2.3   4.0    0.0   0.0   0.0 
Tense   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   6.0    0.0   4.5   0.0 
Uncomfortable   0.0 16.9   0.0   9.3   2.0    0.0   2.3   1.3 
Acceptable 29.0   0.0 66.6 14.0   8.0    0.0 25.0 22.1 
Co-operative 44.4   0.0 33.4 25.6 58.0 100.0 38.6 48.0 
Friendly 26.6 66.2   0.0 48.8 22.0    0.0 29.6 28.6 
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Table A.12b:  Assessment of Social Climate in Classes by Local Officers 
 
A.12b How would you describe the social climate between the ethnic Serbian and Albanian/ethnic 
Macedonian and Albanian groups within in your class? 
 Kosovo Macedonia South Serbia 
 Officers  Officers  Officers 
 n = 175, in % n = 94, in % n = 121, in % 
Antagonistic   0.6   0.0   0.0 
Tense 10.3   7.4   1.7 
Uncomfortable   8.0   5.3   1.7 
Acceptable 35.4 37.2 23.1 
Co-operative 36.6 30.9 44.6 
Friendly   9.1 19.2 28.9 
 Alban. 
n = 81 
Serbs 
n = 67 
Others 
n = 27 
Maced. 
n = 34 
Alban. 
n = 50 
Others 
n = 10 
Serbs 
n = 44 
Alban. 
n = 77 
 in % in % in % in % in % in % in % in % 
Antagonistic   0.0   1.5   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Tense   4.0 18.0 11.1   2.9 10.0 10.0   4.5   0.0 
Uncomfortable   6.0 10.4   7.5   2.9   8.0   0.0   2.3   1.3 
Acceptable 47.0 22.4 33.3 41.2 36.0 30.0 25.0 22.1 
Co-operative 36.0 37.3 37.0 26.5 34.0 30.0 38.6 48.0 
Friendly   7.0 10.4 11.1 26.5 12.0 30.0 29.6 28.6 
 
 
Table A.12c:  Assessment of Social Climate in Classes by Local Cadets and Officers 
 
A.12c How would you describe the social climate between the ethnic Serbian and Albanian/ethnic 
Macedonian and Albanian groups within in your class? 
 Kosovo Macedonia South Serbia 
 Cadets + Officers Cadets + Officers Officers 
 n = 229, in % n = 188, in % n = 121, in % 
Antagonistic   0.9   1.6   0.0 
Tense   7.9   5.3   1.7 
Uncomfortable   6.6   5.3   1.7 
Acceptable 33.6 24.0 23.1 
Co-operative 37.0 37.2 44.6 
Friendly 14.0 26.6 28.9 
 Alban. 
n = 126 
Serbs 
n = 73 
Others 
n = 30 
Maced. 
n = 77 
Alban. 
n = 100 
Others 
n = 11 
Serbs 
n = 44 
Alban. 
n = 77 
 in % in % in % in % in % in % in % in % 
Antagonistic   0.0   2.7   0.0   1.3   2.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Tense   2.3 16.5 10.0   1.3   8.0   9.0   4.5   0.0 
Uncomfortable   4.0 10.9   6.6   6.4   5.0   0.0   2.3   1.3 
Acceptable 40.5 20.5 36.7 26.0 22.0 27.0 25.0 22.1 
Co-operative 38.9 34.3 36.7 26.0 46.0 36.0 38.6 48.0 
Friendly 14.3 15.1 10.0 39.0 17.0 27.0 29.6 28.6 
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Table A.13a:  Assessment of Ethnically Motivated Problems in Classes by Local Cadets 
 
A.13a During the training, did you recognize ethnically motivated problems in your class? 
 Kosovo Macedonia South Serbia 
 Cadets Cadets Officers 
 n = 57, in % n = 97, in % n = 119, in % 
Yes   3.5   8.2 10.9 
No 96.5 91.8 89.1 
 Alban. 
n = 49 
Serbs 
n = 6 
Others 
n = 2 
Maced. 
n = 43 
Alban. 
n = 53 
Others 
n = 1 
Serbs 
n = 44 
Alban. 
n = 75 
 in % in % in % in % in % in % in % in % 
Yes     0.0 33.3     0.0 15.6   5.7     0.0 25.0   2.7 
No 100.0 66.7 100.0 84.4 94.3 100.0 75.0 97.3 
 
 
Table A.13b:  Assessment of Ethnically Motivated Problems in Classes by Local Officers 
 
A.13b During the training, did you recognize ethnically motivated problems in your class? 
 Kosovo Macedonia South Serbia 
 Officers Officers Officers 
 n = 152, in % n = 82, in % n = 119, in % 
Yes 21.1  19.5 10.9 
No 78.9  80.5 89.1 
 Alban. 
n = 81 
Serbs 
n = 67 
Others 
n = 4 
Maced. 
n = 22 
Alban. 
n = 51 
Others 
n = 9 
Serbs 
n = 44 
Alban. 
n = 75 
 in % in % in % in % in % in % in % in % 
Yes   2.5 41.8 50.0   9.1 23.5 22.2 25.0   2.7 
No 97.5 58.2 50.0 90.9 76.5 77.8 75.0 97.3 
 
 
Table A.13c:  Assessment of Ethnically Motivated Problems in Classes by Local Cadets and Officers 
 
A.13c During the training, did you recognize ethnically motivated problems in your class? 
 Kosovo Macedonia South Serbia 
 Cadets + Officers Cadets + Officers Officers 
 n = 209, in % n = 179, in % n = 119, in % 
Yes 16.3 13.4 10.9 
No 83.7 86.6 89.1 
 Alban. 
n = 130 
Serbs 
n = 73 
Others 
n = 6 
Maced. 
n = 65 
Alban. 
n = 104 
Others 
n = 10 
Serbs 
n = 44 
Alban. 
n= 75 
 in % in % in % in % in % in % in % in % 
Yes   1.5 41.1 33.3 10.8 14.4 20.0 25.0   2.7 
No 98.5 58.9 66.7 89.2 85.6 80.0 75.0 97.3 
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Table A.14:  Assessment by Local Cadets and Officers of Social Contact after Training Sessions 
between Cadets of Different Ethnic Groups  
 
A.14 Do/Did you have social contact with cadets belonging to other ethnic groups after training 
sessions? 
 Kosovo Macedonia South Serbia 
 Cadets  Officers Cadets+ 
Officers 
Cadets Officers Cadets + 
Officers 
Officers 
 n = 54 
in % 
n = 172 
in % 
n = 226 
in % 
n = 97 
in % 
n = 89 
in % 
n = 186 
in % 
n = 122 
in % 
Yes  94.4 91.9 92.6 95.9 93.3 94.6  89.3 
No    5.6   8.1   7.4   4.1   6.7   5.4  10.7 
 
 
Table A.15: Assessment of the Conveyability of the Principles of Democratic Police Reform and 
Community Policing to Former Combatants by International Instructors and Monitors 
 
A.15 Do you believe the spirit and principles of democratic police reform and 
 community policing can be conveyed to former combatants? 
 Kosovo Macedonia 
 OSCE Instructors UN Monitors EU Monitors 
 n = 30, in % n = 53, in % n = 30, in % 
Yes  33.3 47.2 53.3 
Only certain 
aspects 
  3.3 13.2   6.7 
No   13.4 24.5 30.0 
Don’t know  50.0 15.1 10.0 
 
 
Table A.16: Local Officers’ Perception of the Threat to the Efficient Functioning of the Multi-Ethnic 
Police Emanating from Former Combatants Incorporated into the Police  
 
A.16 Does the incorporation of former combatants into police represent a threat to the efficient 
functioning of the multi-ethnic police? 
 Kosovo Macedonia South Serbia 
 Officers Officers Officers 
 n = 168, in % n = 97, in % n = 118, in % 
Yes  11.9 20.0 11.9 
No   53.0 46.3 55.1 
Don’t know  35.1 33.7 33.1 
 Alban. 
n = 76 
Serbs 
n = 65 
Others 
n = 27 
Maced. 
n = 36 
Alban. 
n = 51 
Others 
n = 8 
Serbs 
 n = 43 
Alban. 
n = 75  
 in % in % in % in % in % in % in % in % 
Yes    6.6 16.9 14.8 27.8 15.7 12.5 23.3   5.3 
No  71.0 32.3 51.9 33.3 51.0 75.0 41.9 62.7 
Don’t know  22.4 50.8 33.1 38.9 33.3 12.5 34.8 32.0 
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Table A.17:  Local Officers’ Assessment of Social Climate in Multi-Ethnic Units and at 
Police Stations 
  
A.17 How would you describe the social climate between ethnic Serbian and Albanian/ethnic 
Macedonian and Albanian groups in your unit/at your station? 
 Kosovo Macedonia South Serbia 
 Officers (n = 142, in %) Officers (n = 91, in %) Officers (n = 116, in %) 
Antagonistic   0.0   1.1   0.0 
Tense   2.8   3.2   0.9 
Uncomfortable   3.5   2.3   5.1 
Acceptable 32.4 27.5 24.1 
Co-operative 44.4 37.4 33.6 
Friendly 16.9 28.6 36.3 
 Alban. 
n = 69 
Serbs 
n = 63 
Others 
n = 10 
Maced. 
n = 34 
Alban. 
n = 47 
Others 
n = 10 
Serbs 
n = 43 
Alban. 
n = 73 
 in % in % in % in % in % in % in % in % 
Antagonistic   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   2.1   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Tense   0.0   6.3   0.0   2.8   4.3   0.0   2.0   0.0 
Uncomfortable   2.9   4.8   0.0   2.8   2.1   0.0   0.0   8.2 
Acceptable 33.3 31.8 30.0 32.5 23.4 30.0 37.1 16.4 
Co-operative 50.7 36.5 50.0 29.4 46.8 20.0 14.2 45.2 
Friendly 13.1 20.6 20.0 32.5 21.3 50.0  46.7 30.2 
 
 
Table A.18:  Local Officers’ Assessment of Ethnically Motivated Problems in Multi-Ethnic Units and 
at Police Stations 
 
A.18 Have your ever recognized ethnically motivated problems within your police unit/station? 
 Kosovo Macedonia South Serbia 
 Officers (n = 170, in %)  Officers (n = 97, in %) Officers (n = 117, in %) 
Yes  13.5 13.1 13.7 
No  86.5 86.9 86.3 
 Alban. 
n = 80 
Serbs 
n = 63 
Others 
n = 27 
Maced. 
n = 36 
Alban. 
n = 51 
Others 
n = 10 
Serbs 
n = 42 
Alban. 
n = 75 
 in % in % in % in % in % in % in % in % 
Yes    6.3 19.0 22.0   5.6 19.6   0.0 19.0 10.7 
No  93.7 81.0 78.0 94.4 80.4 100.0 81.0 89.3 
 
 
Table A.19:  Local Officers’ Assessment of Social Contact between Officers of Different Ethnic 
Groups after Duty 
 
A.19 Do you have social contact with colleagues belonging to other ethnic groups after duty? 
 Kosovo Macedonia South Serbia 
 Officers  Officers  Officers  
 n = 170, in % n = 99, in % n = 117, in % 
Yes     70.3 82.8 82.1 
No     29.7                      17.2 17.9 
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Table A.22: Assessment of the Biggest Obstacles for the Creation of Multi-Ethnic, Accountable, 
Competent, and Democratic Police Forces in Kosovo and Macedonia by International 
Instructors and Monitors 
 
A.22 What are the biggest obstacles to creating a multi-ethnic, accountable, competent, and 
democratic police force in Kosovo and Macedonia? 
 Kosovo Macedonia 
 OSCE Instructors UN Monitors OSCE Instructors EU Monitors 
 n = 30, in % n = 54, in % n = 6, in % n = 33, in % 
Influence of political 
parties and groups 55.6 64.2 66.7 88.9 
Influence of ethnic 
communities 66.7 62.3 33.3 74.1 
Low acceptance of the 
multi-ethnic police by 
the local population 18.5 39.6 0.0 22.2 
Low salaries of  police 
officers, influencing the 
moral and cultivating 
corruption 74.1 69.8 60.0 96.3 
Influence of organized 
crime 48.1 30.2 20.0 76.9 
Inappropriate 
legislation 44.4 34.0 20.0 65.4 
Insufficient training of 
the multi-ethnic police 3.7 26.4 16.7 70.4 
 
 
Table A.23: Assessment of the Biggest Obstacles for the Creation of Multi-Ethnic, Accountable, 
Competent, and Democratic Police Forces in Kosovo, Macedonia and South Serbia by 
Local Officers 
 
A.23 What are the biggest obstacles for the creation of a multi-ethnic, accountable, competent, and 
democratic police force in Kosovo,  Macedonia and South Serbia? 
 Kosovo Macedonia South Serbia 
 Officers Officers Officers 
 n = 170, in % n = 93, in % n = 122, in % 
Influence of political parties and groups 37.5 79.0 30.0 
Influence of ethnic communities 38.4 30.3 16.5 
Low acceptance of the multi-ethnic police by 
the local population 28.6 43.2 25.8 
Low salaries of  police officers, influencing 
the moral and cultivating corruption 58.9 54.3 57.0 
Influence of organized crime 33.9 55.6 31.5 
Inappropriate legislation 24.1 46.8 30.8 
Insufficient training of the multi-ethnic police 12.5 38.7 27.4 
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Table A.24: Local Officers’ Exposure to Bribery Attempts 
 
A.24 Have you ever been exposed to bribery attempts with respect to your work? 
 Kosovo Macedonia South Serbia 
 Officers Officers Officers 
 n = 173, in % n = 102, in % n = 119, in % 
Yes   8.7 29.4 16.8 
No 91.3 70.6 82.2 
 
 
Table A.25: International Monitors’ Awareness of Cases of Attempted Bribery, in which Local Police 
Officers of their Station were Involved 
 
A.25 Have you ever learned of cases of attempted bribery, in which local police officers of your 
station were involved? 
 Kosovo Macedonia 
 UNMIK Police  Monitors EUPOL Proxima Monitors 
 n = 54, in % n = 27, in % 
Yes  14.8 29.6 
No   85.2 70.4 
 
 
Table A.26: International Monitors’ Awareness of Exclusive Structures of Loyalty within the Multi-
Ethnic Units Based on Ethnic Identity 
 
A.26 Have you ever recognized exclusive structures of loyalty within the multi-ethnic units, which 
were based on ethnic identity? 
 Kosovo Macedonia 
 UNMIK Police  Monitors EUPOL Proxima Monitors 
 n = 50, in % n = 28, in % 
Yes  40.0 17.9 
No   60.0 82.1 
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